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Einleitung
Zahlreiche Finanzprodukte für Privatinvestoren enthalten heutzutage vorzeitige Kündi-
gungs- oder Rückzahlungsoptionen, welche dem Investor das Recht geben, bereits vor Ablauf
der vereinbarten Laufzeit seine Anlage zurückzufordern oder seine Schulden vorzeitig (zumin-
dest teilweise) zu tilgen. Klassische Beispiele für solche Produkte sind Bundesschatzbriefe, Hy-
pothekenkredite oder auch Festgeldkonten mit Sonderkündigungsrechten. Ein derartiges ver-
traglich vereinbartes Recht erhöht offensichtlich die Flexibilität und damit die Sicherheit des
Investors, erschwert jedoch gleichzeitig die Beurteilung und Bewertung solcher Finanzanlagen
auf Seiten der Gegenpartei. Die klassische Optionspreistheorie hat in diesem Zusammenhang
verschiedene Modelle entwickelt, um vorzeitige Kündigungsrechte aus finanzmathematischer
Sicht fair – also ohne Arbitragemöglichkeiten – zu bewerten. Eine wesentliche Annahme in
diesen Modellen ist jedoch grundsätzlich, dass die beteiligten Parteien das Kündigungsrecht
an dem theoretisch optimalen Zeitpunkt in Anspruch nehmen.
Aus empirischer Sicht scheint diese Annahme schwer haltbar zu sein. So weisen Studien
auf Aktienmärkten darauf hin,1 dass Investoren vorzeitige Kündigungsrechte überwiegend
“suboptimal” einsetzen. Insbesondere zeigt sich, dass Investoren regelmäßig finanziell attrak-
tive vorzeitige Ausübungsmöglichkeiten ungenutzt verstreichen lassen. Vielmehr nehmen sie
ihr Optionsrecht zumeist an einem aus finanzmathematischer Sicht zu späten Zeitpunkt in
1Untersuchungen über die Ausübung von Optionsrechten im amerikanischen Aktienmarkt finden sich bei-
spielsweise bei Diz und Finucane (1993), Overdahl und Martin (1994), Dawson (1996), Finucane (1997),
Poteshman und Serbin (2003), Pool et al. (2008) und Barraclough und Whaley (2012). Ähnliche Untersuchun-
gen für den schwedischen Markt finden sich bei Engström et al. (2002), für den chinesischen Markt bei Liao
et al. (2013).
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Anspruch oder vernachlässigen es sogar bis zum Ende der Laufzeit komplett, obwohl eine
vorzeitige Ausübung ihnen einen finanziellen Vorteil gebracht hätte. Weitere suboptimale
Entscheidungen sind offensichtlich auch zu frühe Ausstiege von Investoren, also an Zeitpunk-
ten, an denen der Fortführungswert des jeweiligen Produktes den Ausübungswert (noch)
übersteigt.
Es ist jedoch festzustellen, dass sich die skizzierte Forschung nahezu ausschließlich auf
den US-amerikanischen Markt und auf wenige ausgewählte Aktienderivate konzentriert. Die
Nutzung vergleichbarer Kündigungsrechte im sehr viel größeren Markt der strukturierten
Zinsprodukte ist – mit Ausnahme des Hypothekengeschäfts2 – kaum erforscht. Gleichzeitig
liefert die aktuelle Literatur auch nur vereinzelt Erkenntnisse über das Ausübungsverhalten
bestimmter Investorengruppen. So ist beispielsweise nur wenig über die Strategien der spe-
zifischen Gruppe von Privatinvestoren bekannt, obwohl für diese – unter Berücksichtigung
der vermeintlich weniger fundierten Kapitalmarktkenntnisse und des vermeintlich geringeren
Zeit- und Ressourceneinsatzes im Vergleich zu professionellen Großinvestoren – ein subopti-
males Anlageverhalten besonders naheliegend erscheint.
An dieser Stelle setzt die vorliegende Arbeit an. Drei Essays untersuchen, wie Privatinves-
toren vorzeitige Kündigungsrechte in strukturierten Zinsprodukten nutzen. Als Grundlage für
die Analyse dient hierbei ein neuartiger, nicht öffentlich verfügbarer Datensatz, der über einen
Zeitraum von circa 13 Jahren Entscheidungen von mehr als 800.000 Privatinvestoren über
ein weiteres Halten oder eine vorzeitige Kündigung von Putable Bonds (Bundesschatzbriefen)
abbildet. Das Ziel der Arbeit ist es, das Verständnis von finanziellen Entscheidungsstrategi-
en von Privatinvestoren theoretisch und empirisch zu erweitern sowie mögliche Unterschiede
innerhalb dieser Investorengruppe und im Vergleich zu anderen Kapitalmarktakteuren zu
2Untersuchungen zur Nutzung von impliziten Rückgaberechten im Hypothekengeschäft finden sich bei-
spielsweise bei Schwartz und Toruos (1989), Stanton (1995) und Kalotay (2004).
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identifizieren. Darüber hinaus soll die Arbeit mögliche Handlungsfelder für Emittenten und
Banken, welche vergleichbare Finanzprodukte anbieten, aufzeigen.
Der inhaltliche Schwerpunkt der drei Essays orientiert sich an dieser Zielsetzung. Zu
Beginn wird in einem ersten Beitrag ein neues Modell zur Abbildung und Bewertung von
Entscheidungsstrategien für Optionsrechte aus Sicht eines Investors entwickelt und an empi-
rische Daten kalibriert.3 Als wesentlicher neuer Beitrag zur Literatur wird in diesem Modell
die Annahme einer kontinuierlichen Entscheidungsfindung durch den Investor aufgegeben
und stattdessen endogen eine optimale Entscheidungsstrategie ermittelt, die potentiell auf-
tretende Transaktions- und Entscheidungskosten berücksichtigt. Der Schwerpunkt des zwei-
ten Beitrags liegt auf einer detaillierten empirischen Analyse der Nutzung von vorzeitigen
Rückgaberechten in Putable Bonds durch Privatinvestoren.4 Erstmals in der Literatur wer-
den hierbei auch Unterschiede in der ökonomischen Nutzung solcher Kündigungsrechte in
Abhängigkeit von persönlichen Eigenschaften des Investors beleuchtet – beispielsweise dif-
ferenziert nach Alter, Geschlecht, Wohnort und vorheriger Investitionserfahrung. Schließlich
untersucht der dritte Beitrag den Einfluss der Kuponstruktur von Putable Bonds. Auf Basis
von Simulationsrechnungen und Szenarioanalysen wird diskutiert, wie Emittenten durch spe-
zifische Produktgestaltungen finanzielle Vorteile in Bezug auf die empirisch zu beobachtenden
Ausübungsmuster von Privatinvestoren generieren können.
Wie bereits angedeutet, befasst sich der erste Essay dieser Arbeit (“Individual Investors
and Suboptimal Early Exercises in the Fixed-Income Market”) mit einem neuen theoreti-
schen Modell zur Bewertung von Optionsrechten aus Sicht eines Investors. Aufbauend auf
3Dieses Kapitel entspricht nach Absprache mit dem Betreuer dem Working Paper “Individual Investors
and Suboptimal Early Exercises in the Fixed-Income Market”, welches in Ko-Autorenschaft mit Oliver Entrop
und Marco Wilkens entstanden ist.
4Dieses Kapitel entspricht nach Absprache mit dem Betreuer dem Working Paper “What Makes Individual
Investors Exercise Early? Empirical Evidence from the Fixed-Income Market”, welches in Ko-Autorenschaft
mit Oliver Entrop und Marco Wilkens entstanden ist.
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dem klassischen risiko-neutralen Bewertungsansatz in der Optionspreistheorie steht im Mit-
telpunkt dieses neuen Ansatzes die endogene Bestimmung einer zeitpunktspezifischen op-
timalen Entscheidungs- und Ausübungsstrategie unter Berücksichtigung von Transaktions-
und Entscheidungskosten. Die ökonomische Intuition hinter der modellierten Entscheidungs-
findung ist hierbei, dass ein Investor, der aktuell ein Finanzprodukt mit einem vorzeitigen
Kündigungsrecht hält, dessen Fortführungswert weit oberhalb des aktuellen Ausübungswertes
liegt, typischerweise nicht sofort im nächsten Zeitpunkt eine erneute Entscheidung über ein
weiteres Halten oder eine vorzeitige Ausübung des Produktes treffen wird. Vielmehr wird er
eine gewisse Zeit verstreichen lassen, bevor er in eine solche neue Entscheidung “investiert”.
Im Gegensatz ist zu erwarten, dass der gleiche Investor in der Regel schon nach sehr viel
kürzerer Zeit sein Investment erneut bewerten wird, falls der aktuelle Produktwert sehr nahe
an dem Ausübungswert liegt.
In der Folge legt dieser erste Beitrag dar, dass derartige nicht-kontinuierliche Entschei-
dungsstrategien zu einem verminderten Wert des Ausübungsrechtes aus Sicht des Investors
führen. Komparative statische Analysen verdeutlichen, dass die Gründe für den sinkenden
Optionswert in einer geringeren optimalen Entscheidungsfrequenz und einer längeren durch-
schnittlichen Zeitspanne zwischen zwei Entscheidungen über ein weiteres Halten oder Aus-
üben einer Position liegen. Es besteht das Risiko, potentiell ökonomisch attraktive Ausübungs-
möglichkeiten zu “überspringen” und somit zu verpassen. Eine empirische Kalibrierung des
Modells offenbart dementsprechend auch deutliche Unterschiede zwischen einer Bewertung
mit Standardmodellen aus der Literatur und einer Bewertung anhand des neu vorgestellten
Modellansatzes. Die geschätzten Modellparameter implizieren dabei, dass viele der unter-
suchten Privatinvestoren tatsächlich nicht-kontinuierlichen Entscheidungsstrategien folgen.
Weiterhin deuten die Kalibrierungsergebnisse darauf hin, dass ein Großteil der Privatinves-
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toren nur sehr träge auf geänderte Zinsumgebungen und damit auf neue Bewertungssitua-
tionen reagiert und dass es einen hohen Anteil von weitgehend passiven Investoren gibt, die
grundsätzlich attraktive Ausübungsentscheidungen auslassen – was mit sehr hohen Entschei-
dungskosten gleichzusetzen ist.
Der zweite Essay (“What Makes Individual Investors Exercise Early? Empirical Evidence
from the Fixed-Income Market”) ergänzt den modelltheoretisch geprägten ersten Teil um ei-
ne detaillierte empirische Untersuchung des Ausübungsverhaltens von Privatinvestoren für
Putable Bonds. Mit circa 31 Millionen analysierten monatlichen Entscheidungen über ein
weiteres Halten oder vorzeitiges Ausüben solcher Bonds bietet diese Studie eine größere De-
tailschärfe als die meisten vergleichbaren Studien in der Literatur. Die Untersuchung setzt
zwei Schwerpunkte: Der erste Abschnitt identifiziert Determinanten der vorzeitigen Rück-
gabe von Putable Bonds. In einem zweiten Abschnitt steht die ökonomische Bewertung der
empirischen Entscheidungsstrategien von Privatinvestoren im Vordergrund.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass nicht nur Bewertungsänderungen, sondern auch zahlreiche
weitere Einflussfaktoren, wie beispielsweise Wachstumsphasen im Aktienmarkt, die Dauer
bis zur nächsten Kuponauszahlung oder auch die Investmenthistorie die Wahrscheinlichkeit
einer vorzeitigen Kündigung von Putable Bonds determinieren. Zudem dokumentiert die Un-
tersuchung deutliche Unterschiede im Verhalten von Privatinvestoren in Abhängigkeit von
persönlichen Merkmalen. So nehmen zum Beispiel Investoren aus einer mittleren Altersklasse
von 20 bis 40 Jahren das vorzeitige Kündigungsrecht sehr viel öfter in Anspruch als Investoren
anderen Alters. Insgesamt lässt sich allerdings festhalten, dass – analog zu den angeführten
Untersuchungen für Aktienderivate – Privatinvestoren nur einen Bruchteil der aufkommen-
den ökonomisch attraktiven Ausübungsmöglichkeiten nutzen. Zudem ist die Mehrheit der
beobachteten Rückgaben von Putable Bonds aus theoretischer Sicht nicht sinnvoll. Der Um-
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fang der verpassten Chancen und suboptimalen Ausübungsentscheidungen ist hierbei sogar
deutlich höher als im Falle der eingangs erwähnten Aktienderivate, was in der Konsequenz
zu einer im Durchschnitt negativen Überschussrendite für viele Investoren führt.
In Summe deutet die Analyse des empirischen Ausübungsverhaltens darauf hin, dass eine
Steigerung der Investmentperformance nicht das alleinige Motiv hinter der Entscheidung von
Privatinvestoren für ein weiteres Halten oder Ausüben ihrer Positionen ist. Stattdessen schei-
nen der Bedarf nach Liquidität und der Bedarf nach finanzieller Flexbilität weitere treibende
Faktoren zu sein. Tatsächlich könnten Liquiditätsargumente einige ungewöhnliche Muster in
den empirischen Daten erklären. So liegt es beispielsweise nahe, dass bei Investoren mittleren
Alters ein Hauskauf oder eine Familiengründung zu einem höheren Liquiditätsbedarf führt.
Auch eine explorative Faktoranalyse, welche die konsolidierte Anlagestrategie von Investo-
ren auf einer individuellen Basis näher untersucht, impliziert, dass im Rahmen der Anlage-
und Ausübungsentscheidungen für Putable Bonds Liquiditäts- und Flexibilitätsargumente
für viele Privatinvestoren eine höhere Relevanz aufweisen als eine mögliche Verbesserung der
Investmentperformance.
Der dritte Essay (“Behavioral Financial Engineering in the Fixed-Income Market: The In-
fluence of the Coupon Structure”) untersucht, aufbauend auf den beiden vorherigen Beiträgen,
den Einfluss der Kuponstruktur auf die Anlage- und Ausübungsstrategie von Privatinvesto-
ren in Putable Bonds. Obwohl der Produktstruktur aus theoretischer Sicht regelmäßig eine
entscheidende Rolle bei der Entscheidungsfindung von Investoren zugebilligt wird, finden sich
in der Literatur bisher nur ausgesprochen vereinzelt Studien zur empirischen Bedeutung von
solch unterschiedlichen Produktmerkmalen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung führt jedoch nicht
nur zu neuen Erkenntnissen bezüglich einer bisher wenig erforschten Fragestellung, sondern
bietet auch praktische Implikationen für Emittenten und andere Finanzmarktintermediäre.
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So verdeutlichen die Ergebnisse, dass “Behavioral Financial Engineering”, also ein zielgrup-
penspezifisches Angebot bestimmter Produktstrukturen, das auf ein spezielles antizipierbares
Verhalten abzielt, zu deutlichen finanziellen Vorteilen führen kann.
Im Fokus der Analyse stehen drei Entscheidungssituationen von Privatinvestoren. Neben
dem Einfluss der Kuponstruktur auf die erstmaligen Investitionsentscheidungen wird der Ein-
fluss auf vorzeitige Ausübungsentscheidungen sowie auf Portfolioentscheidungen von Privat-
investoren untersucht. Als wesentliches Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass Produkte mit einer hohen
finalen Kuponzahlung und mit einer vergleichsweise kurzen gewichteten Kapitalbindungs-
dauer (Duration) stärker nachgefragt und länger gehalten werden als finanzmathematisch
gleichwertige Produkte, die lediglich eine andere, meist flachere, Kuponstruktur aufweisen.
Vergleichbare Zusammenhänge lassen sich im Rahmen von Portfolioentscheidungen beob-
achten. Diese Präferenz der Investoren für optisch vermeintlich attraktivere Angebote steht
offensichtlich nicht im Einklang mit der klassischen Finanztheorie, nach der nur der faire Wert
eines Produktes für eine Ausübungs- oder Halteentscheidung relevant ist. Stattdessen deutet
das empirische Verhalten von Privatinvestoren auf einen “Behavioral Bias” hin. Offenbar wird
Zinsprodukten mit einer steilen Kuponstruktur regelmäßig ein höherer Wert zugeschrieben
als vergleichbaren Produktangeboten.
In der Folge erörtert der dritte Beitrag, welche angebotenen Kuponstrukturen Vorteile
aus Sicht von Emittenten und anderen Finanzmarktakteuren bieten können. Hierzu wird im
Rahmen von Szenarioanalysen für eine Vielzahl von beispielhaft konstruierten Putable Bonds
und Zinsszenarien der faire Wert des jeweiligen Produktes mit einem geschätzten empirischen
Wert verglichen, welcher sich an den beobachteten Ausübungsstrategien von Privatinvesto-
ren orientiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Emittenten grundsätzlich auf zwei Arten von einer
gezielten Gestaltung der Kuponstruktur profitieren können. Zum einen ist für Bonds, die
7
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zum Laufzeitende steil ansteigende Kuponzahlungen und eine kurze durchschnittliche Kapi-
talbindungsdauer bieten, ein im Vergleich geringerer Mittelabfluss während der Laufzeit zu
erwarten, was dem Emittenten eine Reduzierung seiner Liquiditätsreserven ermöglicht. Zum
anderen implizieren die Simulationsergebnisse, dass sich die größte Differenz zwischen fairem
und empirischem Wert bei Putable Bonds mit einer konkaven oder flachen Kuponstruktur
ergibt. Der Grund ist, dass bei derartigen Produktstrukturen der theoretische Wert des Opti-
onsrechts in der Regel deutlich höher ist als bei Produkten, die über die Laufzeit ansteigende
Kuponzahlungen anbieten. Da Privatinvestoren – wie zuvor erläutert – ökonomisch optimale
Ausübungsgelegenheiten nur selten wahrnehmen, profitiert der Emittent von einer solchen
hohen Bewertung des vorzeitigen Kündigungsrechts.
Zusammenfassend verdeutlichen die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit, dass Privatinvestoren, die
strukturierte Zinsprodukte mit vorzeitigen Kündigungsrechten halten, empirisch regelmäßig
anderen Ausübungsstrategien folgen als in der klassischen Finanztheorie modelliert. Drei Be-
sonderheiten werden im Rahmen der folgenden Essays im Detail diskutiert. Erstens, durch
Entscheidungskosten induzierte nicht-kontinuierliche Entscheidungsstrategien können zu ei-
ner aus theoretischer Sicht suboptimalen Nutzung des vorzeitigen Kündigungsrechts führen.
Zweitens, neben der Steigerung der Investmentperformance scheinen weitere Motive, wie bei-
spielsweise die Nachfrage nach Liquidität und finanzieller Flexibilität, eine wichtige Rolle in
der Entscheidungsfindung von Privatinvestoren einzunehmen. Drittens, die Kuponstruktur
eines Putable Bonds kann die Entscheidung über ein weiteres Halten oder eine vorzeitige
Rückgabe beeinflussen. Als eine wesentliche Schlussfolgerung dieser Arbeit ergibt sich, dass
Anbieter von strukturierten Zinsprodukten für Privatinvestoren deutliche Vorteile aus einem
erweiterten Verständnis des Verhaltens dieser spezifischen Investorengruppe ziehen können.
Insbesondere können sie durch eine gezielte Produktgestaltung das überwiegend suboptimale
8
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Ausübungsverhalten von Privatinvestoren zu ihrem Vorteil nutzen und somit (unter anderem)
potentiell höhere Renditen realisieren.
9
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1 Introduction
The right to exercise or redeem early before maturity, is a common feature of many
investment and credit products for Individual Investors, such as savings bonds, stock and
index options, mortgages or other financial innovations. However, while Individual Investors’
trading and exercise behavior has been researched extensively with regard to stocks, equity
index options and mortgages, surprisingly little is known about Individual Investors’ use
of options and derivatives on fixed-income markets.1 This is particularly remarkable as
Individual Investors’ portfolios comprise interest-earning assets much more often than equity
products (for Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010; for the U.S.: United States Census
Bureau, 2010; for the U.K.: Office for National Statistics, 2012).
With this paper we aim to fill this gap in the current literature and present a theoretical
and empirical analysis of Individual Investors’ early exercise decisions in standard fixed-
income products. In doing so we make two major contributions. First, we develop a new
rational model to determine Individual Investors’ early exercise decisions within the stan-
dard framework of risk-neutral derivatives valuation. Second, we present, to the best of our
knowledge, the first comprehensive overview of Individual Investors’ empirical early exercise
decisions in putable bonds (German Federal Saving Notes) over a period of 13 years. Based
on this large and unique data set we calibrate and apply our model. Our results provide new
insights in Individual Investors’ exercise behavior and are—among others—highly relevant
for the risk and liquidity management of issuers of fixed-income products.
In general, it is well known in the literature that investors use early exercise rights “sub-
1As mentioned, a notable exception is the broad strand of literature about prepayment rights in mortgages
and mortgage-backed securities such as, e.g., Schwartz and Toruos (1989), Schwartz and Torous (1992) and
Deng et al. (2000), who propose reduced form models, and, e.g., Dunn and McConnel (1981a,b), Stanton
(1995) and Kalotay et al. (2004), who focus on structural models.
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optimally”. They commonly fail to follow the optimal strategy and forgo the theoretically
optimal exercise (e.g., Overdahl and Martin, 1994; Dawson, 1996; Pool et al., 2008; Barra-
clough and Whaley, 2012). Instead, a substantial number of investors exercise early but at a
time when it is not rational to do so, or they completely neglect the exercise right (e.g., Gay
et al., 1989; Diz and Finucane, 1993; Finucane, 1997; Engström et al., 2000; Poteshman and
Serbin, 2003; Liao et al., 2013). In addition, the literature provides some empirical evidence
that non-professional investors perform even more poorly in exploiting the option compo-
nent, compared to other market participants (e.g., Poteshman and Serbin, 2003; Barraclough
and Whaley, 2012). The main arguments—besides irrationality—for this suboptimal exercise
behavior are individual transaction costs (e.g., Stanton, 1995; Finucane, 1997; Koziol, 2006;
Pool et al., 2008), the costs of learning early exercise rules (e.g., Barraclough and Whaley,
2012; Liao et al., 2013), and the effort required to continuously monitor the investment (e.g.,
Gay et al., 1989; Stanton, 1995; Barraclough and Whaley, 2012; Liao et al., 2013). Regard-
ing transaction costs, it is argued that the premium for exercising early, i.e. the difference
between the exercise and the continuation value, must not only be positive for an investor
but actually exceed the transaction costs incurred. Consequently, an exercise right might be
used more seldom or differently than predicted by standard models with no frictions. Learn-
ing and monitoring costs are assumed to lead to non-continuous decision-making, which can
result in the neglect of ex-post attractive exercise opportunities and thus in suboptimal early
exercises.
Intuitively, in view of such costs, it is a more rational strategy for an investor holding a
far out of the money early exercise right to let some time pass by before he “invests” in the
next decision regarding holding or exercising, since the currently almost worthless option is
not expected to be in the money very soon. On the other hand, if the early exercise right is
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currently close to the money, the same investor will most likely decide to make the next deci-
sion on holding or exercising his option within a short time, because it is more probable that
a profitable early exercise opportunity will soon occur. Still, such rational decision strategies
have so far rarely been considered in the literature on early exercises of derivatives. Abel
et al. (2007), Abel et al. (2009) and Alvarez et al. (2012) investigate “rational inattention” and
the implications of “observation costs”, but focus on optimal portfolio choices and consump-
tion.2 Most related to our approach, Stanton (1995) proposes a rational prepayment model
for mortgage-backed securities, where mortgage holders do not re-evaluate their portfolio at
every possible time but only at random, discrete intervals. However, as a key innovation we
replace in our model Stanton’s random component with an endogenously determined, opti-
mal strategy. This optimal “decision strategy” defines when to make a decision on continuing
to hold or on exercising a financial derivative with an incorporated early exercise right. As
part of this strategy, we consider also potential transaction costs if the derivative is exercised
and additionally that costs may be incurred for each decision (“decision costs”) on holding
or exercising.
As a second contribution to the literature, we apply and calibrate our model on a large
and unique data set. Over a sample period from July 1996 to February 2009 we examine
about 880,000 early exercises of German Federal Saving Notes (GFSN), a simple fixed-income
product comparable to a putable bond. Focusing on GFSN allows us to analyze the isolated
early exercise behavior of Individual Investors nearly free of any distortions, since these prod-
ucts are almost exclusively sold to Individual Investors and cannot be traded on a secondary
market. This means that Individual Investors in GFSN only face the problem of deciding
whether to hold or exercise rather than holding, exercising or selling their position as in the
2A newer strand of literature on executive stock options such as Carpenter et al. (2010) concentrates also
on optimal exercise strategies that differ from standard models. Still, modeling a rational decision strategy is
not the focus of these studies.
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case of, e.g., stock options. Hence, in contrast to similar studies such as those by Potesh-
man and Serbin (2003) or Barraclough and Whaley (2012), who focus on early exercises of
exchange-traded options, we do not have to distinguish between different market participants
like institutional or retail investors, and can base our calibration on a more comprehensive
overview of Individual Investors’ early exercise decisions.
We observe a very good fit for our model, which we attribute to the endogenous de-
termination of the optimal exercise strategy that—in contrast to pure empirical approaches
(such as the reduced form models of Schwartz and Toruos, 1989; or Schwartz and Torous,
1992)—allows also to make rational predictions in changing economic environments, as also
pointed out by Stanton (1995). Moreover, we stress four findings from the calibration: first,
our results suggest that Individual Investors act heterogeneously, which is in line with the
observations of, e.g., Stanton (1995) for mortgage holders or Koziol (2006) for warrant hold-
ers, and with the general characterization of Individual Investors’ behavior by Barber and
Odean (2011). Second, a large number of Individual Investors act as if they face significant
transaction and decision costs. Third, many investors behave sluggishly, i.e. they do not ex-
ercise at the optimal exercise opportunity, but with a delay. Yet another significant group of
“passive investors” never make use of their early exercise option, even when it seems strongly
advantageous to do so, which is equivalent to very high transaction or decision costs. Fourth,
we identify a stable base exercise rate, independent of any market movements, and observe
some unusual peaks in the empirical data, which we attribute to both exogenous effects such
as need for liquidity or tax-induced early exercises. Based on our findings we conclude, like,
e.g., Poteshman and Serbin (2003) or Barraclough and Whaley (2012) in the case of equity
options, that Individual Investors’ early exercise decisions in the fixed-income market can
clearly differ from the decisions of institutional investors, which results in a present value
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advantage due to lower option costs for issuers. For our sample we estimate this difference
between the standard model value and the empirical value at more than 2%, which is in line
with the studies of Stanton (1995) or Koziol (2006), among others.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model
and investigate optimal decision and exercise strategies as related to transaction and decision
costs. Section 3 introduces our data set and presents summary statistics on the empirical early
exercises of Individual Investors. In Section 4, we calibrate the model, test the robustness of
our results and estimate the financial advantage for issuers derived from the diverging exercise
strategies of Individual Investors. Section 5 concludes and discusses policy implications.
2 Model
In the following, we consider a derivative with an American early exercise right, for which
payoff at early exercise is reduced by transaction costs and costs arise with every decision to
hold or exercise the derivative (“decision costs”). Since the latter implies that decision-making
is costly for an investor, a continuous decision-making strategy for holding or exercising is no
longer worthwhile. Instead, a rational investor defines after each decision based on all current
information at which upcoming point in time it would be best to make the next decision on
the derivative. This endogenous determination of the optimal “decision strategy” is a key
component of our model.
2.1 Model setup
We consider a continuous-time economy over the time period [0, T ]. Let
(

,F , (Ft)0≤t≤T , Q)
be a probability space equipped with a filtration (Ft)t fulfilling the usual conditions, i.e. it
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is right-continuous and complete. Q is the equivalent spot martingale measure where the
money market account serves as numéraire. The adapted short rate process is denoted by
r(t). We discretize time into equidistant time steps 0 = t0, ..., tN = T with ti+1 − ti = t.
Let T = {t0, ..., tN}.
The investor holds a derivative X whose payoff at maturity T is given by XT .3 Addi-
tionally, the derivative can be exercised early in t1, ..., tN−1 with a respective payoff Xti in
ti. Note that we do not have to specify the type of underlying (e.g., stock or bond) and
its dynamics. The only condition we require is that the payoff of the derivative Xti in ti is
Fti-measurable, i.e. given the information up to ti the early exercise payoff or final payoff on
the respective date is known, and integrable. Transaction and decision costs in ti are denoted
by TCti and DCti , respectively, and are also Fti-measurable and integrable.4
Decision strategy
Our first step is defining the points in time at which the investor decides to make a decision
on the exercise. We call a non-decreasing sequence   = ( n)n=0,...,N of (Fti)-stopping times

 → T a decision strategy and each  n a decision point, if the sequence fulfills the following
conditions:
 0 = 0, (1.1)
 n <  n+1 if  n ̸= tN , (1.2)
 n+1 is F n-measurable. (1.3)
3For the sake of brevity and ease of notation, we do not consider payoffs from the derivative here, such as
coupon payments from bonds, before exercise or maturity. However, these can easily be integrated.
4Transaction and decision costs can be expressed as a fixed sum or as a relative value. Throughout this
paper we work with absolute cost levels, however, our methodology can easily be applied with relative cost
definitions.
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Condition (1.1) simply means that we start today. Condition (1.2) says if a decision is made
at decision point  n the next decision point lies in the future, given that  n is not yet the
end of the considered period.5 In condition (1.3), F n is the σ-algebra associated with the
stopping time  n representing the information available at  n.6 This condition means that the
next decision point  n+1 is known at the decision point  n. For example, today the investor
determines the next decision point  1. Next, in  1 based on the available information at that
point in time, he determines  2, i.e. when to make the next decision, etc.
Exercise strategy
Given a decision strategy   , the derivative can only be exercised at the decision points  n
based on the information associated with  n, yielding a payoff of X n . Exercising the deriva-
tive therefore means stopping the process (X n)n. Based on the decision strategy   , we call
a function τ   : 
→ {1, ..., N} an exercise strategy if it is a (F n)-stopping time.
Strategy
The investor has to jointly choose both the decision and the exercise strategy. Therefore, we
call a pair
(
  , τ  
)
a strategy that consist of a decision strategy   and a respective exercise
strategy τ   . The point in time τ where the investor exercises the derivative is then given by:
τ =  τ   . (1.4)
Note that τ is an (Fti)-stopping time.7
5As   = ( n) is a non-decreasing sequence, condition 1.2 implies that if  n = tN the following decision
points  n+k also have the value tN . Note that these  n+k do not provide any new information and could be
omitted. However, allowing the sequence   to have always the same length simplifies notation here.
6I.e. F n = {A ∈ F : A ∩ { n ≤ ti} ∈ Fti for all ti ∈ T}.
7Note that any strategy determines via (1.4) a unique (Fti)-stopping time (up to null-sets). On the other
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Optimal strategy and value
Given a strategy
(
  , τ  
)
, the investor’s cash flow consists of the exercise or final payoff Xτ ,
the transaction costs TCτ and the decision costs DC n occurring at the decision points until
exercise or maturity, i.e. in  1, ...,  τ   . We define the sum of the discounted cash flows as
X(  ,τ   ):
X(  ,τ   ) = exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
r(s)ds
)
(Xτ − TCτ )−
τ  ∑
i=1
exp
(
−
∫  i
0
r(s)ds
)
DC i , (1.5)
where the first summand of (1.5) is the discounted payoff from the derivative minus the
transaction costs occurring from the exercise in τ =  τ   . The second summand represents
the discounted decision costs that result from the τ   decisions made until the early exercise
or maturity date in τ . Given a specific strategy
(
  , τ  
)
, standard pricing theory implies that
the “value” of the position equals EQ
(
X(  ,τ   )
)
.
The rational investor aims at choosing a strategy that maximizes his wealth position.
This means he chooses a strategy
(
  , τ  
)opt
such that:
EQ
(
X(  ,τ   )opt
)
= sup
(  ,τ   )
EQ
(
X(  ,τ   )
)
(1.6)
holds. Accordingly, we get V0 = EQ
(
X(  ,τ   )opt
)
as the value of the derivative in t = 0.
In Appendix A we prove the existence of an optimal strategy
(
  , τ  
)opt
, show how it
can be constructed and show that the value of the derivative can be calculated via backward
induction. We continue with a solution for the optimal strategy. First, we provide the results
on the construction of the value process Vti via backward induction:
hand, any (Fti)-stopping time τ can be represented via (1.4), for example by setting  n = tn and τ   = τ .
However, this representation is not necessarily unique as there may be different strategies inducing a specific
τ via (1.4).
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• In tN , i.e. at maturity, set:
VtN = XtN − TCtN −DCtN . (1.7)
• Let the value of the derivative be known for each tk > tn. Then the value in tn is:
Vtn =max (Xtn − TCtn , CVtn)−DCtn (1.8)
with CVtn = maxtk>tn
EQ
(
exp
(
−
∫ tk
tn
r(s)ds
)
Vtk
∣∣∣∣∣Ftn
)
, (1.9)
where CVtn is the “continuation value” in tn.
• In t0 = 0 set:
V0 = CV0. (1.10)
Based on this, the optimal strategy
(
  , τ  
)opt
can be constructed as follows:
• In t0 = 0 set:
 0 = 0. (1.11)
• Assume that the decision point  n has been constructed. Then the next decision point
is:
 n+1 =

min
(
ti >  n : CV n = EQ
(
exp
(
− ∫ ti n r(s)ds)Vti∣∣∣F n)) for  n < tN
tN for  n = tN .
(1.12)
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• The optimal exercise strategy is given by:
τ   = min ({i : X i − TC i ≥ CV i ,  i < tN} ∪ {i :  i = tN}) . (1.13)
As already stated, a formal proof can be found in Appendix A. In the following, we briefly
describe the procedure and provide economic intuition for the results.
Starting at maturity (1.7), the value of the derivative equals its payoff minus transaction
and decision costs. In our following analyses, we usually set these costs at zero, i.e. TCtN =
DCtN ≡ 0, which we find most plausible, as the payoff at maturity is usually not an investor’s
decision and as it is usually cost-free. For all other points in time tn, equation (1.8) shows
that the value equals the maximum of the immediate exercise payoff less transaction costs
Xtn−TCtn and the continuation value CVtn , i.e. the derivative value given it is not exercised
in tn, minus decision costs. This is a standard procedure in rational decision-making, also
applied in standard American option pricing theory: investors exercise a derivative if—and
only if—the immediate exercise value minus transaction costs is larger than the continuation
value. Note that while the transaction costs in tn influence the exercise decision in tn, the
decision costs in tn do not, as they occur anyway since a decision on the exercise is made.
The key difference of our model to standard American option pricing is the structure of the
continuation value CVtn (see 1.9) that equals the maximum of the conditional expectations
of discounted values in tk > tn: EQ
(
exp
(
− ∫ tktn r(s)ds)Vtk ∣∣∣Ftn). This is highly intuitive for
the following reason: let us assume the investor is in tn and he is not exercising the derivative,
which implies that he has to make another decision at the next decision point. As he aims
at maximizing his wealth, he will choose that tk as the next decision point that maximizes
the value of his position in tn. Note that the value of the derivative, given tk is the next
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decision point, is EQ
(
exp
(
− ∫ tktn r(s)ds)Vtk ∣∣∣Ftn), so that the investor will choose that tk
that maximizes this expression. This can also be seen in the structure of the optimal decision
strategy (1.12): the optimal next decision point is the first upcoming point in time when
the respective expected discounted value equals the continuation value. Finally, equation
(1.13) expresses that the derivative should be exercised at the first decision point at which
the exercise value minus transaction costs is not smaller than the continuation value or at
maturity.
It is clear that the optimal decision strategy strongly depends on decision costs. For
example, if the decision costs are very high at any point in time before maturity, it would be
optimal to forgo the early exercise opportunity and to choose maturity as the next decision
point. In this case the value of the derivative would equal the value of its European version.
If all decision costs are zero, i.e. decision-making is cost-free, it would be optimal for an
investor to make a decision at each point in time, as he might otherwise miss favorable
exercise opportunities by “skipping over” certain dates. This is also implied by our model,
as it is straightforward to show that in this case the maximum in (1.9) is always reached
in tn+1 so that the continuation value becomes CVtn = EQ
(
exp
(
− ∫ tn+1tn r(s)ds)Vtn+1∣∣∣Ftn)
implying  n+1 = tn+1 in (1.12). Here our procedure coincides with standard American option
pricing models.
We note that our methodology is not restricted to valuing and investigating fixed-income
investments of Individual Investors, as is the focus in the following. Based on the endogenous
determination of an optimal decision and exercise strategy, it is also possible to thoroughly
assess a wide range of derivatives with early exercise rights with relation to transaction and
decision costs, or other financial products where an endogenously modeled decision strategy
is required.
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2.2 Numerical example and comparative-static analyses
For illustration, we apply our model in the following to analyze a simple fixed-income
derivative under transaction and decision costs. We are mainly interested in the influence of
both costs on (i) the value of the derivative, on (ii) the optimal decision strategy, where we
investigate the average number of decisions and the average duration between two decision
points, and on (iii) the timing of early exercises. Furthermore, we examine the influence of
changes in the market environment (volatility) on these results.
We consider an exemplary putable bond with a maturity of 7 years and a notional amount
of 1 that promises a yearly coupon of 5%, where coupons are accrued and paid at maturity.
In addition, an investor has an early exercise right. In case of early exercise x.y years after
issuance, he receives the notional amount plus accrued interest, i.e. the exercise value is given
by 1.05x + 0.05y.8
The short rate process r(t) in this numerical exercise is given by the 1-factor-model of Hull
and White (1990), i.e. dr(t) = κ(θ(t)−r(t))dt+σdW (t), where κ is the mean reversion speed,
σ the short rate volatility, W (t) a standard Brownian motion and θ(t) defined according to
Hull and White (1994) to fit the current term structure (see, e.g., Brigo and Mercurio (2006)
for implementation details). In our standard scenario we set κ = 20%, σ = 2.5% and assume
the term structure to be flat at 5%. The latter implies that the hold-to-maturity value of the
bond, i.e. the value of the bond without option, equals par, so the value of the derivative can
be no less than 1. We consider possible transaction costs between 0% and 12% and decision
costs between 0% and 2.5%, but assume that both costs are constant for an investor over
time and that these costs do not occur at maturity.
8This profile is a simplified version of the type of bonds (Type B GFSN) we analyze empirically in Section
3.
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The valuation according to (1.7) to (1.10) is carried out via Monte-Carlo simulation
with 10,000 runs for each cost combination and a step size of t = 1/12, i.e. we allow
for 84 time steps until maturity using Euler discretization of the short rate process. To
compute the conditional risk-neutral expectation values in (1.9), we basically follow the least
square Monte-Carlo approach proposed by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001).9 However, in
contrast to Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) we determine at each step not only the conditional
expectation values for the next point in time, but perform regressions for all upcoming steps
until maturity, so that we can identify the time point with the respective highest conditional
expectation value.10 To reduce a potential upward bias in our results (see for details Broadie
and Glasserman, 1997), we apply the interleaving estimator as introduced by Longstaff and
Schwartz (2001) and described in detail in Glasserman (2004).
Figure 1 presents the valuation results dependent on transaction and decision costs.
[Figure 1 about here.]
As expected, we find the highest value for our derivative with approximately 1.06 in case of
zero transaction and decision costs. Hence, the early exercise right has a value of 1.06− 1 =
0.06, which coincides with the results from standard valuation models. On the other end,
with very high transaction and decision costs, the bond value falls to 1, which means the
early exercise right is worthless. For transaction and decision costs between these extremes
we recognize in general a strong negative impact of both costs on the valuation, whereby the
results are more sensitive regarding changes in decision costs. The first economic intuition
is that under transaction and decision costs an investor receives only a reduced payoff at
an early exercise and must furthermore account for the cumulated decision costs arising at
9A detailed analysis of this method is provided in Clément et al. (2002).
10As basis function for the regression we choose the first four monomials and a constant. Testing different
forms of basis function, we find that this choice performs best regarding efficiency and robustness.
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each decision. Consequently, there is a trade-off after every decision between “investing” very
soon in another decision on further holding or exercising the bond and alternatively waiting
some time but risking missing out on ex-post attractive exercise opportunities. Naturally, an
investor chooses here the strategy, as described in (1.12), that maximizes the value of the early
exercise right. To make the effect of transaction and decision costs on this strategy and thus
eventually also on the valuation more obvious, we compare the average number of decisions
(Figure 2) and the average duration between two decision points (“decision interval”, Figure
3) on the optimal decision strategy.11
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
Beginning again with the case of zero transaction and decision costs, we observe very frequent
decisions until the bond is exercised or redeemed12 and an average decision interval that lies
at approximately 1.0 step. Highly plausible, this implies a de facto continuous decision
strategy. It is most to the advantage of an investor to make a decision at every possible
point in time, which results in the highest value of the exercise right, as seen before. Higher
transaction and, in particular, decision costs induce a more selective optimal decision strategy
and a lower average number of decisions. Accordingly, the mean decision interval widens with
higher costs, i.e. the investor allows on average more time to pass by before he makes a new
decision on his investment. This is reasonable, because if, for example, the early exercise
right is currently out of the money, the next potentially attractive exercise point—i.e. the
point in time where the option is so deep in the money that it can also account for incurring
11The respective averages are calculated under the risk-neutral measure Q over all simulated paths.
12Compared to the theoretical maximum of 84 decisions, the average number of decisions is relatively low
here, which is mainly due to the assumed significant volatility combined with a long maturity of 7 years, a
situation that facilitates many early exercises.
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transaction and decision costs—tends to be at a later point in time than without these costs.
Overall, the lower average number of decisions and the wider decision interval comprehend
and amplify the negative effect of transaction and decision costs on the value, since possibly
lucrative exercise opportunities might be skipped over and thus the advantage of the option is
reduced. Finally, in the case of very high transaction and decision costs, the average number
of decisions approaches 1 and the decision interval converges to the bond’s maturity (84
months). The possible premium of early exercising is not expected to exceed the incurring
costs at any time and it is optimal for the investor to fully neglect his exercise right and to
simply hold the bond until maturity. Hence, the early exercise right has no value for the
investor.
Still, an investor’s optimal strategy and the valuation depend also on further factors, such
as the market environment or product characteristics. In the following, we exemplary examine
the sensitivities of our results regarding changes in the volatility.13 Figure 4 compares the
valuation, the average number of decisions and the decision interval for a low (1.0%), a normal
(2.5%) and a high volatility (4.0%) scenario, whereby the middle charts correspond to our
standard scenario.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Starting with the low volatility scenario, we observe consistently lower values for all com-
binations of transaction and decision costs compared to our former results. Clearly, this is
due to the one-sided opportunity of the early exercise right, which suffers (gains) from a
reduced (enhanced) volatility in the market. Correspondingly, the average optimal number
of decisions declines, since the probability of an early exercise opportunity that compensates
13Separate analyses not reported here show that the economic relations regarding changes in the product
characteristics are similar to the results of the volatility analysis. Again, the results of our model are very
reasonable.
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also for the cumulated transaction and decision costs is lower than in a moderate or high
volatility environment. We observe a strong sensitivity regarding changes in transaction and
decision costs, so already with moderate costs typically no exercise is any longer feasible and
the average decision interval approaches maturity. On the other hand, in the high volatility
scenario, the value of the early exercise right increases substantially and even in the case
of high transaction and decision costs the option is not forfeited. Accordingly, our model
suggests here a denser average decision frequency with shorter decision intervals, which is
reasonable since in a high volatility environment more opportunities for early exercises come
up.
While the sensitivity analyses above focus on value and the optimal decision strategy, it is
also interesting to examine the timing of early exercises in relation to transaction and decision
costs, i.e. at what point in time the exercise right is used. Accordingly, Figure 5 provides
an overview of the modeled cumulative exercise distributions over all simulated 10,000 paths
over time for our standard scenario and selected cost parameters.
[Figure 5 about here.]
In the case of zero transaction and decision costs (upper-left sub-figure) we recognize an
approximately linear cumulative distribution of exercises that approaches almost 80% at
the last time step. This means that for only 20% of all paths, the investor does not use
the early exercise right and holds the bond until maturity. Observing steady and constant
exercises over time is plausible if there are no costs, since with both flat coupon payments
and a flat interest term structure an early exercise tends to be equally attractive throughout
the bond’s lifetime. Next, under transaction costs (lower-left sub-figures) the cumulative
distribution curve is pulled down but remains a similar shape, which implies steady but
overall fewer early exercises. This is also reasonable, since transaction costs do linearly
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reduce the attractiveness of early exercises for each time step and therefore have a consistent
influence on exercise rates over time. Taking decision costs into account (right sub-figures),
we recognize two effects on the timing of early exercises. First, decision costs lead to a less
smooth distribution. As described, with rising decision costs an investor’s optimal decision
strategy is more selective and focuses on fewer decision points in time. Hence, the formation
of clusters and the increasingly stepped exercise distribution corresponds to the mentioned
decrease in the average optimal number of decisions. Second, we find a growing period of no
exercise activity at the beginning. With increasing transaction and decision costs, the first
optimal decision point at which the potential gain from early exercise can also compensate
for the incurring costs recedes further towards maturity, since the potential advantage of
a one-sided early exercise option naturally grows over time. In summary, transaction and
decision costs have a strong impact on the timing of early exercises and the valuation of the
respective option. The main reason is that both costs influence an investor’s optimal decision
strategy and thus also give rise to different exercise decisions.
3 Data
3.1 German Federal Saving Notes
We base our empirical analysis on the early exercise behavior of Individual Investors in
German Federal Saving Notes (“Bundesschatzbriefe”, henceforth GFSN). GFSN are putable
bonds issued by the Federal Republic of Germany for governmental financing.14 These prod-
14GFSN accounted for about 11.5% of Germany’s overall borrowing in July 1996 with outstanding GFSN
of approximately e46.3 billion according to the Deutsche Bundesbank. However, the relevance of GFSN for
governmental financing decreased with strongly increased debt levels over the years, and the GFSN share of
the overall borrowing sank to about 1.0% in February 2009 with an outstanding volume of about e9.5 billion.
In 2012, the German government decided to stop offering products exclusively for Individual Investors and
stopped issuing new GFSN due to disproportionately high costs.
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ucts are very well suited for our analysis for the following reasons. First, GFSN are offered
exclusively to Individual Investors and resident institutions serving the public benefit, char-
itable or religious purposes.15 Because the latter account for only a very small share of the
overall investor group, GFSN are de facto a pure Individual Investor product. Thus focusing
on GFSN allows us to observe the isolated early exercise behavior of Individual Investors. We
do not have to distinguish between different market participants like institutional or retail
investors, as in similar studies such as Poteshman and Serbin (2003) or Barraclough and
Whaley (2012), who analyze early exercises of exchange-traded options. Second, there is
no secondary market, i.e. GFSN cannot be traded. Individual Investors must only decide
whether to hold or exercise, rather than to hold, exercise or sell their position. This gives
us a much more comprehensive picture of Individual Investors’ early exercise activities com-
pared to studies based on tradable financial products such as warrants or call options, where
selling is always an alternative to exercising (e.g., Koziol, 2006; Pool et al., 2008). Third,
GFSN are simple, easily comprehensible and standardized mid-term fixed-income products,
whose structure and general product features have been unchanged since 1969. New issuances
have been offered several times a year, which provides us with sufficient cross-sectional and
time-series variation to analyze the general structure of Individual Investors’ early exercises.
Fourth, issuer’s credit risk can be neglected for GFSN due to the high creditworthiness of the
Federal Republic of Germany.
Two types of GFSN exist: Type A, a yearly coupon-paying step-up bond with a maturity
of 6 years and Type B, an accrued-coupon bond with rising yearly coupons and a maturity of
7 years.16 GFSN are offered at nominal value plus accrued interests, whereby at new launches
15All product details are described in German Finance Agency (2012).
16This means Type B has a zero-bond structure. At early exercising or maturity, an investor receives the
nominal value plus all accrued coupons.
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all current issuances are closed. Both GFSN types are equipped with an early exercise right—
a specific American put option—, which allows the investor to reclaim his investment plus the
accrued interests and for Type B compounded interests at any time after an initial blocking
period of one year.17
The main distribution channel for GFSN is direct sale by the German Finance Agency
(“Bundesrepublik Deutschland Finanzagentur GmbH”), a state-owned central service provider
for Germany’s governmental borrowing and debt management. The German Finance Agency
offers cost-free debt accounts for Individual Investors and does not charge fees for purchasing
and administration nor for redemption of GFSN. Alternatively, GFSN can also be acquired
through banks, which however typically charge custody fees for administration. It is possible
to transfer GFSN ordered through an intermediary to a cost-free account at the German
Finance Agency at any time.
For our study on Individual Investors’ early exercise behavior we are able to utilize a large,
non-publicly available data set from the German Finance Agency. This data set contains—on
a daily and single account basis—all Individual Investor investments and early exercises of
GFSN from July 1996 to February 2009 that were booked in the German Finance Agency’s
debt register accounts (approximately 64% of the overall outstanding volume).
3.2 Summary statistics
There are 102 GFSN issuance dates in our sample period with an average time between
issuances of 45 days. At each issuance both Type A and Type B are offered with an iden-
tical coupon structure for the first 6 years. Table 1 provides an overview of GFSN coupon
structures in comparison to prevailing spot rates at issuance.
17For both types an additional restriction applies: investors are allowed to reclaim a maximal nominal value
of e5,000 within 30 interest days, which we ignore in the following.
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[Table 1 about here.]
Typically the offered coupons lie below the corresponding spot rates for the first years
but rise above market rates towards maturity. Yet in accordance with changes in market
conditions, the coupon structure of new issuances is regularly adjusted, implying a significant
variance in coupon offerings over time for both Type A and B.
Table 2 presents further summary statistics on our data set along two dimensions. The
left sub-tables review the GFSN issuances in our sample. The right sub-tables focus on
Individual Investor accounts with funds placed in GFSN.
[Table 2 about here.]
Regarding GFSN issuances, we find that Type A (Type B) GFSN are held on average in
39,719 (26,192) accounts. Still, as indicated by the lower median of only 29,175 (19,155) ac-
counts and the comparatively high standard deviations, the distribution is positively skewed.
Similar variations can be observed in the investment volume per GFSN. While the mean vol-
ume per GFSN amounts to approximately e103.220 million (e31.666 million), the median
volume lies at e77.778 million (e25.703 million). In a more detailed analysis not reported
here, we note that both the number of accounts as well as the tendered volume per GFSN
tends to decrease over time. Nevertheless, we find that all GFSN are of significant size and
sufficiently similar for an overall comparison. Even the least considered GFSN in our sample
period (November 2008) is held in more than 4,000 (4,600) accounts at the German Finance
Agency.
Over the sample period 812,750 different Individual Investor accounts held GFSN in
the German Finance Agency’s debt register. About 13% of these accounts acquired both
product types, so that we have in total 558,122 Individual Investor accounts for Type A and
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361,141 accounts for Type B GFSN. On average each account invested in 3.617 (4.005) GFSN
issuances, but we recognize again a distribution skewed strongly to the right, with a median
of 1.000 (1.000) investment per account. In other words, the majority of Individual Investor
accounts selected only one GFSN issuance throughout the whole sample period. Remarkably,
the corresponding mean and median investment volume per account is very small, with only
e21,087 (e9,721) or e9,746 (e3,067) per account respectively, which we attribute to the
restriction of GFSN to non-institutional investors.
Finally, we observe that Individual Investors in GFSN make frequent use of their early
exercise rights. The lower part of Table 2 shows that more than one-fourth of all accounts
in our sample exercised early at least once, which equates to an absolute number of 148,812
(95,604) accounts. On average there occurred 6,156 (3,744) early exercises per GFSN issuance,
accounting for a mean early exercise volume per GFSN of e17.868 million (e6.740 million).
On a single account level, this corresponds to a mean exercise volume per account and GFSN
of approximately e2,849 (e1,661).
In summary, the data set provides us with a large number of GFSN issuances, which
consistently attracted a wide range of Individual Investors. We find a very low number
of investments per account, rather small investment volumes and significant early exercise
activities. Since in this study we are most interested in the latter, the following section
focuses on analyzing the early exercise rates of GFSN.
3.3 Early exercise rates
To further examine Individual Investors’ exercise activities in GFSN, we start with cal-
culating the early exercise volume and the remaining exercisable volume per day for each
GFSN. Subsequently, we aggregate these empirical data points to an early exercise rate per
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month EERObsg,t per GFSN by:
EERObsg,t = 1−
 Dt∏
d=1
[
1− Early Exercise Volumeg,t,dExercisable Volumeg,t,d
] , (1.14)
where g is the product index, t the month index, d the day index and Dt stands for the
number of days in the respective month.18
As outlined in the lower part of Table 2, the mean monthly exercise rate is 0.570% (0.536%)
over all exercisable19 Type A (Type B) GFSN, whereby the high standard deviation of 1.028%
(0.810%) points towards a notable variance among products and months. The upper charts
in Figure 6, where we plot the observed early exercise rates for all GFSN against time, also
illustrate this. We register strong fluctuations with a maximum early exercise rate of about
16.8% (14.1%) for an individual GFSN and a minimum rate close to 0% for some Type A
and B GFSN in selected months. Still, we can identify some patterns. For instance, on
an individual bond level we find an increased exercise activity in the first month after the
blocking period. Moreover, there are two general peaks in the exercise rates around the years
2000 and 2007, but also a longer period of less exercise activity between 2002 and 2006.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Searching for rationales behind these patterns, we investigate the relationship between the
empirical exercise rates and the economic advantage of an exercise in the respective months.
To proxy the latter we calculate a “hold-to-exercise ratio” for each time step and GFSN,
which we define as the fraction of the present value of a GFSN without early exercise right
18As outlined in Section 3.1, Individual Investors can transfer (or deduct) GFSN investments from their
bank accounts to a cost-free debt account at the German Finance Agency at any time. Thus we have to
consider possible daily changes in the exercisable volume in our calculation of monthly early exercise rates.
19178 GFSN (89 Type A, 89 Type B) are exercisable in our sample, since they have left the initial blocking
period.
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to its exercise value, i.e.:20
Hold-to-exercise ratiog,t =
Present Value of GFSN without optiong,t
Exercise Valueg,t
. (1.15)
We use this ratio as a first simple indicator for the potential benefit of an early exercise, since
a hold-to-exercise ratio above 100% implies that it is not reasonable for Individual Investors
to early exercise their GFSN—except for possible exogenous reasons such as, e.g., the need
for liquidity. In contrast, an exercise might be beneficial if the calculated ratio lies below
100%, depending on the option value. The middle charts of Figure 6 depict the development
of the hold-to-exercise ratios for all GFSN over time. Like in our analysis of exercise rates,
we notice a broad variance throughout the sample period but again some general patterns.
We find that the hold-to-exercise ratios stay clearly above 100% for most outstanding GFSN
in most months, which indicates a low attractiveness of early exercises, although there are
also several months where an early exercise seems to be highly advantageous.
The lower charts in Figure 6 combine both upper analyses and show the relationship be-
tween the monthly exercise rates and the corresponding hold-to-exercise ratios. Even though
Individual Investors obviously do not act homogeneously, we can observe a clear negative
correlation here. The higher the hold-to-exercise ratio, the lower the average monthly early
exercise rates tend to be. Nevertheless, even in highly unattractive months with substan-
tially enhanced hold-to-exercise ratios, some investors still opt to reclaim their investments.
As outlined later in more detail, we attribute these unexpected early exercises to exogenous
reasons such as investors’ liquidity constraints or tax optimizations. On the other hand,
early exercise rates tend to grow exponentially with decreasing hold-to-exercise ratios. In
20To keep the analysis simple, we neglect the exercise option in determining the GFSN holding strategy
here. However, we find that the economic relations are very similar for more complex ratios.
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particular, we find a strong increase as soon as the hold-to-exercise ratio drops below 100%.
At a first glance the described empirical patterns might be surprising, since according to
standard option theory, one would expect a significant, uniform jump in the exercise rates as
soon as the economic advantage of an early exercise is higher than the present value of holding
the GFSN. However, the empirical findings coincide very well with the reasoning behind
our model in Section 2.1 regarding transaction and decision costs. With transaction costs,
early exercises are only attractive for Individual Investors if the hold-to-exercise ratio falls
significantly below 100%, since the economic advantage of an early exercise must compensate
also for these additionally incurring costs. Moreover, as pointed out in the comparative-static
analysis, transaction and decision costs induce a non-continuous decision strategy and lead
to clustered and temporarily offset early exercise points, which might be linked to hold-to-
exercise ratios that (clearly) undercut 100%.
To further investigate Individual Investors’ early exercises and to avoid misleading infer-
ences based on idiosyncratic patterns of selected GFSN issuances, we move from the single
bond perspective to a more consolidated overview. Figure 7 exhibits the average monthly ex-
ercise rate over all exercisable GFSN of both types over time. Additionally, the corresponding
German 1- and 10-year spot rates are depicted, indicating the level and shape of the interest
term structure at the respective time in Germany.
[Figure 7 about here.]
We stress five observations here. First, we find that the average monthly rates are in large
part very similar for Type A and Type B GFSN. The highest rates for both types are observed
around July 2000, where on average about 2.1% (1.9%) of the outstanding volume is returned
for Type A (Type B) GFSN. Least activity occurs in both cases at the end of 2005 with
average exercise rates as low as 0.2% (0.1%).
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Second, similar to the analysis on a single bond base, we identify two periods of elevated
exercise rates during our sample period which both coincide with rising short- and middle-
term interest rates. In general, Individual Investors’ exercise rates appear highly sensitive
to spot rate movements and valuation changes. We note a distinct trend among Individual
Investors towards more (less) early exercise activity in rising (falling) interest environments.
As described, this is reasonable, because with increased interest rates the respective hold-
to-exercise ratio falls and it might be advantageous for Individual Investors to deduct their
funds or just roll their investments into a newer GFSN issuance with higher coupons.
Third, the aggregated view underlines once again that the investor base acts heteroge-
neously. We find comparably small mean empirical exercise rates, which also differ among
months and products. In the case of homogeneous investors with an identical basis for
decision-making, we would instead expect exercise rates of either 100% or close to 0% on a
single product level.
Fourth, regardless of any interest rate movements, we identify a base exercise rate of
about 0.160% over all GFSN per month. Even in times of broadly appreciating GFSN and
high hold-to-exercise ratios there are always some Individual Investors, who still decide to
recall their investments before maturity. As already mentioned, we consider this continuous
base exercise rate to be exogenously triggered. We argue that, for example, individual liq-
uidity requirements might be a reason for steady early exercises. Indeed, since GFSN can be
terminated comparatively easily and without any extra fees, a GFSN exercise might be one
of the first choices for an Individual Investor with liquidity constraints.
Fifth, we observe small but regular peaks in the exercise rates of Type B products at the
end of a year, especially in 1999 and 2006. We attribute these effects to a second exogenous
factor, namely the tax optimization of Individual Investors at the end of a year, a well known
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effect described in the literature (e.g., Badrinath and Lewellen, 1991; Sias and Starks, 1997;
Ivkovic et al., 2005; who find that Individual Investors show frequent tax-motivated trading
before the year is over). In Germany interest payments to Individual Investors are generally
taxed when they are distributed, whereby only the share of interest payments is considered
that exceeds a saver’s tax allowance. At the beginning of both years 2000 and 2007 this
tax threshold was significantly reduced in Germany, which put in particular Type B GFSN
at a disadvantage, since due to the zero-bond structure the tax allowance for such products
can be utilized only once, whereas for Type A GFSN it is considered for each year’s interest
payment. Hence, it could have been advantageous for Individual Investors to exercise Type
B GFSN early with hold-to-exercise ratios above 100% shortly before the new tax regulations
in 2000 and 2007 became effective, so as to exploit tax advantages. We also ascribe the small
but regular peaks around December (year-end effect) for Type B GFSN to taxation rules.
The same argument applies: since the taxation is not spread over several years as for Type
A GFSN, year-end optimizations of personal tax allowances are much more relevant and
can be a good reasons for early exercises. In the following, we account for both exogenous
effects—base exercise rate and taxation—by introducing control variables.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Calibration procedure
In this section we calibrate our model to the data set and derive conclusions about the
empirical early exercise behavior of Individual Investors. Assuming that Individual Investors’
exercise strategies of GFSN are driven by individual transaction and decision costs, we aim to
determine the empirically best-fitting cost levels for our model. We structure the calibration
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in four steps. First, we define and estimate an interest rate term structure model. Second,
we consider heterogeneity of transaction and decision costs among Individual Investors by
forming different investor clusters. Third, we account for increased exercise activities after
the initial one-year blocking period and for exogenous effects that are likely to be found in the
empirical data—as suggested by the analysis in Section 3.3—but which are not incorporated
in our model. Eventually, we specify the calibration via an optimization algorithm.
Interest rate model
For the valuation of interest rate derivatives, typically no-arbitrage term structure models,
such as one- or two-factor HJM models or LIBOR market models, are applied (see, e.g.,
Hull, 2006). While these models have the advantage of being perfectly consistent with the
current interest term structure, they prove to be less suitable for our study due to possible
logical violations in comparing the empirical and modeled optimal exercise strategies. With
a continuous re-calibration it might happen that the optimal exercise point determined by
the model is empirically never feasible, a circumstance that would distort the calibration
quality and reduce its reliability. Therefore, we choose to apply a more sophisticated model
of the class of essential affine term structure models according to Dai and Singleton (2000),
which determines the interest term structure throughout the whole sample period based on
a time-invariant function of only a small set of common state variables.
Egorov et al. (2006) and Tang and Xia (2007) show that a three-factor essentially affine
model, with one factor affecting the conditional variance matrix, provides empirically the best
performance for different countries including Germany, while it also allows for very flexible
specifications. Accordingly, we utilize for the calibration a three-factor essentially affine
model EA1(3). We calibrate the model to monthly German term structures over the period
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of July 1996 to February 2009 via a Kalman filtering algorithm together with quasi-maximum
likelihood, under the assumption that the rates of all yearly maturities 1 to 10 years are not
perfectly observed. This is basically the same procedure as used by, e.g., Hördahl and Vestin
(2005). The estimated model parameters are presented in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here.]
Heterogeneity of Individual Investors
As already discussed, it is likely that transaction and decision costs vary among Individual
Investors. To incorporate this heterogeneity in the calibration while also preserving a low
number of estimation parameters and numerical efficiency, we make three assumptions. First,
each investor has constant transaction and decision costs, i.e. a specific Individual Investor
features the same cost profile over the whole sample period and for each acquired GFSN.
Second, we do not estimate individual costs for each single account but group Individual
Investors in discrete clusters, which is a common approach in the literature (e.g., Stanton,
1995; Koziol, 2006) to capture heterogeneity. We allow for 9 different clusters of transaction
costs from 0% to 7.5% and for 9 different clusters of decision costs from 0% to 0.75%,21 which
gives us overall 81 clusters representing a wide choice of different combinations of transaction
and decision costs. In addition, we consider that there might be a group of “passive investors”,
who under no circumstances make use of their exercise rights, and form an extra cluster with
“infinite” or very high transaction and decision costs. Third, the pool of Individual Investors
is identical for each GFSN of the same type with regard to the distribution of transaction and
decision costs, which seems plausible in view of the broad range of investors in each GFSN
and the unchanged product structure throughout the sample period.
21Obviously, there is a broad variety of possible cost ranges we can assign to the clusters. Intensively testing
different approaches, we find that the following cost parameters are most suitable for our calibration: decision
costs of [0%, 0.010%, 0.025%, 0.050%, 0.0750%, 0.100%, 0.250%, 0.500%, 0.750%] and transaction costs of
[0%, 0.100%, 0.250%, 0.500%, 0.750%, 1.000%, 2.500%, 5.000%, 7.500%].
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The key challenge of our approach is the determination of appropriate cluster weights.
Avoiding estimating each proportion separately, we assume here—extending the approach of
Stanton (1995)—that all cluster weights can be described by a combination of two discretized
beta distributions. We choose the beta distribution because it can adapt to a multitude of
different shapes based on the estimation of only two parameters α and β.22 Utilizing the
cumulative distribution function of the beta distribution, which is given by:
F (x|α, β) = 1
B(α, β)
∫ x
0
tα−1(1− t)β−1dt, (1.16)
where B(α, β) stands for the standard beta distribution with parameters α and β, we estimate
all individual cluster weights p at issuance through:
pg,0,i,j = (1− ω)×
[
F
(
i
9 |αTC , βTC
)
− F
(
i− 1
9 |αTC , βTC
)]
×
[
F
(
j
9 |αDC , βDC
)
− F
(
j − 1
9 |αDC , βDC
)]
, (1.17)
where ω is the proportion of passive investors, g is the GFSN index, i and j are the cluster
indices for the respective transaction and decision costs, and the time index 0 denotes that
we start at issuance.
We know from our model that there is always only one individual optimal strategy
(
  , τ  
)
for each combination of transaction and decision costs. This means we get diverging optimal
exercise strategies among our clusters. For instance, we can presume that clusters with
comparatively low transaction and decision costs use their exercise rights more often and
earlier than others. Conversely, clusters associated with high costs might take later or no
22To reduce complexity we limit in the following the interval of possible values for α and β to [0,8]. Testing
several possible interval ranges we find that this restriction does not have a significant influence on the results.
40
Individual Investors and Suboptimal Early Exercises in the Fixed-Income Market
advantage of attractive exercise opportunities. Such different exercise strategies result in
shifts in the relative cluster proportions over time and induce a phenomena known as burnout
(e.g., Stanton, 1995). Burnout basically refers to the dependency of early exercise rates on
former exercise activities, which leads in our case to a declining sensitivity over time of all
GFSN regarding interest rate movements due to the shrinking proportion of clusters with
low transaction and decision costs, which have not exercised yet.
Besides the burnout feature we also take into consideration that Individual Investors can
act sluggishly, which means that not all investors in a cluster exercise at the optimal exercise
month.23 More precisely, we allow that at the optimal exercise point a sluggish proportion s
of investors delay the exercise (e.g., because they are lazy or hesitant) and instead defers the
transaction to an upcoming month. We assume a latest sluggish reaction after 6 months and
thus restrict s to an upper bound of 65%.24 Consequently, the overall endogenous exercise
rate EERr per month and GFSN is given by:
EERrg,t,i,j =

(1− s)× pg,t,i,j , t =  τ  g,i,j
(1− s)× pg,t,i,j , EERrg,t−1,i,j > 0
0, otherwise,
(1.18)
where t stands for the month index and s for the sluggish proportion of investors. Equation
(1.18) says that a cluster exercises at (or shortly after) an endogenously defined optimal point
in time, which is determined by the decision strategy   and the respective exercise strategy
τ   . At all other months the endogenous exercise rate equals zero. We determine  τ   for
23Such sluggish reactions are described in the literature on momentum effects, among others. For example
Hvidkjaer (2011) finds extremely sluggish reactions of Individual Investors to past returns.
24After 6 months, the maximum remaining investor share in a cluster equals 0.656 ≈ 0.075. We assume
that these remaining investors also exercise 6 months after the optimal exercise point.
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all GFSN and clusters according to (1.11) to (1.13), whereby we follow the same calculation
approach as outlined in Section 2.2 for the comparative-static analysis—except that we now
replace the one-factor short rate model with the described essentially affine interest term
structure model.25
Blocking period
The right to exercise a GFSN early cannot be used in the first year after its purchase. As
a consequence, we observe increased exercise activities in the first month after this initial
blocking period, which might, e.g., be attributed to investors’ deferred liquidity demand over
the previous twelve months or could simply be a reaction to earlier market changes. We
account for these extraordinary exercises after the blocking period by introducing a dummy
variable EERb and define EERbg,t,i,j = pg,t,i,j ×EERb.
Exogenous effects
In accordance with our empirical observations and the study of Stanton (1995), we control for
three different exogenous effects in the calibration. First, we incorporate a base exercise rate,
which we set to the empirically observed rate of 0.160% per GFSN per month. Additionally,
we consider for Type B GFSN a possible year-end effect in December and taxation effects
in December 1999 and December 2006. Thus the exogenous early exercise rate EERe per
month and GFSN is given by:
EEReg,t,i,j = pg,t,i,j × (0.0016 +DY E +DT99 +DT06), (1.19)
25Since we have to compute for each GFSN and each month not only the respective exercise value but also
all possible continuation values, these calculations are still a challenge even for modern computers. Here, there
are up to 300 billion path calculations and up to 30 million regressions needed.
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where DY E is the the year-end dummy and DT99 and DT06 are the respective dummies
for changes in the tax legislations. Both endogenous (1.18) and exogenous exercises (1.19) as
well as the increased demand after the initial blocking period EERb lead to shrinking cluster
weights over time, since less Individual Investors stay invested in the respective GFSN. Hence,
as last step in our calibration approach, we model the development of each cluster weight
through:
pg,t+1,i,j = pg,t,i,j − EERrg,t,i,j − EEReg,t,i,j − EERbg,t,i,j . (1.20)
Overall calibration
Combining equations (1.16) to (1.20), the overall early exercise rate EER of a single GFSN
in a selected month is given by:
EERg,t =
9∑
i=1
9∑
j=1
EERrg,t,i,j + EEReg,t,i,j + EERbg,t,i,j
9∑
i=1
9∑
j=1
pg,t,i,j + ω
, (1.21)
where g is the GFSN index, t the month index, i and j are the cluster indices and ω stands
for the group of passive investors. Aiming at minimizing the difference between the modeled
exercise rates and the empirical observations, we apply a sequential programming approach
that searches for best fitting distribution parameters (αTC , βTC , αDC , βDC) and model factors
(ω, s, EERb, DY E, DT99, DT06) for each Type A and B GFSN through a multidimensional
non-linear minimization algorithm based on the interior-point method. As a measure of the
goodness-of-fit we use the mean squared error (MSE) on a single product base, which we
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define over all 151 months and all investigated GFSN per type as:
MSE = 1151
151∑
t=1
1
Nt
Nt∑
g=1
(
EERg,t−d(g)+1 − EERObsg,t−d(g)+1
)2
, (1.22)
where EERObs is the empirical exercise rate for a selected GFSN and month as determined
in (1.14), EER the model-implied exercise rate according to (1.19), N stands for the number
of outstanding and exercisable GFSN at each month and d(g) is a function determining
the issuance month of the respective GFSN.26 We re-run the calibration algorithm until the
measured change in the MSE falls below 0.000001%. Finally, to reduce potential biases in
the results due to local minima and to test the robustness of our results, we repeat the entire
calibration approach 250 times with random start parameters.
4.2 Calibration results
We note that our calibration is not a full general equilibrium specification, since transac-
tion and decision costs—occurring at the decision points and at exercise in our model—may
in reality also occur when the hedge portfolio is adjusted over time, affecting the arbitrage
reasoning of standard option theory. However, for example (implicitly) assuming equivalence
of real and risk-neutral probability measures is a standard approach in calibrating similar
models, such as mortgage prepayment models (see, e.g., Stanton, 1995; Stanton and Wallace,
1998). Table 4 provides the calibration results.
[Table 4 about here.]
Focusing first on the full-sample results (left column), we receive a very good fit of the modeled
early exercise rates to the empirical data with a mean squared error (MSE) on a single GFSN
26We test several measures of the goodness-of-fit (e.g., MSE of the average exercise rate per month per
type), but find that an optimization using the MSE on a single product base provides best results.
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and month level of approximately 0.0036% for Type A GFSN (0.0025% for Type B), which
equates to a mean absolute error of circa 0.2827% (0.2627%). To verify the model fit, we
calculate also the mean R2 value between modeled and empirical exercise rates over all N
GFSN according to R2 = 1N
∑N
g=1 1− Variance of monthly prediction errorgVariance of empirical monthly exercise rateg and a consolidated
R2 value between the modeled and empirical average monthly exercise rate according to
R2 = 1 − Variance of average monthly prediction errorVariance of empirical average monthly exercise rate . Both values are remarkably high with
about 50% and 79% for Type A and approximately 47% and 73% for Type B GFSN, whereby
the second R2 value is higher due to consolidation effects. For a further analysis of the model
fit, the upper part of Figure 8 depicts the consolidated calibration results compared to the
mean empirical rates over time.
[Figure 8 about here.]
We note that our model captures different market phases equally well, as the mean modeled
and observed rates differ by less than 0.1% for both types for most months. Only at the
beginning of the sample period, between 1997 and 1999, does our model output clearly
underestimate the empirical data, which we ascribe at least partly to the launch of a new
stock market segment in Germany in 1997. This “New Market” broadly attracted Individual
Investors and thus presumably also enhanced the exogenous demand for liquidity.27
The next part of Table 4 presents the estimated beta distribution factors. The resulting
distributions are diagrammed graphically in the lower part of Figure 8. We get mean decision
costs of about 0.062% for Type A GFSN (0.138% for Type B) and remarkably higher mean
transaction costs of circa 3.993% (3.791%) over all clusters during our sample period, which
implies that empirically Individual Investors do not use their exercise rights as predicted
by standard models. Instead, they act as if they face significant transaction and decision
27According to the Deutsche Bundesbank, the share of stock investments of Individual Investors’ overall
capital increased in Germany from circa 8.0% in 1997 to circa 14.5% in 2000.
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costs. It is not surprising that decision costs are estimated significantly lower here since these
costs can accrue several times and have—as seen—a stronger impact on an investor’s decision
strategy, whereas transaction costs are due only once, at exercise.
Moreover, we find that the estimated beta distributions for decision costs are clearly
bent left towards very low or zero costs, whereas the distributions for transaction costs are
more even but somewhat skewed to the right. Decision costs are slightly more important
for Type B GFSN, which we attribute to the generally higher nominal value of Type GFSN
due to the zero-bond structure with accumulated interest payments and to our definition of
absolute rather than relative transaction and decision costs. The broad standard deviations
of estimated transaction and decision costs imply strongly diverging optimal strategies among
investors and over time.
We estimate the share of passive investors at about 56% (53%) of the overall investor
group, which expresses that a considerable proportion of investors in GFSN completely ne-
glect the incorporated early exercise right. In addition, the calibration results indicate that
approximately 65% (65%) of the investors per cluster respond sluggishly, which is very close
to our upper bound of half a year response time and means that a large share of investors
show some kind of delay between the optimal decision and the actual exercise.
Regarding exogenous effects, we find that in particular the adjustments in the tax leg-
islation for the year 2000 had a substantial influence on Individual Investors’ early exercise
decisions. We estimate that these changes account for additional exercises of circa 1.984% of
the outstanding volume of Type B GFSN in December 1999. The year-end effect (0.568%)
and the change in taxation in 2006 (1.167%) had, according to our calibration, a smaller but
still notable impact.
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4.3 Robustness
To verify the results, we re-calibrate our model for different sub-samples. The right part
(two columns) of Table 4 shows exemplary results for two calibrations, each based on roughly
half of the sample period. We find that the estimated parameters for both the transaction
and decision cost distributions and for the share of passive or sluggish investors are relatively
robust and stay in similar ranges, which validates our former findings. Moreover, while the
calibration performs better and is more stable if we incorporate both exercise peaks around
2000 and 2007 and a longer time horizon, the MSE for our exemplary sub-samples remains
at a low level of only circa 0.0036% for Type A GFSN (0.0025% for Type B GFSN) and
of about 0.0069% (0.0035%) respectively. Accordingly, we compute again convincing sub-
sample R2 values of 86.005% (77.338%) and 70.105% (58.351%) respectively between the
average modeled monthly exercise rates and the average empirical rates.
4.4 Valuation
The comparative-static analysis in Section 2.2 revealed that transaction and decision
costs result in diverging optimal exercise strategies and timings compared to the standard
case. Obviously, issuers gain a financial advantage when Individual Investors exercise at
other points in time than would, e.g., institutional investors, who follow standard financial
rationality. Similarly, issuers benefit when Individual Investors completely forfeit the exercise
right or exercise “randomly”.
To quantify the advantage for the issuer, we compare the valuation of the option com-
ponent of a GFSN at issuance according to standard valuation,28—assuming all investors
28As described, standard market valuation gives the same results as our model with no transaction and
decision costs.
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exercise optimally with no transaction and decision costs—(model value) with the empirical
value which incorporates the actual exercise behavior of Individual Investors. We calculate
the empirical value in two steps. First, for a given GFSN we simulate 10,000 paths and
calculate the optimal exercise point for each combination of transaction and decision costs.
Second, we utilize the full-sample calibration results of Section 4.2 to weight all exercise
values according to our estimated cost distributions, whereby we also account for the base
exercise rate, the share of passive investors, sluggish reactions and additional exercises for the
first month after the initial blocking period and—in the case of Type B GFSN—at the end
of the year. We exclude only the one-time tax effects due to changes in the tax legislation
because such events cannot be foreseen in a valuation ex-ante. The overall weighted value is
our empirical value.
The first two columns of Table 5 show statistics on the model and the empirical value of
the option component for all GFSN in our sample. Additionally, the third column exhibits
the respective advantage for the issuer, which we calculate simply as the difference between
both values.
[Table 5 about here.]
We find that the value of the early exercise right on the issuance date according to standard
market valuation amount on average to 2.2433% of the nominal value for Type A and to
2.9859% for Type B GFSN, whereby the higher option value for Type B GFSN can mainly
be attributed to the longer maturity. For both types we note a significant variation over time
as indicated by option values of 1.1071% (1.3672%) for the 5 percent quantile and 4.0102%
(5.2208%) for the 95 percent quantile. However, the empirical value of the early exercise
right at issuance is much lower for most products. On average we compute empirical option
values of only approximately 0.2009% for Type A GFSN (1.1411% for Type B), whereby the
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95 percent quantile lies at only 0.8194% (2.8956%). These significantly lower empirical values
are due to a combination of three factors: first, we have a high proportion of passive investors
and the empirical value is a weighted average over all investor clusters. Second, transaction
and decision costs can lead to missed optimal exercise opportunities. Third, liquidity-driven
exercises (base exercise rate) and exogenously motivated exercises (tax effects) can occur at
points in time where it is not optimal to exercise according to standard models and where early
exercises can actually have a negative effect on the valuation. In fact, for some GFSN this
negative effect can even overcompensate the positive influence of early exercises at attractive
points in time, which results in negative option costs for the issuer (see the 5 percent quantile
in Table 5). Generally, we observe a significant and consistent financial advantage over time
for issuers due to Individual Investors’ diverging empirical exercise strategies. We determine
an average advantage of circa 2.0424% of the nominal value for Type A and circa 1.8449% for
Type B GFSN. Similarly, the median advantage accrues to approximately 1.8559% (1.7604%).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed Individual Investors’ early exercise behavior in fixed-income
derivatives. We showed that given transaction and decision costs, continuous decision-making
is no longer worthwhile and developed a new approach to model early exercises that endoge-
nously determines a rational decision and exercise strategy in the face of such costs. Based on
a comprehensive empirical data set, we applied our model and found a convincing fit between
the modeled early exercise rates and the empirical observations. Our results suggest that
a large proportion of Individual Investors act as if they face significant but heterogeneous
transaction and decision costs, that there is also a notable share of passive investors and that
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investors’ reaction to exercise opportunities is often sluggish. All these findings imply that
the optimal timing of early exercises for Individual Investors can clearly differ from that of,
e.g., institutional investors.
Following, we derive three policy implications. First, considering transaction and decision
costs, the value of a fixed-income derivative with an early exercise right is lower than suggested
by standard valuation models. As a result, issuers gain a significant financial advantage in
pricing such derivatives without accounting for investors’ individual exercise strategies, which
we estimate at around 2% of the nominal value for our sample. Second, we reckon that
issuers can influence investors’ strategies by designing specific derivative structures. In some
separate analyses, we find for example that a very steep coupon structure leads to a higher
sensitivity towards decision costs and makes decision-making less attractive during much
of the GFSN lifespan until maturity. This implies that investors tend to more frequently
forgo possible exercise opportunities. Third, issuers or financial intermediaries dealing with
Individual Investors must—besides allowing for rational early exercise decisions—also account
for a base exercise rate and for potential, unexpected, early exercise peaks in their risk and
liquidity management due to exogenous effects such as changes in tax laws.
Finally, we note that our model need not be restricted to analyzing fixed-income deriva-
tives and Individual Investor’s exercise decisions as in this study. Our approach can easily
be applied to other derivatives, investor groups or overall research questions, where an en-
dogenously determined decision strategy is relevant. For instance, mortgages might be a
possible field of application, as it seems reasonable to assume that homeowners also do not
continuously make decisions on refinancing or prepaying, but follow similar rational decision
and exercise strategies as described in this paper.
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Appendix A — Model proof
The main idea of the proof is to transform the problem into an equivalent optimal stopping
problem in a process that is indexed by a partially ordered set. Roughly speaking, we
replace the question “When shall I make the next decision?” in the ordered set T with the
question “In which direction shall I go next?” in a partially ordered set I. Re-indexing the
(discounted) payoff process accordingly allows us to adopt techniques from the theory of
sequential stochastic optimization for multi-dimensionally-indexed processes as, for example,
presented by Cairoli and Dalang (1996).
To provide some intuition, let us assume that the derivative can be exercised at the points in
time 1, 2 and 3, i.e. T = {0, 1, 2, 3}. Then, given a realization ω, there is a one-to-one rela-
tionship between a decision strategy and a sub-sequence of the set I = {(0), (0, 1), (0, 2), (0, 3),
(0, 1, 2), (0, 1, 3), (0, 2, 3), (0, 1, 2, 3)}. Today, in 0, the investor has to decide on the next de-
cision point 1, 2 or 3. This decision is represented by (0,1), (0,2) or (0,3), respectively. If
he, for example, decides on 1, i.e. he chooses (0,1), he can make the next decision in 2
or 3, represented by (0,1,2) and (0,1,3). Figure 9 shows the resulting possible transformed
strategies. For example, making a decision in 1 and 3 means going from (0) to (0,1) and
afterwards to (0,1,3). Thus, making a decision regarding the next decision point is equivalent
to choosing a path through the decision tree representing all possible realization of a decision
strategy. Assigning to each knot γ ∈ I of the decision tree the (discounted) payoff of the
derivative Xγ—including the transaction and decision costs occurring when going from (0)
to γ—, finding an optimal strategy is equivalent to finding an optimal path through the tree
and then finding the best time to stop the path, i.e. to exercise the derivative.
[Figure 9 about here.]
Definitions and re-indexing
Let I = {(0, γ1, ..., γm) : 0 < γm < γm+1, 0 ≤ m ≤ N} be the set of all increasing sub-
sequences of T whose first element is 0. For γ ∈ I, define l(γ) = card(γ) − 1, L(γ) = γl(γ),
and γ[m] = (0, γ1, ..., γm) for m ≤ l(γ) and γ[m] = γ for m ≥ l(γ), i.e. l(γ) is the length of
the sequence γ excluding the first component, L(γ) is the last component of γ, and γ[m] is
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the element of I that is formed by the first m+ 1 components of γ or equals γ. We define a
partial order “≺” on I via:
γ ≺ δ if γ = δ[l(γ)], (A.1)
i.e. γ is smaller than δ if it forms the first components of δ that is called a successor of γ.
Define Dγ = {δ ∈ I : γ ≺ δ and l(δ) = l(γ) + 1}. Elements of Dγ are the smallest elements of
I that are larger than γ with respect to the order ≺ and are therefore called direct successors
of γ. Note that the set of direct successors of γ is empty if and only if the last component of
γ, L(γ), equals tN .
We set for each γ ∈ I:
Xγ = exp
(
−
∫ L(γ)
0
r(s)ds
)
(XL(γ) − TCL(γ))−
l(γ)∑
i=1
exp
(
−
∫ γi
0
r(s)ds
)
DCγi , (A.2)
Gγ = FL(γ). (A.3)
Xγ represents the discounted payoff if the deterministic decision strategy γ is applied and
stopped in L(γ), and the process (Xγ)γ , indexed by the partially ordered set I, is adapted to
the filtration (Gγ)γ .
Transformed strategies and equivalent optimization problem
We call a sequence   ′ = (  ′n)n=0,...,N , of (Gγ)-stopping points29 
→ I a transformed strategy,
if the sequence fulfills the following conditions:
  ′0 = (0), (A.4)
  ′n+1 ∈ D  ′n if   ′n+1 ̸=   ′n, (A.5)
  ′n+k =   ′n for all k ≥ 1 if   ′n+1 =   ′n, (A.6)
  ′n+1 is G  ′n-measurable. (A.7)
Define l(  ′) = inf{n :   ′n+1 =   ′n} that is a (G  ′n)-stopping time. Intuitively, a transformed
strategy is a rule for choosing a path through I that is stopped in   ′l(  ′). A denotes the set
29A stopping point is the vector-valued analogon of a stopping time, i.e. {  ′n ≺ γ} ∈ Gγ for all γ.
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of all transformed strategies and Aγ denotes for γ ∈ I the set of transformed strategies that
stop in γ or one of its successors, i.e. Aγ = {  ′ ∈ A : γ ≺   ′l(  ′) a.s.}. This implies that
the first components of   ′ are deterministic and coincide with (γ[0], γ[1], ..., γ[l(γ)] = γ) which
means that the path through I described by   ′ goes through γ.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between strategies defined in Section 2.1 and trans-
formed strategies defined above. Given a strategy (  = ( n)n, τ   ), set
  ′n =
 ( 0, ...,  n) on {τ
  ≥ n}
( 0, ...,  τ  −1,  τ   , ...,  τ   ) on {τ   < n}.
(A.8)
It is straightforward to show that   ′ = (  ′n)n is a transformed strategy. On the other hand,
given a transformed strategy   ′ set,
 n =
 L( 
′
n) on {l(  ′) ≥ n}
tN on {l(  ′) < n},
(A.9)
τ   = l(  ′). (A.10)
Then, (  = ( n)n, τ   ) is a strategy.
We define for a transformed strategy   ′:
X  ′ = exp
− ∫ L
(
  ′
l(  ′)
)
0
r(s)ds
X
L
(
  ′
l(  ′)
) − TC
L
(
  ′
l(  ′)
)
−
l(  ′)∑
i=1
exp
(
−
∫ L(  ′i )
0
r(s)ds
)
DCγi .
(A.11)
Note that each γ ∈ I defines a unique deterministic transformed strategy by setting   ′ =
(0, γ[1], ..., γ[N ]) that stops in γ. Thus, (A.2) and (A.11) coincide in this case. Due to the
one-to-one correspondence between strategies and transformed strategies the optimization
problem (1.6) from Section 2.1 is equivalent to finding an optimal transformed strategy   ′opt:
EQ (X  ′opt) = sup
  ′
EQ (X  ′) . (A.12)
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Solving the problem
We solve this problem via backward induction:30
• For all γ with Dγ = ∅ set:31
Zγ = Xγ . (A.13)
• If l(γ) < N , Dγ ̸= ∅ and Zδ has been defined for all δ ∈ Dγ :
Zγ = sup
(
Xγ , sup
δ∈Dγ
EQ(Zδ|Gγ)
)
. (A.14)
(Zγ)γ is adapted to (Gγ)γ and a supermartingale with respect to ≺.32 For each γ we equip
Dγ with an order according to the size of the last element L(δ), δ ∈ Dγ .
Define:
D(γ) = inf
{
δ ∈ Dγ : EQ(Zδ|Gγ) = sup
δ′∈Dγ
EQ(Zδ′ |Gγ)
}
(A.15)
and let (  (γ))γ∈I be a family of random variables defined backward in the following way:
• For all γ with Dγ = ∅ set:
  ′(γ) =
(
γ[0], γ[1], ..., γ[N ]
)
. (A.16)
• If l(γ) < N , Dγ ̸= ∅ and   ′(δ) has been defined for all δ ∈ Dγ , set:
  ′(γ) =

(
γ[0], γ[1], ..., γ[N ]
)
on {Zγ = Xγ}
  ′(D(γ)) on {Zγ > Xγ}.
(A.17)
A simple exercise shows that   ′(γ) is a transformed strategy for each γ with   ′(γ) ∈ Aγ . In
the following we show that   ′((0)) is optimal in the sense of (A.12). The following theorem
is the key.
30The procedure and the following proof of Theorem 1 are analogous to Cairoli and Dalang (1996), pp.
210–212, for constructing so-called optimal “accessible stopping points” when a process is indexed by specific
finite subsets of Nd.
31Note that l(γ) = N implies Dγ = ∅.
32It can be shown that (Zγ)γ is Snell´s envelope, i.e. the smallest supermartingale dominating (Xγ)γ .
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Theorem 1 For all γ ∈ I and ′ ∈ Aγ
Zγ = EQ(X  ′(γ)|Gγ) ≥ EQ(X ′|Gγ) (A.18)
holds.
Proof. (A.18) is trivial for γ with Dγ = ∅. Let γ ∈ I with Dγ ̸= ∅ and assume (A.18) has
been shown for all δ ∈ Dγ . We first consider the equality in (A.18). By definition, we have
for F ∈ Gγ :
∫
F
Zγ =
∫
F∩{Zγ=Xγ}
X  (γ) +
∫
F∩{Zγ>Xγ}
Zγ . (A.19)
By hypothesis, Zδ = EQ(X  ′(δ)|Gδ) holds for all δ ∈ Dγ , and by definition Zγ = EQ(Zδ|Gγ) on
{Zγ > Xγ}∩{D(γ) = δ} ∈ Gγ . This implies Zγ = EQ(X  ′(δ)|Gγ) on {Zγ > Xγ}∩{D(γ) = δ}
and therefore Zγ = EQ(X  ′(D(γ))|Gγ) on {Zγ > Xγ}. Consequently, the equality in (A.18)
holds.
The next step is proving the inequality. Let ′ ∈ Aγ with ′ ̸=   ′(γ). For all δ ∈ Dγ , define
′(δ) =
 
′ on {′l(γ)+1 = δ}
(δ[0], δ[1], ..., δ[N ]) on {′l(γ)+1 ̸= δ}.
(A.20)
′(δ) is a transformed strategy with ′(δ) ∈ Aδ. As ′ ∈ Aγ , ′ goes through γ which
implies ′l(γ) = γ. This implies that we either have ′l(γ)+1 = γ, i.e. ′ stops in γ, or
′l(γ)+1 ∈ Dγ . Also note that {′l(γ)+1 = δ} ∈ Gγ for all δ ∈ Dγ . Thus, we have for F ∈ Gγ :
∫
F
Zγ ≥
∫
F∩{′
l(γ)+1=γ}
Z′ +
∑
δ∈Dγ
∫
F∩{′
l(γ)+1=δ}
Zδ (A.21)
≥
∫
F∩{′
l(γ)+1=γ}
X′ +
∑
δ∈Dγ
∫
F∩{′
l(γ)+1=δ}
X′(δ) (A.22)
=
∫
F∩{′
l(γ)+1=γ}
X′ +
∫
F∩{′
l(γ)+1 ̸=γ}
X′ (A.23)
=
∫
F
X′ , (A.24)
where the first inequality results from the supermartingale property of Zγ and the second
holds by hypothesis. Consequently, the inequality in (A.18) holds. 
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Theorem 1 implies that the transformed strategy   ′((0)) defined by (A.17) is an optimal
solution of (A.12). Thus, Z(0) = EQ(X  ′((0))|G(0)) equals V0, i.e. the value of the derivative,
and—due to the one-to-one correspondence—an optimal strategy exists.
The final step is to show (via induction) that the optimal transformed strategy   ′((0)) is
equivalent via (A.9) and (A.10) to the strategy defined by (1.11) to (1.13). The equivalence
is trivial for n = 0. Assume it holds for n. Let H = {( 0, ...,  n) = γ} ∩ {D(γ) = δ∗} ∩ {τ   ≥
n} ∈ Gγ . As δ∗ is a direct successor of γ, its first n elements form γ. By (A.9) we have
 n+1 = L(  ′n+1) = δ∗n+1 on H. It suffices to show that δ∗n+1 equals the smallest element of I
larger than γn that maximizes EQ
(
exp
(
− ∫ δn+1γn r(s)ds)Vδn+1∣∣∣F n) on H with δ ∈ Dγ .
First, define for each ′ ∈ Aγ :
Xn′ = exp
− ∫ L
(
′
l(′)
)
γn
r(s)ds
X
L
(
′
l(′)
) − TC
L
(
′
l(′)
)
−
l(′)∑
i=n
exp
(
−
∫ L(′i)
γn
r(s)ds
)
DCL(′i).
(A.25)
E(Xn′ |Gγ) equals the “value” of the derivative in γn if the strategy ′ is applied. By
definition, we have EQ(Zδ∗ |Gγ) ≥ EQ(Zδ|Gγ) for all δ ∈ Dγ on H. Given (A.18), Zδ =
EQ(X  ′(δ)|Gδ) holds, and, thus,
EQ(X  ′(δ∗)|Gγ) ≥ EQ(X  ′(δ)|Gγ) for all δ ∈ Dγ on H. (A.26)
As the   ′(δ) and   ′(δ∗) coincide in their first n elements, this implies:
EQ(Xn  ′(δ∗)|Gγ) ≥ EQ(Xn  ′(δ)|Gγ) for all δ ∈ Dγ on H, (A.27)
which implies that δ∗n+1 fulfills the above required condition. Analogue considerations hold
for τ   .
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Figures
Figure 1: Valuation of a putable bond dependent on transaction and decision costs
This figure shows the exemplary valuation of a putable bond dependent on transaction and decision costs. The analysis is based on
an accrued-coupon bond that offers a yearly coupon of 5% in a zero bond structure over a maturity of 7 years and grants the investor
additionally an early exercise right. The interest rate environment is estimated using the 1-factor-model of Hull and White (1990) with
κ = 20%, σ = 2.5% and θ adjusted to a long-term interest rate of 5%. For the valuation a Monte-Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths with
a step size of t = 1/12 (84 steps) and least squares regression methods are applied.
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Figure 2: Average number of decisions dependent on transaction and decision costs
This figure shows the average optimal number of decisions according to the optimal decision strategy for an exemplary putable bond
dependent on transaction and decision costs. The analysis is based on an accrued-coupon bond that offers a yearly coupon of 5% in a
zero bond structure over a maturity of 7 years and grants the investor additionally an early exercise right. The interest rate environment
is estimated using the 1-factor-model of Hull and White (1990) with κ = 20%, σ = 2.5% and θ adjusted to a long-term interest rate of
5%. For the valuation a Monte-Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths with a step size of t = 1/12 (84 steps) and least squares regression
methods are applied, whereby the respective averages are calculated under the risk-neutral measure Q over all simulated paths.
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Figure 3: Average decision interval dependent on transaction and decision costs
This figure shows the average duration between two decision points (“decision interval”) in steps according to the optimal decision strategy
for an exemplary putable bond dependent on transaction and decision costs. The analysis is based on an accrued-coupon bond that offers
a yearly coupon of 5% in a zero bond structure over a maturity of 7 years and grants the investor additionally an early exercise right.
The interest rate environment is estimated using the 1-factor-model of Hull and White (1990) with κ = 20%, σ = 2.5% and θ adjusted to
a long-term interest rate of 5%. For the valuation a Monte-Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths with a step size of t = 1/12 (84 steps)
and least squares regression methods are applied, whereby the respective averages are calculated under the risk-neutral measure Q over
all simulated paths.
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Figure 4: Sensitivities of value, number of decisions and decision interval regarding volatility
This figure presents a sensitivity analysis of the value and the optimal decision strategy, i.e. the average optimal number of decisions and
the average decision interval (denoted in steps, minimum 1 step to maximum 84 steps), regarding changes in the interest rate volatility.
The analysis is based on an accrued-coupon bond that offers a yearly coupon of 5% in a zero bond structure over a maturity of 7 years and
grants the investor additionally an early exercise right. The interest rate environment is estimated using the 1-factor-model of Hull and
White (1990) with κ = 20%, σ as shown and θ adjusted to a long-term interest rate of 5%. For the valuation a Monte-Carlo simulation
with 10,000 paths with a step size of t = 1/12 (84 steps) and least squares regression methods are applied, whereby the respective
averages are calculated under the risk-neutral measure Q over all simulated paths.
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Figure 5: Cumulative exercise distributions over time dependent on selected transaction and
decision costs
This figure shows cumulative early exercise distributions for an exemplary putable bond over time dependent on selected transaction
and decision costs. The analysis is based on an accrued-coupon bond that offers a yearly coupon of 5% in a zero bond structure over
a maturity of 7 years and grants the investor additionally an early exercise right. The interest rate environment is estimated using the
1-factor-model of Hull and White (1990) with κ = 20%, σ = 2.5% and θ adjusted to a long-term interest rate of 5%. For the valuation a
Monte-Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths with a step size of t = 1/12 (84 steps) and least squares regression methods are applied.
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Figure 6: GFSN early exercise rates per month in relation to hold-to-exercise ratio
This figure shows the early exercise rates per month for Type A and B GFSN over time and in relation to the respective hold-to-exercise
ratio, which is defined as the fraction of the present value of a GFSN without option to its exercise value. The upper charts present the
development of the early exercise rates over time (except for the initial one-year blocking period) for all 178 exercisable GFSN issuances.
The middle charts exhibit the development of the hold-to-exercise ratios for all GFSN over time. The lower charts plot the economic
relation between the hold-to-exercise ratio and the early exercise rates per month. There are no exercises before 1997 due to the initial
blocking period.
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Figure 7: Average monthly GFSN exercise rates
This figure presents the average monthly early exercise rates over all exercisable GFSN of Type A and B from July 1996 to February 2009.
There are no exercises before 1997 due to the initial one-year blocking period. Additionally, the development of the respective German
1-year and 10-year spot rates (according to Deutsche Bundesbank) are depicted.
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Figure 8: Calibration results and model fit
This figure shows the fit of the overall calibration and the estimated beta distributions for transaction and decision costs for both Type
A and B GFSN based on the results in the first column of Table 4. The upper charts present a comparison between the mean modeled
early exercise rates per month and the empirical observations. The lower charts exhibit the estimated cost distributions over the defined
clusters.
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Figure 9: Exemplary decision tree
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Tables
Table 1: GFSN coupon structure and spot rates
Type A and Type B GFSN Type B GFSN
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7
Yearly Mean 2.745 3.199 3.627 4.034 4.409 4.821 4.944
coupon in % Median 2.750 3.250 3.625 4.000 4.250 4.500 4.750
Min. 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500 3.250 3.500 3.500
Max. 4.500 4.750 5.500 6.250 6.750 7.500 7.500
Std. dev. 0.810 0.811 0.805 0.819 0.856 0.927 0.924
Spot rate at Mean 3.387 3.540 3.700 3.853 3.994 4.122 4.235
issuance in % Median 3.429 3.599 3.779 3.898 3.936 4.021 4.117
Min. 1.909 2.061 2.207 2.383 2.562 2.730 2.882
Max. 5.119 5.216 5.267 5.293 5.608 5.940 6.202
Std. dev. 0.821 0.766 0.727 0.709 0.707 0.713 0.724
The table exhibits statistics on the coupon offerings for Type A and B GFSN for all 204 issuances (102 Type A, 102 Type B) in
our sample period from July 1996 to February 2009 and on the corresponding German spot rates. For year 1 to 6 identical coupons
are offered for Type A and B at each issuance date, whereas the coupons in year 7 are only applicable for Type B. The spot rates
represent the term structure of interest rates on listed Federal securities (method by Svensson) at the respective issuance date
according to Deutsche Bundesbank.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for GFSN data set
German Federal Saving Notes (GFSN) Individual Investor accounts
Type A Type B Type A Type B
Total issuances 102 102 Total 558,122 361,141
Number of Mean 39,719 26,192 Number of Mean 3.617 4.005
investors per Median 29,175 19,155 different GFSN Median 1.000 1.000
GFSN p5 8,711 7,639 investments per p5 1.000 1.000
p95 100,068 54,037 account p95 13.000 16.000
Std. dev. 32,686 17,385 Std. dev. 6.761 8.559
Volume in em Mean 103.220 31.666 Investment Mean 21,087 9,721
per GFSN Median 77.778 25.703 volume in e per Median 9,746 3,067
p5 17.139 8.140 GFSN per account p5 511 255
p95 254.559 66.864 p95 79,897 37,807
Std. dev. 89.958 22.664 Std. dev. 41,240 27,702
Number of 547,864 333,232 Number of 148,812 95,604
early exercises accounts with (27%) (26%)
early exercises
Number of Mean 6,156 3,744 Number of Mean 0.982 0.923
early exercises Median 5,508 3,718 early exercises Median 0.000 0.000
per GFSN p5 514 444 per account p5 0.000 0.000
p95 13,286 8,275 p95 5.000 4.000
Std. dev. 4,173 2,355 Std. dev. 3.116 3.331
Early exercise Mean 17.868 6.740 Early exercise Mean 2,849 1,661
volume in em Median 13.989 5.053 volume in e per Median 0 0
per GFSN p5 0.780 0.332 GFSN per account p5 0 0
p95 46.914 17.164 p95 15,850 9,203
Std. dev. 15.873 6.401 Std. dev. 8,669 5,937
Monthly early Mean 0.570 0.536
exercise rates in % Median 0.240 0.283
per GFSN p5 0.100 0.096
p95 2.397 1.892
Std. dev. 1.028 0.810
The tables shows summary statistics on the GFSN data set for our sample period from July 1996 to February 2009. Overall 204 GFSN and
812,750 accounts with 881,096 early exercises are considered. The statistics on early exercises are based only on the 178 exercisable GFSN
(after the initial one-year blocking period) from July 1996 to February 2008. em stands for emillion.
Table 3: Parameters for essentially affine three-factor model
δ β κ θ
Estimated 0.0106 1.0000 0.0365 0.0000 0.0000 15.0218
parameters 0.0002 4.0189 -0.4965 -0.1798 0.3223 40.8385
0.0000 2.5195 0.4256 -2.2507 1.6917 50.3077
0.0013
The table shows the estimated parameters for an essentially affine three-factor interest term
structure model EA1(3) on a weekly basis with one factor affecting the conditional variance
matrix for the German market from July 1996 to February 2009. The model is defined as rt =
δ0 + δ′Yt, whereby the dynamics of Y are modeled by dYt = KQ(θQ − Yti )dt+ 
√
StdW˜t
and S is given by St,j,j = αj + β′jY (t).
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Table 4: Calibration results
Overall Sub-sample Sub-sample
1996-2009 1996-2002 2003-2009
Type A Type B Type A Type B Type A Type B
Mean squared error in % 0.0036 0.0025 0.0036 0.0025 0.0069 0.0035
Mean absolute error in % 0.2827 0.2627 0.3061 0.3276 0.5059 0.3860
Mean R2 (on single GFSN level) in % 49.946 46.606 56.989 52.701 52.519 50.091
Consolidated R2 (mean exercise rates) in % 78.915 72.715 86.005 77.338 70.105 58.351
Beta distribution of αTC 1.652 1.397 0.666 1.410 1.771 1.746
transaction costs βTC 0.637 0.607 0.506 0.929 0.754 1.002
Std. dev. 0.247 0.265 0.336 0.268 0.244 0.249
Skewness -0.838 -0.742 -0.257 -0.354 -0.731 -0.459
Mean transaction costs in % TC 3.993 3.791 2.911 2.707 3.693 2.909
Median transaction costs in % TC 2.500 2.500 1.000 1.000 2.500 1.000
Beta distribution of αDC 0.132 0.350 0.123 0.523 0.275 0.512
decision costs βDC 0.679 0.687 0.825 1.642 1.421 0.796
Std. dev. 0.275 0.331 0.240 0.241 0.224 0.321
Skewness 1.745 0.647 2.093 1.031 1.629 0.408
Mean decision costs in % DC 0.062 0.138 0.043 0.054 0.036 0.155
Median decision costs in % DC 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.025
Passive investors in % ω 56.340 52.741 58.403 58.803 61.786 62.655
Sluggish investors in % s 65.000 64.955 62.911 64.890 64.509 63.960
Additional exercises first month EERb 2.092 2.426 3.572 3.175 1.947 3.175
after blocking period in %
Exogenous early exercises DT99 1.984 2.258
in % (dummies) DT06 1.167 1.271
DY E 0.568 0.804 0.792
The table shows calibration results for different data samples. The results in the first column are based on a calibration on the
whole sample period from July 1996 to February 2009, while for the second and third column the calibration is based only on a
sub-sample from July 1996 to December 2002 respectively on a sub-sample from January 2003 to February 2009. For the calibration
all exercisable GFSN are valued based on the model of Section 2.1 using Monte-Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths with a step size
of t = 1/12 (84 steps) and applying least square regression methods. The interest structure is modeled based on an essentially
affine interest term structure model on a weekly basis. Accordingly, the calibration parameters are estimated via a multidimensional
non-linear minimization algorithm based on the interior-point method with a MSE change tolerance of 0.000001% as stopping criterion.
Additionally, the results are checked for local minima by re-running the calibration 250 times with random start parameters. The base
exercise rate is fixed to the empirical observed value of 0.160% to ensure robustness of the calibration. The tax-related dummies are
only considered for Type B GFSN (DT stands for tax changes, DYE for the year-end-effect).
Table 5: Comparison of standard model and empirical valuation based on calibration
Value of early exercise right in GFSN in % Advantage for issuer
Standard model (no transaction Empirical Standard model minus
and decision costs) (according to calibration) empirical valuation
Type A Type B Type A Type B Type A Type B
Mean 2.2433 2.9859 0.2009 1.1411 2.0424 1.8449
Median 1.9486 2.7005 0.1165 0.9372 1.8559 1.7604
p5 1.1071 1.3672 -0.1469 -0.1680 1.1741 1.3136
p95 4.0102 5.2208 0.8194 2.8956 3.2183 2.4394
Std. dev. 0.9704 1.2373 0.3134 1.0210 0.6791 0.4108
The table shows statistics on the valuation of the option component of all 178 exercisable GFSN at issuance in the sample period. The
left part compares the valuation according to standard market models without transaction and decision costs and the empirical valuation
based on the calibration results of Table 4 except the tax dummies. The right part shows statistics on the spread between the standard
model and the empirical valuation.
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1 Introduction
Individual Investors’ use of stocks and equity derivatives has been a major field of re-
search over the last two decades. A variety of papers have investigated Individual Investors’
trading and exercise behavior (e.g., Shefrin and Stratman, 1985; Odean, 1999; Grinblatt and
Keloharju, 2001; Poteshman and Serbin, 2003; Barber and Odean, 2011; Barraclough and
Whaley, 2012), have analyzed investors’ performance (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2000; Barber
et al., 2009; Bauer et al., 2009), have studied differences dependent on personal characteris-
tics (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001; Dorn and Huberman, 2005) and examined the influence
of exogenous effects, such as taxes (e.g., Badrinath and Lewellen, 1991; Ivkovic et al., 2005).
In contrast, surprisingly little is known about Individual Investors’ empirical behavior with
regard to fixed-income products and derivatives,1 even though interest-earning products,
such as bonds, redeemable long-term deposits or savings bonds, are a common part of many
Individual Investors’ portfolios (see Bricker et al., 2012).
This paper therefore contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive empirical
analysis of Individual Investors’ use of early exercise rights in German governmental non-
tradable putable bonds. Moreover, as we provide several new insights into the general exercise
behavior of Individual Investors, we expect our results also to be of considerable interest for,
e.g., banks and other issuers that offer similar products with embedded options to this specific
investor class.
We basically cover three research questions. First, we analyze determinants of early
exercises. In this context we focus on the following dimensions: economic benefit of exercis-
ing, investment history, environmental circumstances, product characteristics and investors’
1A notable exception is the broad strand of papers on mortgages (e.g., Green and Shoven, 1986; Schwartz
and Toruos, 1989; Stanton, 1995; Deng et al., 2005), which however focus mostly on rather specific questions
related to prepayments, defaults or refinancing.
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personal characteristics. Second, we examine the economic reasonableness of Individual In-
vestors’ exercise behavior and its determinants. More specifically, we analyze how often the
empirically observed exercise decisions are financially reasonable according to theory, how of-
ten investors fail to exploit attractive opportunities and what excess returns investors achieve
through early exercising. Third, we aim at discovering general investment and exercise mo-
tives of Individual Investors in putable bonds.
Our study is based on a not-publicly available data set that comprises circa 31 million
decisions of more than 220,000 Individual Investors to hold or exercise putable bonds (Ger-
man Federal Saving Notes, GFSN) over a time horizon of 13 years.2 Besides the immense
size and the long sample period our data set offers additional advantages, which allow us to
draw a very comprehensive picture of Individual Investors’ financial behavior. First of all, the
fixed-income products we analyze (GFSN) are sold only to Individual Investors. Therefore,
unlike many studies on the equity market (e.g., Poteshman and Serbin, 2003; Pool et al.,
2008; Barraclough and Whaley, 2012) we do not have to distinguish between different market
participants, but can exclusively analyze Individual Investors’ decisions. Moreover, GFSN
cannot be traded on a secondary market. Hence, as an investor’s only possibility to mone-
tize a GFSN investment is to use the early exercise right, we obtain a more comprehensive
picture of Individual Investors’ exercise behavior than in the case of tradable products, such
as tradable equity options. Finally, due to the detailed structure of the data set we can con-
duct analyses on an individual account level, whereas adjacent studies (e.g., Overdahl and
Martin, 1994; Finucane, 1997; Lakonishok et al., 2007; Barraclough and Whaley, 2012) must
typically rely on aggregated data sets or netted volumes. Consequently, this paper is, to
the best of our knowledge, also first in studying the relations of individual exercise decisions
2Our data set is similar to the data analyzed in Eickholt et al. (2014). Yet, in this paper we focus on
a subsample of holding and exercise decisions on an individual account level, whereas the study of Eickholt
et al. (2014) uses consolidated exercise ratios per product.
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to, e.g., an investor’s experience, former decisions on the investment position and personal
characteristics.
As indicated, we start our analysis with examining the determinants of Individual In-
vestors’ early exercises of putable bonds. Using pooled and random-effects logit regressions,
our main findings are as follows: first, the economic benefit is an important determinant.
The probability of an exercise increases significantly with a diminishing ratio of present value
to exercise value. Second, the exercise probability depends on the investment and decision
history. We observe delayed reactions to market changes within the last 6 months. Third,
strong movements in the equity market are accompanied by enhanced exercise activities in
GFSN, which indicates that Individual Investors use the early exercise right to liquidate in-
vestments so as to participate in attractive growth phases of other markets. Similarly, our
results suggest—in an analogy to the equity market (e.g., Badrinath and Lewellen, 1991; Grin-
blatt and Keloharju, 2001; Ivkovic et al., 2005; Liedtka and Nayar, 2012)—that the exercise
option is broadly used to optimize tax payments. Fourth, we find differences in the exercise
probability related to product characteristics. Besides a product’s maturity, the steepness
of the coupon structure and the time until the next coupon payment also seem to have an
influence on Individual Investors’ decision-making. Our analysis shows that investors prefer—
valuation, maturity and all else being equal—products with a high final coupon payment to
products with a flatter coupon structure, which we attribute to psychological reasons. More-
over, it becomes obvious that investors hesitate to exercise a GFSN shortly before a coupon
payment date, which—referring to the mental accounting concept (e.g., Shefrin and Stat-
man, 1984; Szymanowska et al., 2009)—implies that investors differentiate between accrued
interests and cash payouts. Fifth, the exercise frequency varies depending on an investor’s
portfolio and personal characteristics. For instance, we note that experience in early exercis-
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ing a GFSN investment leads to an increased probability of another exercise, which might be
due to lower information costs or learning effects (compare Nicolosi et al., 2009). As another
example, we find that investors between 20 and 40 years of age have a significantly higher
exercise probability than other investors groups. We ascribe this to a potentially increased
liquidity demand at that stage of life due to, e.g., the purchase of a house.
Next, we study the economic reasonableness of Individual Investors’ exercise behavior.
Evaluating all decisions to hold or exercise early for each month and each product, our
major result is that the broad majority of early exercises (between 76% and 86%) occur at
times where it is not beneficial, i.e. where the exercise value lies (significantly) below the
continuation value. In addition, we find that Individual Investors regularly fail to exercise
(more) attractive exercise opportunities. Throughout our sample period more than 98% of
exercise rights in GFSN that should have been used remain unexercised. This extent of
“suboptimal” decisions in both directions is remarkably larger than in comparable studies
for the equity market (e.g., Poteshman and Serbin, 2003; Pool et al., 2008; Barraclough
and Whaley, 2012). Not surprisingly, we calculate an on average negative excess return
of exercising of circa -0.117% to -0.300% per year for our sample and conclude—consistent
with the study of, e.g., Bauer et al. (2009) for equity options—that only a small number of
Individual Investors achieves a better performance through early exercising putable bonds.
While this holds true for almost all investor subgroups, we again find differences depending
on personal characteristics. For instance, investors between the ages of 20 to 40 show an
even poorer exercise performance than other investor groups. In contrast, investors who use
the direct distribution channel stand out with a significantly higher share of economically
reasonable exercise decisions, which we attribute to a presumably higher financial literacy.
To sum it up, our main empirical findings in the first two analyses are that a broad range
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of factors determines early exercises of GFSN and that Individual Investors use their option
right predominantly when it is not economically advisable while they frequently forfeit (more)
attractive exercise opportunities. All this indicates that maximizing profit is not the main
motive of exercising. Literature typically relates such a non-performance-oriented behavior to
irrationality (e.g., Poteshman and Serbin, 2003; Pool et al., 2008; Barraclough and Whaley,
2012), a non-continuous monitoring of the investment (e.g., Stanton, 1995; Barraclough and
Whaley, 2012; Liao et al., 2013) and transaction costs (e.g., Stanton, 1995; Finucane, 1997;
Koziol, 2006). Yet, several patterns in the data let us assume that—besides these arguments—
a further factor influences Individual Investors’ decisions in the fixed-income market. Our
results suggest that the demand for liquidity and financial flexibility, driven by, e.g., exogenous
events or personal needs, is an important driver of early exercises.
Consequently, our third research interest is to further explore the general motives of In-
dividual Investors’ for holding and exercising putable bonds. For this, we run an exploratory
factor analysis based on consolidated information on investors’ investment and exercise strate-
gies in GFSN. Passing several robustness checks, the factor analysis isolates four to five latent
factors, which underlines our former argument that performance is not the sole decision crite-
rion. We interpret the latent factors as follows: the first and most important factor comprises
investors’ wish for liquidity and financial flexibility. The second factor represents the impor-
tance of the mid- and long-term value of an investment. The third factor isolates the desire
for performance and is associated with positive excess returns. In contrast, a fourth factor
summarizes an active “trading” strategy that does not result in higher investment yields, for
which reason we label this factor “activism”. Finally, the fifth factor represents an investor’s
sensitivity to changes in taxation. Not surprisingly, the relevance of these identified latent
factors differs among the investor base. Still, the overall results of the factor analysis suggest
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again that Individual Investors in putable bonds interpret their early exercise right more as
a financial flexibility feature than as an option to improve the investment performance.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the data set. Section 3 analyzes
the determinants of early exercising (Section 3.1), evaluates the economic reasonableness of
Individual Investors’ exercise behavior (Section 3.2), examines investors’ performance (Sec-
tion 3.3) and discusses implications (Section 3.4). Following these, Section 4 runs a factor
analysis to gain further insights into Individual Investors’ motives and decision-making on
putable bonds. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Product description
For our analyses we are able to utilize a large and unique data set from the German
Finance Agency (“Bundesrepublik Deutschland Finanzagentur GmbH”)3, which covers in-
vestment and early exercise decisions of Individual Investors in German Federal Saving Notes
(“Bundesschatzbriefe”, in the following GFSN). GFSN are basically standard putable bonds
issued by the Federal Republic of Germany for financing the government,4 which—most in-
teresting for our study—incorporate an early exercise option that gives the investor the right
to reclaim his investment plus accrued interests at any time during maturity after an initial
one-year blocking period.5 No fees or penalty payments are charged in the case of an early
3The German Finance Agency is a state-owned central service agency for Germany’s governmental bor-
rowing.
4While GFSN accounted for a significant share of Germany borrowing until the 1990s, the relevance has
decreased since then. Finally, due to high administrative costs, the German government decided in 2012
to stop offering products exclusively for Individual Investors and stopped issuing new GFSN. Nevertheless,
similar products are still sold by, e.g., banks.
5An additional restriction applies: the maximal exercise value per investor is capped at e5,000 within 30
interest days, which we ignore in the following.
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exercise. At each issuance date two types of GFSN are offered: Type A, a step-up bond
with a maturity of 6 years and yearly coupon payments and Type B, a step-up bond with a
maturity of 7 years where all coupons are accrued and paid at maturity.
Investors can purchase the current issuance of a GFSN at any time at nominal value
plus accrued interests. Regularly, following significant changes in market conditions, all open
issuances are closed and new GFSN of both Type A and Type B are issued with identical
coupon structures for the first six years. GFSN can be acquired in two ways. First, it is
possible to invest directly through the German Finance Agency via telephone, postal order
or online order. Second, GFSN can be purchased at banks, which however typically claim
custody fees for administering GFSN positions. Investors can shift their investments from an
account at a bank to a cost-free account at the German Finance Agency at any time.
Several advantages make GFSN a natural choice to analyze Individual Investors’ exer-
cise decisions in the fixed-income market. Most importantly, GFSN are sold exclusively to
Individual Investors,6 hence we do not have to distinguish in our analysis between different
investor types as in many adjacent studies (e.g., Poteshman and Serbin, 2003; Pool et al.,
2008; Barraclough and Whaley, 2012). Next, GFSN cannot be traded on a secondary mar-
ket. The only possibility of monetizing an investment is to use the exercise right and return
the product to the issuer, which gives us a very comprehensive picture of investors’ exer-
cise activities. Finally, GFSN are simple and standardized fixed-income products that have
been continuously offered in the same structure since the 1970s, which allows us to conduct
consistent cross-sectional and time-series analyses.
6Additionally, GFSN can also be acquired by resident institutions serving public benefit, charitable or
religious purposes, which we neglect in the following due to the very small share of overall investments.
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2.2 Summary statistics
Our data set comprehends—on a daily and single-account basis—all GFSN transactions
and early exercise decisions of 223,017 Individual Investors booked between July 1996 and
February 2009 in the German Finance Agency’s debt register account.78 Overall, these
transactions are spread over 204 issuances of Type A and B GFSN in the observation period
on 102 issuances dates. In addition, we have some information on each investor’s personal
characteristics. This detailed data structure on an individual account and daily level allows us
to link individual transactions to, e.g., an investor’s age, gender or investment history, which
is not possible in studies that must rely on aggregated data sets or ratios (e.g., Overdahl
and Martin, 1994; Finucane, 1997; Lakonishok et al., 2007; Barraclough and Whaley, 2012).
Table 1 presents selected summary statistics for the investor sample.
[Table 1 about here.]
In general, we have a broad and relatively balanced investor base that is very similar for both
Type A and Type B GFSN structures. For instance, there is an almost equal representation
of male (33.469% for Type A, 38.406% for Type B) and female (38.362%, 37.995%) investors
(no information for 28.169%, 23.598%). Similarly, we have a wide range of investor ages
(on average 43.551 years, 32.711 years) with a slightly positively skewed distribution, i.e.
there are somewhat more older than younger investors in our data set. There is also a
significant share of very young investors (in particular for the zero-bond structure of Type B
GFSN), which we mainly interpret as savings accounts in a child’s name for, e.g., education
costs. Concerning investors’ educational background, the data provides us with information
7Our data set is a randomly drawn sample of the original data that represents circa 25% of all accounts
at the German Finance Agency.
8We exclude accounts with an average transaction volume below e300 since for such small volumes the
early exercise right is of comparatively low importance.
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on doctoral degrees and professorships, which taken together form 4.150% (3.499%) of the
investors. Geographically, the investor base is widespread over Germany. We classify all
investors into four clusters of residence areas9 based on the first two digits of an investor’s
zip code, which we have in the data, and conclude that the majority of investors in GFSN
live in less populated areas (51.371%, 51.417%), while a smaller number (15.380%, 15.089%)
lives in highly populated areas or cities. Finally, we note that more than half of the investors
prefer to acquire GFSN indirectly (59.181%, 54.011%) via banks and transfer their accounts
later to the German Finance Agency, even though typically custody and administration are
only cost-free at the German Finance Agency.10 Next, Table 2 summarizes the activities of
our investor sample.
[Table 2 about here.]
The statistics show that most investors invested rarely or only once in GFSN during the
sample period. The average number of investments is comparatively small with only 3.147
investments per investor for Type A and 2.790 for the less popular structure of Type B GFSN.
Furthermore, we find small median overall investment volumes of only e10,226 and e4,090
respectively, whereby the high variances for both product types indicate that there are also
investors with significantly higher investment volumes and trading frequencies. In general, we
attribute the low activity level in our sample to the strict restriction of GFSN to Individual
Investors. With institutional investors we would expect considerably more transactions and
9As a proxy we use the average population density per sq. km according to German Federal Statistics Office
(2009) and define the following clusters: <250 = sparsely, 250-750 = moderately, >750 = highly populated
area. In a fourth cluster we group investors living in large cities, which we identify by their short double-digit
zip codes that are allocated only to major cities in Germany.
10Indirect distribution means in this paper that an investor purchases a GFSN at a bank and transfers his
investment later to the German Finance Agency. In contrast, we define the preferred distribution channel as
direct if an investor executes at least one direct transaction in the overall observation period. We are aware
that this classification might produce a bias towards direct distribution since some investors use both channels.
On the other hand we do not have direct transactions in our data set from 1996 to 1999 as these were not
possible during these times.
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higher investment sums.
The right to redeem early a GFSN investment is frequently used (fourth to sixth row).
On average each investor in Type A GFSN exercised early 0.526 times (0.517 for Type B)
throughout the sample period resulting in a mean overall exercise volume of e1,812 (e1,284).
Again the standard deviation is high with 1.491 (1.483) exercises per investor, which is also
emphasized by the median of 0 (0) and the 95 percent quantile of 2.000 (2.000) exercises per
investor account. The high variance here is a first indicator that Individual Investors use
early exercise rights very heterogeneously. We further discuss this issue in a later section.
Finally, the last two rows of Table 2 outline investors’ use of the exercise option over
time. As proxy we calculate a monthly early exercise rate per GFSN, defined as the ratio of
number of exercises to the number of overall investments ( Number of exercisesNumber of investments). On average
this rate amounts to circa 0.626% (0.518%) per month and GFSN, whereby the median value
is smaller due to several exercise peaks throughout our observation period. Interestingly, a
quite constant base exercise rate seems to exist over all GFSN. Even the 5 percent quantile
of the exercise rates still lies at around 0.081% (0.081%), which implies that exercises occur
independently of the market environment.
2.3 Variables
To investigate Individual Investors’ decisions in the course of time and to identify determi-
nants of early exercises we convert the described transaction data to a longitudinal structure
on a monthly basis. The resulting data panel comprises circa 31 million decisions by the
investor base to hold or exercise a GFSN, which is a noticeably larger sample than that in
most studies on early exercises so far. Moreover, we comprehend the data set with several
variables and ratios (Table 3 contains a detailed overview) in the following categories to ac-
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count for potential influences on investors’ decisions: economic benefit, investment history,
environmental circumstances, product characteristics, portfolio and personal characteristics.
[Table 3 about here.]
Economic benefit
We use the ratio of present value of a GFSN to its exercise value (PVEV) to measure the
economic advantage of a potential early exercise:
PV EV = Present value of GFSNExercise value of GFSN . (2.1)
According to standard theory it is optimal to use the exercise right as soon as the present
value equals the exercise value. This means only an early exercise at a PVEV-ratio of 1 can
be classified as economically reasonable,11 whereas an exercise is the more disadvantageous
the higher the PVEV-ratio rises above 1.
The exercise value of a GFSN is simply the notional amount plus accrued interests. For
the calculation of the present value, we have to determine the value of the respective early
exercise right, which basically equals an American put option. Our first step in this valuation
is to model the underlying interest rate dynamics, applying an essentially affine 3-factor term
structure model EA1(3) on a weekly basis according to Dai and Singleton (2000). We utilize
here the parameterization by Eickholt et al. (2014), who calibrate this model to German
term structures over the period from 1996 to 2009. Subsequently, we refer to standard op-
tion theory and apply the least-squares simulation approach as suggested by Longstaff and
Schwartz (2001), carrying out Monte-Carlo simulations with 10,000 paths, whereby we use
11For simplicity, we define an exercise decision as reasonable if the PVEV-ratio equals 1 at the exercise date
regardless of the investment history, even though the exercise decision is theoretically only “optimal” if the
exercise happens at the first feasible opportunity. This means, the estimated numbers in this paper represent
a lower bound for the share of economically disadvantageous exercise decisions.
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Euler discretization on a monthly basis and take the first four monomials as basis function.
Moreover, we apply the interleaving estimator according to Glasserman (2004) to mitigate
the effects of a potential high bias due to the backward induction approach and of a potential
low bias due to a suboptimal stopping rule.
Investment history
Considering the investment history allows us to set Individual Investors’ behavior in relation
to, e.g., former valuation movements and former decisions. Accordingly, our first variable
MISSEDALL measures for each GFSN and month how many economically attractive exer-
cise opportunities an investor has ignored so far, quantified by the number of months when the
PVEV-ratio equaled 1. The second variable MISSED6, defined as the number of economically
reasonable exercise months omitted within the last half year, controls for short-term effects
and examines whether investors react sluggishly to former exercise opportunities, which is a
well known pattern for small traders in equity products (e.g., Hvidkjaer, 2011). Finally, we
also incorporate the investment volume (VOLUME).
Environmental circumstances
We control for four environmental factors. First, we consider the development of the German
stock index CDAX as proxy for potential investment yields in the equity class. Based on the
assumption that mainly large changes of the CDAX may have an influence on early exercises
in the fixed-income market, the dummy variables CDAX10+ and CDAX10- signal increases
or decreases of the CDAX of more than 10% within one month. Focusing on longer trends,
the dummy variables CDAX25+ and CDAX25- cover index changes of more than 25% within
6 months. Second, VOLDAX and VOLINT measure the option-implied 45-day volatility of
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the German stock market (using the VDAX index) and the volatility of the German 5-year
spot rate estimated from weekly returns over a 6-month window to encompass investors’ reac-
tion to uncertainties in the markets. Third, the dummy variable NEWMARKET controls for
abnormal capital outflows to the “New Market” between 1998 and 2000, a new stock segment
in Germany which attracted considerable attention among Individual Investors during this
period. Fourth, we account for tax effects, whereby we focus on Type B GFSN since changes
in the tax legislation have a much higher relevance for products with a zero-bond structure—
as all coupon payments are taxed at the same time—than for coupon-paying products for
which personal tax allowances can be utilized each year. During our observation period two
major changes occurred in the German tax legislation. In both years 2000 and 2006 Indi-
vidual Investors’ tax allowances were severely reduced, which might have made it attractive
for investors to exercise GFSN positions early shortly before the new regulations became
effective—even when a valuation was clearly above the exercise value—to optimize personal
tax debts. Accordingly, our variables TAX99 and TAX06 are designed to capture potential
extraordinary exercise activities in November and December 1999 and 2005, respectively. In
addition, the dummy YEAREND controls for tax-motivated early exercises at the end of the
year when Individual Investors typically review their tax burdens and allowances.
Product characteristics
While the general structure of GFSN remains constant over all issuances in our sample pe-
riod, the offered coupons are typically adapted to current market circumstances with every
issuance. Accordingly, we have a broad range of coupon structures among the 204 GFSN
offerings in our sample. To determine if visual or psychological factors, such as the shape of
the coupon structure or shortly awaited coupon payments affect an investor’s behavior, we
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consider three variables. First, we calculate the average yearly growth of coupon payments
until maturity as an indicator for the steepness of the coupon structure (UPSTEEP). Sec-
ond, we compute for each GFSN and month the duration in years (DURATION) of the bond
component, which we interpret as the weighted average time until an investor receives all
coupon payments and the initial investment. For the calculation we refer to the definition
of Fisher and Weil (1971). Third, the dummy variable COUPON, which is only relevant for
Type A GFSN, signals if a coupon payment occurs within the next 60 days.
Lastly, we incorporate the dummy variables BLOCK and LIFETIME (for Type A GFSN).
BLOCK controls for potential increased exercise activities in the first month after the initial
one-year blocking period. LIFETIME is the elapsed time since issuance.12
Portfolio characteristics
Besides personal attributes, such as age or gender, we also account for an investor’s experi-
ence in GFSN. We define four proxies: the number of former personal investments in GFSN
(INVESTS), the sum of overall investment volumes so far (INVESTSUM), a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the investor has made use of the early exercise right once before for a
GFSN investment (EXERCISED) and a dummy variable signaling if he has exercised early at
an economically opportune time once before (PERFORMED) as indicated by a PVEV-ratio
at exercise of 1.
12Due to the zero-bond structure of Type B GFSN the variables LIFETIME and DURATION are for this
type perfectly correlated, wherefore we neglect the LIFETIME variable for Type B in the following regressions.
For Type A GFSN the lifetime is also correlated to the duration, which might potentially result in inflated
standard errors. However, running the following regressions with orthogonalized regressors leads to similar
findings, so that we decided to continue with the described variables.
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3 Analysis of early exercise decisions
3.1 Determinants
In this section we use the described panel data set to examine determinants of Individual
Investors’ early exercise decisions. We apply pooled and random-effects logit regressions to
estimate the influence of our above-mentioned variables (see Table 3) on the probability of
an exercise. For the panel regression we consider that each GFSN per investor represents an
own group of observations, whereby the number of observations ranges from 1 for GFSN that
are exercised early in the first month after the blocking period, to a maximum of 60 (72 for
Type B) for investments held until maturity.
Our analyses are positioned at the very low end of the logit distribution due to the small
number of exercise events compared to non-exercise events (as shown in Table 2, the exercise
rate for most GFSN lies below 1% per month), which could lead to biased coefficient estimates
and standard errors (see King and Zeng, 2001). Yet, rare-event regressions as introduced by
King and Zeng (2001) result in only minor deviations in the estimates, wherefore we choose
to continue with standard estimators due to the better handling and improved comparabil-
ity. We also run several robustness checks—not reported here—based on time and investor
subsamples, which lead to consistent findings. Table 4 contains the regression results on our
overall data set and the respective marginal effects (dy/dx) at means indicating the ceteris
paribus effect of changes of the respective variable (fourth and seventh column). We use
robust standard errors in this and all following regressions (see Huber, 1967; White, 1980,
1982).
[Table 4 about here.]
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Beginning with the overall model output, we get a pseudo-R2 of 17.00% for the pooled regres-
sion and 19.78% for the panel analysis (15.17% and 19.27%). We emphasize six regression
results: first, the probability of the option being exercised is related to the economic benefit
of an early exercise. A decreasing PVEV-ratio goes hand-in-hand with an increasing exercise
probability, which implies that the average investor is sensitive to changes in the value of
his investment. Second, the investment history has a statistically significant influence. The
positive coefficients for MISSED6 and MISSEDALL indicate that the probability of an exer-
cise increases with the number of missed economically advantageous exercise opportunities.
While the influence of MISSED6 might be attributed to delayed or sluggish responses to ear-
lier market or value changes, the positive loading for MISSEDALL is a more surprising result,
as we would expect Individual Investors who aim to maximize their investment performance
to utilize one of the first economically reasonable exercise opportunities to shift investments
or re-arrange their portfolio. We further investigate this issue and how frequently investors
exploit arising exercise chances in Section 3.2.
Third, environmental influences have a strong impact. We find that significant movements
in the equity segment (CDAX) and the launch of the “New Market” in Germany are accompa-
nied by increasing exercise activity, which suggests that investors use the early exercise right
to liquidate investments so as to participate in attractive growth phases of other markets.
On the other hand, the exercise probability diminishes in times of severe equity market drops
(CDAX25−) and high volatility in the interest term structure (VOLINT). We trace this to
a higher attractivenesses of fixed-income investments in times of bear equity markets and
in times of higher uncertainty. Finally, the significantly positive coefficient for the tax vari-
ables indicates that—in an analogy to the equity market (e.g., Badrinath and Lewellen, 1991;
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Ivkovic et al., 2005; Liedtka and Nayar, 2012)—Individual
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Investors use the exercise right broadly to react to tax changes and to optimize their tax
debt.
Fourth, the probability of an early exercise depends on product characteristics. We find
a in general positive influence of the duration (DURATION) and a (in most cases) negative
loading regarding the steepness of the upcoming coupon structure (UPSTEEP). Addition-
ally, we note that investors hesitate to exercise early shortly before a coupon payment date
(COUPON). Such behavior cannot be justified with standard economic arguments as, accord-
ing to theory, an exercise decision should only be based on the current valuation regardless
of the upcoming coupon structure. Similarly, there is no structural advantage to waiting
until a coupon payment, as accrued interests are considered at an early exercise. Hence,
we interpret the empirical patterns related to the product structure as psychological effects.
Apparently, Individual Investors value GFSN with increasing coupon payments more highly
than almost identical products that offer a flatter coupon structure. Moreover, the reduced
exercise probability before coupon payment dates implies that investors differentiate between
accrued interests and cash payouts and thus use “mental accounting” (e.g., Shefrin and Stat-
man, 1984; Szymanowska et al., 2009). Lastly, we note that there is a peak in exercise rates
in the first month after the blocking period.
Fifth, the early exercise frequency differs among investor groups. The regressions reveal
that experience in exercising is associated with a higher early exercise probability (EXER-
CISED). This effect is even stronger if the investor has exercised at an economically rea-
sonable point in time (PERFORMED). We attribute both effects to experienced investors
having greater financial literacy, lower information costs and less inhibition in using the right
to exercise. On the other hand, our two more general portfolio variables—the number of in-
vestments and the overall investment volume so far—show negative coefficients, which might
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be due to less exercise activity of the part of wealthy investors (see also Dhar and Zhu, 2006).
Sixth, male investors and investors between 20 and 40 years of age use the exercise right
more often, while investors holding a doctoral degree and investors who acquire directly
through the German Finance Agency are slightly less likely to exercise. An investor’s geo-
graphical location has no statistical influence. We further discuss the apparent differences in
exercise probability among the investor base at the end of this section.
Our main conclusion in this first analysis is that a broad range of factors cause Individual
Investors to exercise early. As economic arguments are only one determinant among several
other influence factors, it seems natural to assume that not all early exercises of GFSN
are financial advantageous. Hence, the next section focuses on examining the economic
reasonableness of investors’ decision-making.
3.2 Economic reasonableness
In this section we investigate the economic reasonableness of Individual Investors’ exercise
behavior. According to standard theory a putable bond should be exercised as soon as its
present value equals the exercise value, which implies a PVEV-ratio of 1. In contrast, there
should occur no early exercises if the PVEV-ratio is greater than 1. We use this definition
to determine how many early exercise decisions in our data set are economically reasonable
and how many attractive exercise opportunities investors exploit or forgo over time. Table 5
contains the results of this economic analysis.
[Table 5 about here.]
The left part of Panel A shows that the majority of early exercises take place when it is not
economically reasonable. For Type A GFSN, about 75.674% of early exercises are financially
disadvantageous. For Type B, this share even amounts to 86.061%. In other words, only
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24.326% (13.939%) of the empirical exercise decisions in our data set comply with the con-
siderations in standard option pricing theory, namely that exercises should occur only at a
PVEV-ratio of 1. Instead, we observe exercises at a broad range of valuations. In fact, a more
detailed analysis—not reported here—reveals that the largest share of exercises (45.778% and
50.743%) can be construed as clearly economically disadvantageous, with a PVEV-ratio of
greater than 1.03. This extent of “suboptimal” decisions of Individual Investors in GFSN
is markedly larger than in comparable studies for equity derivatives (e.g., Poteshman and
Serbin, 2003). It is also another indicator that enhancing the investment performance is not
the primary motive of Individual Investors’ exercise decisions.
Next, we use the calculated PVEV-ratio per month and GFSN to determine how fre-
quently Individual Investors take advantage of upcoming attractive exercise opportunities
(right part of Panel A). This means we extend our analysis beyond the investor’s final early
exercise and also consider all previous decisions to continue holding the investment. In line
with our former findings the results reveal that Individual Investors act with much less finan-
cial sophistication than we would expect from, for example, institutional investors. In fact,
overall only 1.856% (1.829%) of the attractive exercise opportunities that arise are utilized
by Individual Investors. In other words, this implies that for both GFSN types investors
waive more than 98% of their chances to increase the investment yield through re-arranging
their portfolio, resulting in significant opportunity costs. This finding is also supported by
the above-defined variable MISSEDALL (see Table 3), which counts for each investment at
maturity or at an early exercise how many economically reasonable exercise months the in-
vestor has let pass and instead decided to continue holding the investment. In a separate
analysis not shown here, we find that at an early exercise of a Type A GFSN an investor
has already missed on average 3.920 economically reasonable exercise opportunities (2.425
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for Type B), thereof 1.609 (1.000) within the last half year. While such a general “failure to
exercise” is also well documented for retail investors in equity derivatives (Pool et al., 2008;
Barraclough and Whaley, 2012), the incidence of missed exercises in our study is again—as
for the share of economically disadvantageous exercise decisions—significantly higher. A pos-
sible reason might be the more conservative character of fixed-income products compared to
other investment classes, as these are presumably preferred by a different type of investor
with other investment horizons and motives.
Panel B of Table 5 again analyzes what if any differences exist in the reasonableness of
exercise behavior among selected investor groups. For this, we run two logit regressions.
First, we regress a dummy variable indicating whether or not an early exercise is reason-
able on portfolio and personal characteristics of investors (left part), whereby we control
also for the investment volume, for tax influences and for a potentially increased demand
in the first month after the blocking period. In the second regression we use a dummy
variable that denotes if an investor fails to exercise at an economically attractive opportu-
nity or not (right part). In this case we also consider the investment history as dependent
variable (MISSEDALL, MISSED6) to determine whether earlier decisions to forgo similar
opportunities have an influence. Moreover, we control for the effect of a shortly upcoming
coupon payment date (COUPON), account for different product characteristics (UPSTEEP,
DURATION) and incorporate the lifetime of a GFSN.
The pseudo-R2 for the first regression is 19.31% (12.90% for Type B GFSN) and 20.49%
(18.79%) for the second regression. In general, the results demonstrate that the economic
reasonableness of Individual Investors’ holding and exercise decisions in our sample differs
broadly depending on the investment history, environmental influences, product characteris-
tics and on portfolio and personal characteristics. Beginning with the investment history, the
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regression output supports our former finding that investors tend to respond sluggishly to
market changes. The likelihood of an investor missing a good opportunity to exercise declines
if that investor has recently left out some attractive exercise chances (MISSED6). Regard-
ing the product variables, we observe that the probability that an economically attractive
exercise opportunity will be ignored is higher if the product characteristics of the respective
GFSN match investors’ preferred payment profile (see Section 3.1), i.e. if the GFSN has a
steeply rising coupon structure and a low capital duration. This is consistent with our results
in the last subsection. Similarly, the positive coefficient for COUPON corresponds to the al-
ready discussed (irrational) tendency among Individual Investors to ignore (attractive) early
exercise opportunities shortly before coupon payment dates. Finally, the regression returns
negative loadings for the last two product variables BLOCK and LIFETIME. The negative
coefficient for BLOCK in the first regression implies that in the first month after the blocking
period a significantly higher number of exercises than usual are economically unreasonable,
which we attribute to accumulated requests to exercise, due perhaps to liquidity constraints,
that pile up until the first exercise possibility. The negative loading for the LIFETIME vari-
able for Type A GFSN in the second regression indicates that the probability of a failure to
exercise increases over time, which might perhaps be due to a lack of attention to products
that mature in the near future.
Moreover, we note that the economic reasonableness of an early exercise decision depends
on an investor’s portfolio and personal characteristics. One reason for this is that experi-
ence apparently plays an important role in investors’ decision-making as shown by the high
coefficients for the portfolio variables PERFORMED and EXERCISED in both analyses in
Panel B. The positive influence of PERFORMED in the first regression shows that investors
who have already exercised at an economically beneficial point in time once before are much
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more likely to make further sophisticated exercise decisions, whereas the negative loading for
EXERCISED in the first regression implies that a previous poor decision to exercise at an
inopportune time (i.e. the PERFORMED dummy is 0) is regularly followed by a decreas-
ing probability of an economically rational exercise decision on other investments. Similar
relationships appear in the second regression, where we observe that the probability of an
investor missing an exercise opportunity drops significantly if he has exercised a GFSN be-
fore and decreases even more if his earlier exercise decision was economically reasonable (i.e.
both the EXERCISED and the PERFORMED dummy equal 1). Overall, the patterns in
both regressions indicate that investors’ exercise behavior is in principle consistent over time.
Looking at personal characteristics, we summarize that female investors tend to act more
cautiously and thus miss more potential chances than men, but achieve economically better
results if they do decide to exercise. This finding is in line with several studies on Individual
Investors’ trading behavior in stocks (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju,
2001). Differences also exist related to the age of an investor. Most striking, we detect that
investors between 20 and 40 years of age employ their exercise rights considerably more often
than other investor groups but also more often at points in time where it is not economically
advantageous. A possible reason might be a higher demand for liquidity in that stage of life
due to, e.g., costs for purchasing a house, increased expenses of raising a family or repayment
of education debts.
We do not find that investors’ geographical location has any statistical influence on the
economic reasonableness of the exercise behavior. However, differences appear regarding the
preferred distribution channel. Investors who prefer to acquire directly through the German
Finance Agency make markedly better exercise decisions. This is consistent with the usually
higher financial literacy of investors who skip intermediaries. Still, direct investors show also
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an increased probability to fail to utilize upcoming economically attractive opportunities. As
our last finding, we note that investors holding a doctoral degree have a similar investment
profile as the just described direct investors, which we also ascribe to a higher financial
literacy of this investor group.
3.3 Excess returns of exercising
To quantify the observed differences in investors’ exercise strategies and to check the ro-
bustness of our results, we determine in this section the performance of each GFSN investment
and each respective exercise in our data set. As performance measure we use the difference
(“excess return”) between the yearly internal rate of return of a buy-and-hold strategy and
the yearly internal rate of return of the empirically observed investment behavior. We assume
in the calculation of the latter that at an early exercise the whole investment is directly rein-
vested in a fixed-income product with the same (remaining) maturity that pays the market
par-yield.13 Moreover, we ignore any potential transaction costs for buying bonds. Table 6
provides the results.
[Table 6 about here.]
As already indicated by the low number of economically reasonable exercises and the high
number of missed beneficial opportunities (see Panel A of Table 5), the results show that
only few investors achieve a positive yearly excess return through exercising GFSN. This
finding is similar to the study of Bauer et al. (2009), who analyze Individual Investors’
trading returns for equity options. On average, exercises in our data sample lead to negative
excess returns against a buy-and-hold strategy of circa -0.117% per year for Type A and
circa -0.300% for Type B GFSN. Not surprisingly, a separate analysis—not reported here—
13This implies that the fictive re-investment product has a market value of 1.
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again finds differences in investors’ exercise performance related to personal and investment
characteristics, whereby the general patterns are in line with our former discussions. For
example, investors between 20 and 40 years of age show an even poorer exercise performance
(mean excess returns of -0.302% and -0.438%) than, e.g., investors between the ages of 0 and
20 (-0.029% and -0.243%). Furthermore, investors who prefer direct distribution (0.119% and
-0.096%) markedly outperform those who prefer to invest at banks (-0.372% and -0.498%).
Finally, we note that the best exercise performance for both GFSN types tends to be achieved
by investors that exercise early only selected investments, whereas investors that have a high
ratio of early exercises to investments regularly realize poor excess returns.
3.4 Discussion
Summing up the empirical and economic results of our last three subsections, two key
insights emerge. The first is that Individual Investors in GFSN most frequently use their early
exercise rights when it is not economically advisable. The second is that they typically forgo
numerous attractive exercise opportunities throughout the lifetime of their investments. The
equity derivatives literature typically classifies such a non-performance-oriented behavior as
“suboptimal” and refers to irrationality (e.g., Poteshman and Serbin, 2003; Pool et al., 2008;
Barraclough and Whaley, 2012), non-continuous monitoring of the investment (e.g., Stanton,
1995; Barraclough and Whaley, 2012; Liao et al., 2013) and transaction costs (e.g., Stanton,
1995; Finucane, 1997; Koziol, 2006).14
However, two further findings in our analyses are that investors react very sensitively to
environmental influences and that exercise behavior significantly differs among the investor
14Further examples of motives for non-performance oriented exercises are typically gambling and entertain-
ment (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 2007; Bauer et al., 2009), which we ignore here since GFSN are quite conservative
medium-term fixed-income products that are obviously less suitable for short-term gambling purposes.
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base. For instance, we observe strongly increased exercise activity during the introduction
of the “New Market” in Germany and during bullish periods in the equity market. As an
example for differences that depend on personal characteristics, we find for investors aged
between 20 and 40 years suspiciously high exercise activity at times that are frequently un-
reasonable from an economic point of view and that result in markedly poorer average excess
returns from exercising, compared to other investor groups. Such reactions to environmental
changes and such age-related behavior are difficult to reconcile with the standard reasoning
in the literature. In fact, the literature seem to offer only weak explanations why the degree
of irrationality, the monitoring behavior or transaction costs should differ so substantially
dependent on, e.g., the development of the equity market or the affiliation to a specific age
cohort. Hence, we suggest that—besides the common factors in the literature—a further
factor drives Individual Investors’ exercise decisions in fixed-income products. This factor is
the desire for liquidity and financial flexibility.
Indeed, the liquidity and flexibility argument fits well to the described empirical patterns
in the data. We link it to five observations in our former analyses. First, the significantly
higher probability of early exercise of a GFSN by investors between the ages of 20 to 40
might be due to their higher liquidity requirements at that stage of life, due, for example, to
raising a family or purchasing a house. Second, the higher early exercise activity in the first
month after the initial blocking period can be attributed to investors’ demand for liquidity
that has accrued over the first twelve months of maturity. Third, the increased exercise rates
during strong growth phases in the equity markets can be interpreted as a direct reaction
of investors in GFSN who use the early exercise right to liquidate their investments so as to
benefit from bullish trends in other markets.
Fourth, only very few early exercise decisions in our data seem to be driven by economic or
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performance reasons, as most GFSN are exercised early at economically inopportune times.
Moreover, we observe a relatively constant base exercise rate, independent of market move-
ments or valuation changes. Besides irrationality, both patterns—the high number of exer-
cise decisions at a PVEV-ratio above 1 and the base exercise rate—can obviously also be
attributed to investors’ demand for liquidity, in which case the current value of a product is
of secondary importance. Fifth, consistency in taking advantage of attractive exercise oppor-
tunities is low. Investors have typically already missed several (better) opportunities when
they exercise. As the literature states (see, e.g., Barraclough and Whaley, 2012), this might
be due to time-dependent transaction costs, non-continuous monitoring or irrationality. On
the other hand, the low rate of realizing exercise chances combined with the tendency to
exercising early at inopportune times rather than somewhat later when the investment would
have worth more also fits very well to investors who follow a conservative buy-and-hold strat-
egy and only exercise to meet liquidity needs or due to environmental influences such as tax
changes. The latter argument seems to be particularly relevant as GFSN are medium-term
government bonds with a low risk profile and hence presumably attract mainly conservative
investors.
4 Investment and exercise motives
Our analyses so far show that investors’ use of the exercise right deviates from the theo-
retically optimal exercise strategy—even to a higher extent than in the equity market—and
that the demand for liquidity and financial flexibility might be important reasons for early
exercising. Consequently, in this section we aim to cast further light on the motives of In-
dividual Investors for holding and exercising GFSN. We perform our analysis in two steps.
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First, we compile a new data set that describes the average investment and exercise strategy
of each Individual Investor in our data set. We then conduct an exploratory factor analysis
to extract the main dimensions of variation in the data and to isolate latent factors that
drive investors’ investment and exercise behavior. Second, we examine the relevance of the
identified latent factors for each investor and determine whether there are any statistically
significant relationships to personal and financial attributes.
4.1 Exploratory factor analysis
While we have concentrated in this paper so far on decisions and transactions at an
individual account and product level, we now focus on the general behavior of Individual
Investors. Hence, our first step is to create a new data set that consolidates the individual
transaction data for each investor into a few explicit characteristics of behavior. Table 7
provides an overview of the variables we calculate for each account, whereby the selection
adheres closely to the identified determinants of early exercising (see Table 4).
[Table 7 about here.]
In short, we consider three kinds of variable. First, we compute economic indicators and
ratios that describe an investor’s average investment and exercise strategy. For instance,
we determine what percentage of his exercises occurs at times when the PVEV-ratio equals
1 (PVEVLOW), which implies—as discussed—an economically rational exercise. Similarly,
we calculate the variables PVEVMED and PVEVHIGH, which represent the share of early
exercises at medium (1<PVEV≤1.03) or high PVEV-ratios (PVEV>1.03). Second, we ac-
count for the average reaction to environmental influences, such as the percentage of exercise
opportunities used when the CDAX has moved by more than 25% during the previous 6
months or the percentage of investments an investor liquidates in the months before changes
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in the tax environment become effective. Third, we subsume information on the products an
investor chooses to purchase. Here, we consider, for instance, the average steepness of the
coupon structure over all chosen investments or the average value of the bond component
without the option right. Finally, we also incorporate an investor’s number of investments
and early exercises.
In this analysis we have to cope with missing data, because some of the defined variables
in Table 7 depend on economic or environmental circumstances that may not have arisen
during an individual’s investment period. For example, we cannot calculate the percentage
of exercised investments in the months before changes in the tax legislation become effective
if an investor did not hold a GFSN at such a time. According to the classification of Rubin
(1976), such data is missing at random (MAR), since its absence is not related to the value
of the respective variable but only to other variables, such as the market or tax environment.
The literature suggests several methods of handling data missing at random (see, e.g., Allison,
2002; Enders, 2010), yet there seems to be no best commonly accepted approach. We apply
multiple imputation algorithms and the full-information maximum likelihood method here,
but find only small differences in the results. We proceed with the likelihood estimator for
efficiency reasons, whereby we implicitly assume that Individual Investors, for whom we may
lack some data, do not systematically make decisions that are widely different from the other
investors in our data set, which seems reasonable considering the broad and large investor
base.
An exploratory factor analysis, using the maximum-likelihood extraction method and
applying robust standard errors to correct for non-multivariate normally distributed data (see
Yuan and Bentler, 2000), isolates four factors that primarily drive the investment and exercise
behavior of Type A GFSN investors, while five factors seem most suitable for Type B GFSN
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investors (see Table 8).15 For both analyses the model fit is satisfying. The standardized root
mean square residual (SRMR) lies at 5.2% for Type A GFSN (3.7% for Type B), the root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) lies at circa 6.5% (5.0%) and the comparative
fit index (CFI) approaches 88% (92%). Overall, the identified factors account cumulatively
for circa 55.227% (59.000%) of the overall variance. Table 8 contains details on the factor
selection and on the rotated standardized factor loadings, which we estimate via the direct
geomin oblique rotation algorithm.
[Table 8 about here.]
The factor analysis returns distinct and strong loading patterns for all identified factors.
It is remarkable that the estimated factors and factor structures are very similar for the
independently conducted analyses of Type A and Type B GFSN investors, which we take to
indicate the economic robustness of our results. The first and most important factor, which in
the case of Type A GFSN accounts for about 19.153% of the variance in all variables (17.819%
for Type B), shows positive loadings for all three PVEV variables. This indicates that the
factor is related to both economically reasonable and disadvantageous exercise decisions,
which is plausible if exercises are triggered by exogenous factors such as the introduction
of new market segments or strong movements in the equity market. In fact, for this factor
we observe statistical positive coefficients for all market variables (CDAX10, CDAX25 and
NEWMARKET) and for the BLOCK variable, which indicates an increased exercise rate in
the first month after the blocking period. Based on these observations and on our discussion
above, we interpret the first factor as being due to an investor’s need for liquidity and financial
flexibility.
15To determine the number of latent factors, we consider the Kaiser-criterion (Kaiser, 1960), a parallel
analysis and a scree plot. For a clear presentation of the results we decided to keep factors with an eigenvalue
larger than 1.0, although the results do not differ significantly in the case of other selection criteria.
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The second factor represents the importance of the mid- and long-term value of an in-
vestment and thus stands for a conservative strategy. It is associated with an investment
behavior focusing on steep coupon structures and a high valuation at issuance. The third
latent factor consolidates the desire for high investment performance. It loads strongly on
the ratio of early exercises at a PVEV-ratio of 1 (PVEVLOW) and accordingly on positive
excess returns of exercising (EXCESSRETURN). In contrast, the fourth factor summarizes
a highly active investment behavior with a high number of early exercises that, however, do
not result in positive excess returns—hence we label this factor “activism”. Finally, the fifth
factor, which appears only for Type B GFSN, captures the sensitivity to changes in the tax
regulation. It loads mainly on the tax (TAX9906) and the year-end variable (YEAREND).
Overall, we note that the results of the factor analysis coincide with our previous finding
that the desire for a better yield performance is only one of several factors in the decision-
making of Individual Investors. In fact, the factor analysis suggests again that other motives,
such as the need for financial flexibility, play a more important role.
4.2 Importance of latent factors
Following the general analysis, we also estimate personal factor scores for each Individual
Investor in our data set. To determine whether any differences exist in the relevance of
latent factors related to personal characteristics, we regress the computed scores on selected
personal and financial characteristics (average investment volume per investment). Table 9
shows the results.
[Table 9 about here.]
We emphasize five regression results relevant to points discussed in this paper. First, the
relevance of the financial flexibility factor is most strongly pronounced for investors between 20
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and 40 years of age. Additionally, this factor appears to be more important for male investors
and for higher average investment volumes. Second, the desire for value mainly drives the
decisions of investors with larger investments, who prefer to acquire GFSN indirectly at
banks. We also observe that this factor is of higher relevance for investors younger than 20,
compared to other age groups, which we attribute to GFSN accounts that are established as
savings accounts in a child’s name. Third, the performance factor is strongly marked for direct
investors who omit any intermediary and presumably have a higher average financial literacy.
In contrast, performance seems to be a less important motive for many investors between the
ages of 20 and 40, which corresponds to the high relevance of the financial flexibility factor
for this investor group. Fourth, activism is stronger associated with male direct investors and
is closely related to low average investment volumes. As for all other factors, we find no clear
relevance attached to an investor’s residence area. Fifth, the tax factor is more relevant for
investors with higher investment volumes, which seems very reasonable.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed Individual Investors empirical use of early exercise rights in the
fixed-income market. In short, we find that a broad range of environmental and economic
factors determine investors’ exercise decisions, whereby distinct differences exist among the
investor base that depend on portfolio and personal characteristics. Still, most investors
have in common the fact that they use the exercise right at times that are not economically
reasonable and that they frequently fail to exploit more favorable exercise opportunities.
Consequently, a broad majority of exercises in our sample result in negative excess returns.
The observed behavior and several empirical patterns let us infer that performance seeking
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is not the sole or main driver of Individual Investors’ exercise decisions in putable bonds.
In fact, our results suggest that for Individual Investors performance is in general a less
important motivator of exercise decisions than it presumably is for, e.g., professional or
institutional traders. Instead of performance, the wish for financial flexibility, for example in
the case of substantial changes in the equity market or liquidity constraints, seems to be a
major motive for early exercising. The results of an exploratory factor analysis support this
hypothesis. We identify five latent factors that mainly drive Individual Investors’ investment
and exercise strategy, of which the most important factor can in fact be interpreted as an
investor’s desire for flexibility.
In view of this, we derive three policy implications. First, sophisticated liquidity manage-
ment is highly important for the issuers of fixed-income derivatives for Individual Investors.
Issuers must anticipate that investors will use their exercise rights not mainly to optimize
their investment yields, but also to react to things like environmental changes or liquidity
constraints. This means early exercises frequently occur at times not predicted by standard
theory. Second, information on personal characteristics of the investor base can be used
to refine predictions of early exercise activity. For instance, the exercise behavior in our
sample differs particularly regarding gender, age and the preferred distribution channel of
an investor. Third, as Individual Investors fail to exercise the broad majority of attractive
early exercise opportunities and use the option right—as noted—frequently at economically
suboptimal points in time, the empirical value of the early exercise right is in general lower
than its financial fair value. Hence, issuers gain a (significant) financial margin in pricing
putable bonds for Individual Investors with standard financial models. Moreover, our study
shows that issuers can increase this margin by offering specific product designs and exploit-
ing the behavioral biases of Individual Investors. For instance, there are some indications
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that Individual Investors prefer bonds with a high final coupon payment to financially fully
equivalent products with a flatter coupon structure. Accordingly, our results suggest that
investors more often fail to use attractive exercise opportunities that arise for bonds with a
steep coupon structure, which is obviously advantageous for the issuer.
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Tables
Table 1: Statistics on investor base
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Percent Absolute Percent Absolute
Personal characteristics
Gender
Male 33.469 52,717 38.406 35,595
Female 38.362 60,425 37.995 35,214
n/a 28.169 40,370 23.598 21,871
Age
0 to 20 years 18.978 29,892 38.515 35,696
21 to 40 years 23.665 37,276 20.986 19,450
41 to 60 years 28.127 44,304 24.455 22,665
61 to 100 years 25.960 40,890 13.166 12,202
n/a 3.270 5,150 2.878 2,667
Doctoral degree
Doctorate or professorship 4.150 6,536 3.499 3,243
No doctoral degree 95.850 150,976 96.501 89,437
Geographical location
City 4.165 6,560 3.835 3,554
Highly populated 11.215 17,665 11.254 10,430
Moderately populated 28.547 44,965 29.252 27,111
Sparsely populated 51.371 80,916 51.417 47,653
n/a 4.702 7,406 4.243 3,932
Preferred distribution(1)
Indirect (at banks) 59.181 93,217 54.011 50,057
Direct (via the German Finance
Agency)
40.819 64,295 45.989 42,623
Overall 100.000 157,512 100.000 92,680
The table exhibits information on personal characteristics of all 223,017 Individual Investors in our data sample,
whereof 27,175 investors hold both Type A and Type B GFSN. Investors are clustered in residence areas according
to the first two digits of their zip code using an urbanization index and population density figures from German
Federal Statistics Office (2009). We classify the population density per sqkm as follows: <250 = sparsely, 250-750
= moderately, >750 = highly populated. (1) We define the preferred distribution channel as direct if an investor
executes at least one direct transaction. Indirect means that an investor purchases a GFSN at a bank and later
transfers his investment to an account at the German Finance Agency.
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Table 2: Statistics on investors’ financial activities
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Mean Med. p5 p95 St.dev. Mean Med. p5 p95 St.dev.
Investments per investor
Number of investments 3.147 1.000 1.000 11.000 5.200 2.790 1.000 1.000 9.000 5.139
Overall investment volume in e 23,053 10,226 1,019 85,569 45,614 11,526 4,090 511 44,945 30,593
Volume per investment in e 8,818 5,266 639 25,565 14,789 5,085 2,505 460 17,663 6,693
Early exercises per investor
Number of exercises 0.526 0 0 2.000 1.491 0.517 0 0 2.000 1.483
Overall exercise volume in e 1,812 0 0 10,178 4,761 1,284 0 0 6,647 3,547
Volume per exercise in e 4,094 4,090 511 10,000 2,742 3,017 2,540 511 7,669 2,610
Early exercises over time
Exercise rate per month
and GFSN in % 0.626 0.309 0.081 2.418 1.058 0.518 0.327 0.081 1.693 0.671
Exercise volume per month
and GFSN in e 160,356 80,323 2,711 570,448 296,062 55,242 26,212 2,228 209,374 296,062
The table exhibits statistics on the investments and early exercises of all 223,017 Individual Investors in 204 issued GFSN (102 Type A, 102
Type B) during our sample period from July 1996 to February 2009. The early exercise rate is defined as the monthly ratio of number of
exercises to the number of current investments in this GFSN.
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Table 3: Variables considered for analysis of determinants
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Abbr. Variable description Mean St.dev. Mean St.dev.
Economic benefit
PVEV Ratio of present value to exercise value 1.034 0.027 1.0511 0.048
Investment history
MISSEDALL Number of economically reasonable exercise months (PVEV=1)
since issuance
2.869 6.044 1.726 5.022
MISSED6 Number of economically reasonable months (PVEV=1) within the
last 6 months
0.769 1.649 0.427 1.291
VOLUME Investment volume in e 7,513 11,165 3,972 8,025
Environmental circumstances
CDAX10+ Dummy, changes in CDAX > +10% points within a month 0.033 0.177 0.031 0.174
CDAX10- Dummy, changes in CDAX < -10% points within a month 0.080 0.271 0.081 0.273
CDAX25+ Dummy, changes in CDAX > +25% points within 6 months 0.094 0.292 0.095 0.293
CDAX25- Dummy, changes in CDAX < -25% points within 6 months 0.085 0.278 0.087 0.281
VOLDAX 45-day option-implied volatility of DAX measured by VDAX 24.045 9.846 23.888 9.877
VOLINT Volatility of German 5-year spot rate estimated from weekly
returns over a 6-month window
0.012 0.002 0.012 0.002
NEWMARKET Dummy, introduction of new stock market “New Market” in
Germany (January 1998 to December 2000)
0.197 0.398 0.176 0.381
TAX99 Dummy, change in tax legislation 2000 (November-December 1999) 0.012 0.109
TAX06 Dummy, change in tax legislation 2007 (November-December 2006) 0.017 0.129
YEAREND Dummy, end of the year (each December) 0.086 0.280
Product characteristics
UPSTEEP Average yearly growth of coupon payments until maturity (last
coupon minus current coupon divided by years to maturity)
0.005 0.002 0.004 0.002
DURATION Fisher-Weil duration of bond component in years 2.585 1.315 3.300 1.711
COUPON Dummy, coupon payment upcoming within the next 60 days 0.090 0.285
BLOCK Dummy, first month after blocking period 0.023 0.151 0.021 0.142
LIFETIME Lifetime since issuance in years 2.315 1.450 2.672 1.711
Portfolio characteristics
INVESTS Number of former investments in GFSN 7.397 10.127 8.231 11.668
INVESTSUM Sum of overall investments in eso far 40,087 73,561 27,156 64,055
EXERCISED Dummy, signaling if investor has exercised early a GFSN once
before
0.104 0.306 0.108 0.311
PERFORMED Dummy flagging if investor has exercised early a GFSN once before
when it was economically reasonable (PVEV=1)
0.037 0.189 0.032 0.176
N 19.089m 11.467m
The table shows the variables and ratios we consider in our analysis of determinants of Individual Investors’ exercise behavior. Overall
19.089m monthly observations are considered for Type A GFSN (11.476m for Type B). The one-year blocking period at beginning of a GFSN
is excluded. Data sources are Deutsche Bundesbank for interest term structures, Thomson One Banker for environmental and equity market
variables and the German Finance Agency for GFSN data. The descriptive statistics are calculated based on all observations of the data set,
wherefore the figures differ from, e.g., the analysis on an individual investor level (see Table 2).
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Table 4: Determinants of early exercise
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Observations per Investment Observations per Investment
Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
42.370 1.000 60.000 48.770 1.000 72.000
Logit RE logit Logit RE logit
Coefficient Coefficient Margin(1) Coefficient Coefficient Margin(1)
Economic benefit
PVEV -13.446* -12.851* -18.158* -7.650* -3.296* -11.930*
Investment history
MISSEDALL 0.022* 0.049* 0.029* 0.001 0.039* 0.002
MISSED6 0.059* 0.171* 0.079* 0.144* 0.224* 0.224*
VOLUME 0.011* 0.023* 0.014* 0.014* 0.031* 0.023*
Environmental circumstances
CDAX10+ 0.261* 0.323* 0.399* 0.289* 0.358* 0.518*
CDAX10- 0.157* 0.124* 0.228* 0.242* 0.194* 0.420*
CDAX25+ 0.131* 0.122* 0.187* 0.318* 0.408* 0.568*
CDAX25- -0.377* -0.510* -0.438* -0.154* -0.268* -0.226*
VOLDAX 0.005* 0.007* 0.008* -0.003* -0.003* -0.004*
VOLINT -86.190* -84.767* -116.392* -49.856* -70.138* -77.748*
NEWMARKET 1.010* 1.299* 1.924* 0.991* 1.357* 2.218*
TAX99 0.482* 0.584* 0.960*
TAX06 0.999* 1.118* 2.624*
YEAREND 0.349* 0.405* 0.633*
Product characteristics
UPSTEEP -4.943* 59.881* -6.675* -78.250* -68.645* -122.029*
DURATION 4.346* 12.028* 5.869* 0.204* -0.177* 0.318*
COUPON -0.140* -0.089* -0.179*
BLOCK 0.368* -0.259* 0.595* 0.407* -0.617* 0.777*
LIFETIME 3.537* 11.025* 4.777*
Portfolio characteristics
INVESTS -0.046* -0.113* -0.063* -0.046* -0.107* -0.072*
INVESTSUM -0.005* -0.009* -0.006* -0.006* -0.010* -0.010*
EXERCISED 2.979* 6.445* 18.137* 2.977* 6.497* 20.612*
PERFORMED 0.428* 1.047* 0.709* 0.235* 0.618* 0.410*
Personal characteristics
Gender
Female -0.059* -0.144* -0.078* -0.105* -0.169* -0.160*
n/a 0.046* 0.048* 0.064* 0.041* 0.068* 0.067*
Age
21 to 40 years 0.484* 0.870* 0.759* 0.641* 1.014* 1.139*
41 to 60 years 0.240* 0.362* 0.330* 0.427* 0.652* 0.677*
61 to 100 years -0.008 -0.126* -0.009 0.294* 0.348* 0.435*
n/a -4.228* -6.579* -1.206* -4.004* -6.726* -1.248*
Doctoral degree
Doctorate or professorship -0.125* -0.244* -0.160* -0.122* -0.327* -0.181*
Geographical location
City -0.002 -0.118* -0.003 -0.022 0.010 -0.035
Highly populated -0.045* -0.016 -0.061* 0.025 0.025 0.041
Moderately populated -0.018* -0.014 -0.025* -0.054* -0.053* -0.084*
n/a 0.016 0.003 0.023 -0.028 -0.109* -0.044
Preferred distribution
Direct -0.221* -0.526* -0.292* -0.114* -0.290* -0.177*
Constant -11.204* -51.235* 1.599* -3.465*
Groups (Investments) 450,526 235,307
N 19.089m 19.089m 11.467m 11.467m
Pseudo-R2 in % 17.00 19.78 15.17 19.27
The table exhibits the results of a pooled logit and a random-effects logit regression on Individual Investors’ exercise decisions
in Type A and Type B GFSN. Only investments and decisions after the one-year blocking period are considered. For the
pooled regressions robust standard errors are used. For the panel estimation we apply the Gauss-Hermite algorithm with 4
integration points. The lifetime variable is not considered for Type B GFSN as it is perfectly correlated to the respective
product’s duration. The marginal effects (dy/dx) are calculated at means based on the pooled logit regression. Pseudo-R2 is
the percentage improvement in the log-likelihood achieved by our model compared to a constant-only model. (1) Displayed
at 1e+4. * signals statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 5: Economic reasonableness of early exercise behavior
Panel A Distribution of early exercises in % Attractive exercise opportunities in %
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
PVEV=1 PVEV>1 PVEV=1 PVEV>1 Exploited Missed Exploited Missed
24.326 75.674 13.939 86.061 1.856 98.144 1.829 98.171
Panel B Logit: Early exercise economically Logit: Failed to exercise
reasonable (PVEV=1, yes/no) when PVEV=1 (yes/no)
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Coefficient Margin(1) Coefficient Margin(1) Coefficient Margin(1) Coefficient Margin(1)
Investment history
MISSEDALL 0.002 0.074 0.030* 0.128*
MISSED6 -0.068* -0.202* -0.033* -0.143*
VOLUME -0.011* -0.002* -0.011* -0.002* -0.006* -0.018* -0.011* -0.048*
Environmental circumstances
TAX99 -0.784* -0.111* 0.387* 1.399*
TAX06 0.425* 0.082* -0.508* -2.828*
YEAREND 0.378* 0.072* -1.050* -7.426*
Product characteristics
UPSTEEP 26.743* 78.972* 150.609* 654.423*
DURATION -2.398* -7.083* -0.395* -1.718*
COUPON 0.102* 0.291*
BLOCK -1.702* -0.296* -1.041* -0.148*
LIFETIME -1.546* -4.567*
Portfolio characteristics
INVESTS 0.012* 0.003* 0.012* 0.002* 0.043* 0.128* 0.043* 0.189*
INVESTSUM 0.003* 0.001* 0.003* 0.000* 0.002* 0.074* 0.002* 0.010*
EXERCISED -0.624* -0.137* -0.562* -0.100* -2.403* -20.308* -2.455* -31.188*
PERFORMED 1.873* 0.436* 1.778* 0.394* -1.240* -6.641* -1.257* -10.137*
Personal characteristics
Gender
Female 0.050* 0.011* 0.050 0.009 0.045* 0.130* 0.118* 0.495*
n/a 0.008 0.002 0.030 0.005 -0.121* -0.375* -0.119* -0.563*
Age
21 to 40 years -0.641* -0.138* -0.650* -0.115* -0.149* -0.487* -0.241* -1.143*
41 to 60 years -0.310* -0.071* -0.389* -0.074* -0.048* -0.150* -0.098* -0.432*
61 to 100 years -0.006 -0.001 -0.182* -0.036* 0.109* 0.314* -0.027 -0.115
n/a 0.196 0.047 0.231 0.050 3.960* 2.968* 3.620* 4.091*
Doctoral degree
Doctorate or professor-
ship
0.069 0.015 0.157* 0.029* 0.077* 0.219* 0.062 0.265
Geographical location
City -0.012 -0.003 0.019 0.003 0.070* 0.202* 0.094 0.398
Highly populated 0.020 0.004 -0.009 -0.002 0.032 0.096 0.035 0.153
Moderately populated 0.013 0.003 0.037 0.007 0.010 0.031 0.040 0.175
n/a 0.083 0.018 -0.093 -0.016 -0.026 -0.079 0.090 0.384
Preferred distribution
Direct 0.999* 0.215* 0.698* 0.123* 0.414* 1.274* 0.335* 1.507*
Constant -0.767* -1.228* 15.105* 5.803*
N 82,787 82,787 47,900 47,900 3.028m 3.028m 1.114m 1.114m
Pseudo-R2 in % 19.31 12.90 20.49 18.79
The table shows four economic analyses of Individual Investors’ exercise behavior in GFSN. In the left part of Panel A we compute the share
of early exercises in our data set that are economically reasonable and the share of theoretically not beneficial exercises. Second, in the
right part of Panel A we calculate the percentage of exploited and missed economically attractive exercise opportunities (PVEV=1). Third,
the left part of Panel B presents the results of a pooled logit regression on a dummy variable that indicates if an exercise is economically
beneficial. The second column displays the corresponding marginal effects (dy/dx) at means. Fourth, the right part of Panel B exhibits the
results of a pooled logit regression on a dummy variable that indicates if an investor fails to use an attractive exercise opportunity. Again,
the next column shows the marginal effects (dy/dx) at means. Robust standard errors are used. Pseudo-R2 is the percentage improvement
in the log-likelihood achieved by our model compared to a constant-only model. (1) Displayed at 1e+4.
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Table 6: Excess returns of early exercising
Individual Investors’ excess return
of early exercising in % p.a.
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Mean -0.117 -0.300
Median -0.098 -0.289
p5 -1.306 -1.429
p10 -1.017 -1.124
p90 0.709 0.572
p95 1.023 0.868
St.dev 0.704 0.711
N 82,787 47,900
The table shows statistics on the average yearly excess return of early
exercising based on the exercise decisions of all 223,017 Individual In-
vestors in 204 issued GFSN (102 Type A, 102 Type B) during our sam-
ple period from July 1996 to February 2009. For the calculation we
assume that an investment exercised early is directly reinvested in a
product with an identical remaining maturity paying the market yield.
The excess return is then calculated as the difference between the inter-
nal rate of return of the exercise strategy and a buy-and-hold strategy.
Table 7: Variables calculated to summarize an investor’s investment and exercise behavior
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Abbr. Variable description Mean St.dev Mean St.dev
Economic benefit
PVEVHIGH Percentage of early exercises employed where PVEV>1.03 0.147 0.334 0.163 0.348
PVEVMED Percentage of early exercises employed where 1<PVEV≤1.03 0.056 0.205 0.066 0.221
PVEVLOW Percentage of early exercises employed where PVEV=1 0.087 0.260 0.082 0.250
Ø EXCESSRETURN Average excess return of early exercising p.a. -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004
Ø MISSEDALL Average number of missed attractive exercise opportunities
before early exercise / maturity
5.790 5.823 4.383 5.086
Environmental circumstances
CDAX10 Percentage of exercise opportunities used when CDAX moved
by more than +/-10% in last month
0.008 0.047 0.007 0.042
CDAX25 Percentage of exercise opportunities used when CDAX moved
by more than +/-25% over last 6 months
0.008 0.042 0.007 0.038
NEWMARKET Percentage of exercise opportunities used in phase of “New
Market” in Germany (January 1998 to December 2000)
0.009 0.060 0.008 0.052
TAX9906 Percentage of Type B GFSN exercise opportunities used in
November / December 1999 and 2006
0.012 0.089
YEAREND Percentage of Type B GFSN exercise opportunities used in
December
0.007 0.042
Product characteristics
Ø VALUE Average value of GFSN investments at issuance 1.012 0.008 1.019 0.011
Ø BOND Average value of GFSN bond component at issuance 0.987 0.010 0.986 0.014
Ø STEEPNESS Average steepness of coupon structure of GFSN investments
at issuance
0.027 0.010 0.027 0.010
Ø DURATION Average Fisher-Weil duration of GFSN investments at is-
suance in years
5.544 0.188
BLOCK Percentage of exercise opportunities used in first month after
the blocking period
0.022 0.116 0.018 0.099
Portfolio characteristics
INVESTS Number of investments in GFSN 3.755 6.210 4.039 6.961
EXERCISES Number of early exercises 0.643 1.773 0.735 1.982
N 157,512 92,680
The table gives an overview of the calculated variables and ratios we use to describe an Individual Investor’s average investment and exercise
strategy. The excess return is calculated according to the definition in Table 6. The descriptive statistics summarize an investor’s average
investment and exercise strategy over his whole portfolio, wherefore the figures differ from, e.g., the analysis on an individual investor level
(see Table 2). The duration is not considered for Type B GFSN (zero-bond structure) as it always equals maturity.
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Table 8: Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on consolidated investment and exercise behavior
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Liquidity /
financial flexibility Value Performance Activism Tax
Type A Type B Type A Type B Type A Type B Type A Type B Type B
Economic benefit
PVEVHIGH 0.563* 0.519* 0.036* 0.028* -0.415* -0.491* 0.105* 0.100* 0.160*
PVEVMED 0.022* 0.017* -0.028* -0.056* -0.104* -0.081* 0.182* 0.217* 0.131*
PVEVLOW 0.111* 0.099* -0.063* -0.082* 0.285* 0.285* 0.347* 0.318* 0.130*
Ø EXCESSRETURN -0.068* -0.051* -0.050* -0.056* 1.402* 1.353* 0.042* 0.024* -0.024*
Ø MISSEDALL -0.313* -0.231* -0.122* -0.159* 0.072* 0.084* 0.032* 0.012* -0.113*
Environmental circumstances
CDAX10 0.389* 0.398* 0.022* 0.016* -0.124* -0.104* 0.043* 0.073* -0.027*
CDAX25 0.449* 0.478* 0.020* 0.026* -0.024* -0.051* 0.024* 0.043* -0.023*
NEWMARKET 0.556* 0.508* 0.070* 0.072* -0.138* -0.135* -0.041* -0.041* 0.038*
TAX9906 0.051* 0.019* -0.122* 0.031* 0.695*
YEAREND 0.073* 0.026* -0.100* 0.050* 0.588*
Product characteristics
Ø VALUE 0.020* 0.021* 1.666* 1.336* -0.051* -0.070* -0.032* -0.092* 0.000
Ø BOND 0.065* 0.007* 0.462* 0.564* -0.029* -0.021* -0.102* 0.023* 0.020*
Ø STEEPNESS 0.089* 0.076* 0.311* 0.424* -0.104* -0.113* -0.227* -0.164* 0.027*
Ø DURATION -0.080* 0.062* 0.031* 0.382*
BLOCK 0.678* 0.673* 0.023* 0.002 -0.007* 0.029* -0.013* -0.013* -0.009
Portfolio characteristics
INVESTS 0.004* -0.003 -0.093* -0.129* 0.039* 0.053* 0.768* 0.652* -0.040*
EXERCISES 0.248* 0.232* -0.060* -0.045* -0.044* -0.041* 0.734* 0.808* 0.073*
Eigenvalue 2.873 2.851 2.424 2.373 1.627 1.546 1.360 1.206 1.464
Proportion in % 19.153 17.819 16.160 14.831 10.847 9.663 9.067 7.583 9.150
Cumulative in % 19.153 17.819 35.313 32.650 46.160 42.313 55.227 49.850 59.000
Indicators for model fit
SRMR 0.052 0.037
RMSEA 0.065 0.050
CFI 0.879 0.923
The table shows the results of an exploratory factor analysis of Individual Investors’ investment and exercise strategies in Type A and
Type B GFSN. The results are based on the maximum-likelihood factor extraction method, whereby we keep factors with an eigenvalue
larger than 1.0 (Kaiser-criterion). The geomin oblique algorithm is applied to rotate factors. RMSEA stands for root mean square error
of approximation, SRMR for standardized root mean square residual and CFI for comparative fit index. * signals statistical significance
at the 5% level.
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Table 9: Relation of factor scores to investors’ personal characteristics
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Liquidity /
financial flexibility Value Performance Activism Tax
Type A Type B Type A Type B Type A Type B Type A Type B Type B
Personal characteristics
Gender
Female -0.050* -0.061* -0.096* -0.076* 0.006 0.031* -0.045* -0.036* -0.012*
n/a 0.244* 0.008 0.071* 0.037* -0.008 -0.030 0.019* 0.036* 0.024*
Age
21 to 40 years 0.181* 0.208* 0.009 -0.042* -0.345* -0.305* 0.040* 0.097* 0.093*
41 to 60 years 0.086* 0.114* -0.211* -0.249* -0.167* -0.115* 0.100* 0.150* 0.047*
61 to 80 years 0.022* 0.079* -0.462* -0.517* 0.002 0.030 0.040* 0.119* 0.047*
n/a -0.214* -0.228* -0.246* 0.351* 0.163* 0.303* -0.186* -0.024* -0.130*
Doctoral degree
Doctorate of professor-
ship
-0.061* -0.076* -0.019 -0.164* 0.056* 0085* 0.039* 0.021 -0.076*
Geographical location
City -0.032* -0.019 -0.046 -0.193* -0.027 0.046 -0.005 -0.035* -0.028*
Highly populated -0.001 0.017 0.062* -0.037* 0.030* 0.028 0.028* 0.005 -0.001
Moderately populated 0.011* 0.016* 0.049* -0.006 0.017 0.025 0.029* 0.021* -0.013*
n/a -0.002 -0.001 0.518* 0.297* 0.092* 0.077* 0.036* 0.005 -0.023
Preferred distribution
Direct -0.033* -0.049* -1.019* -1.395* 0.149* 0.103* 0.473* 0.236* -0.011*
Average volume per investment
e1,000-3,000 0.044* 0.039* 0.198* 0.034* -0.005 -0.068* -0.125* -0.055* 0.047*
e3,000-10,000 0.087* 0.095* 0.258* 0.036* 0.060* -0.138* -0.182* -0.089* 0.131*
> e10,0000 0.077* 0.064* 0.230* -0.077 0.003 -0.136* -0.283* -0.177* 0.115*
Constant -0.108* -0.078* 0.254* 0.173* 0.048* 0.100* -0.069* -0.178* -0.070*
N 157,512 92,680 157,512 92,680 157,512 92,680 157,512 92,680 92,680
R2 in % 1.13 1.71 3.67 15.01 0.97 0.96 12.39 6.63 1.02
The table exhibits regression results for the estimated four (five) latent factor scores on the personal characteristics (as detailed in Table
1) of all 157,512 Individual Investors in Type A GFSN and of all 92,680 Individual Investors in Type B GFSN. The average investment
volume is defined in four clusters. Robust standard errors are used. * signals statistical significance at the 5% level.
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1 Introduction
The influence of psychological factors on investors’ trading and exercise decisions is at-
tracting more and more attention in those researching market phenomena and investigating
Individual Investors’ financial behavior (e.g., Odean, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2011). Such
psychological arguments imply that investors behave differently than ways that are assumed
in standard models and that they do not act fully rationally according to theory. The lit-
erature commonly refers to this as the “cognitive biases” or “behavioral biases” of investors
(see, e.g., Thaler, 2005). Prominent biases in the literature comprise among others overcon-
fidence (e.g., Odean, 1998), mental accounting (e.g., Thaler, 1985), representativeness (e.g.,
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shefrin and Statman, 1994) and inconsistent time preferences
(e.g., Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).1
While most of the mentioned concepts have been empirically researched for several in-
vestor classes and investment forms, few studies have explicitly investigated how the product
design itself influences decision-making, that is how investors’ decisions depend on, e.g., a
product’s duration, its coupon structure or the timing of coupon payments. For instance, most
recent studies on exercise decisions in equity derivatives (see, e.g., Poteshman and Serbin,
2003; Pool et al., 2008; Barraclough and Whaley, 2012) do not incorporate the product struc-
ture as a dependent variable. Hence, the motivation of this paper is to extend the current
behavioral finance literature by examining how the different coupon designs of putable bonds
affect the decision-making of Individual Investors. Our results are of particular interest to the
wide range of issuers and intermediaries who deal with fixed-income derivatives for Individ-
ual Investors, as our analyses suggest that proficient “behavioral financial engineering”, i.e.
1A comprehensive overview of behavioral biases can be found in Hirshleifer (2001) and—with a focus on
Individual Investors—in De Bondt (1998).
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optimizing and adapting the coupon structures of newly issued bonds, can lead to a higher
demand and can imply financial benefits for the issuer.
Several papers on investors’ behavior in structured products have argued that the product
structure influences investment and exercise decisions. As one of the first Hersh and Statman
(1993) discuss behavioral aspects in relation to the product design and find that the attrac-
tiveness of products varies due to a different framing of cash flows by investors. More recently,
Branger and Breuer (2007) derive an optimal demand for retail derivatives and argue that
not only the product type but also the contract structure is of importance. Similarly, Hens
and Rieger (2009) demonstrate that complicated payoff structures lead to mis-estimations
by investors resulting in extra margins for banks. Changing sides, Bernard et al. (2007)
develop a theoretical framework for optimally designing structured products from an issuer’s
perspective. They argue that products with capital protection are advantageous for issuers.
Additionally, in an analysis of the optimal product design for specific discount certificates,
Breuer and Perst (2007) find that issuers should prefer large stocks as underlying and aim at
less competent customers to maximize profit.
However, empirical research following these mainly theoretical works is—as noted—scarce.
A remarkable exception is the paper of Henderson and Pearson (2007), who examine patterns
in the payoffs of publicly traded structured equity derivatives and show that investors tend
to demand concave payoffs for products linked to stocks and convex payoff profiles for index
products. In this paper we investigate a similar question, but focus on the fixed-income mar-
ket. We analyze how the coupon structure of German governmental non-tradable putable
bonds influences Individual Investors’ investment, exercise and portfolio decisions and exam-
ine the financial implications of different coupon offerings. In particular, we are interested in
the potential benefits to issuers who exploit empirical exercise patterns related to the coupon
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design of fixed-income products.
Our analyses build on first findings in the studies of Eickholt et al. (2014a) and Eickholt
et al. (2014b) regarding Individual Investors’ behavior in putable bonds, which provide first
indications that the product structure influences the probability of an early exercise. In this
paper, we analyze a data set similar to that in the study of Eickholt et al. (2014b), but focus
solely on empirical patterns related to the coupon structure. Our data set comprises, over a
sample period of almost 13 years, circa 26 million financial decisions by Individual Investors
to acquire, hold or exercise early German Federal Saving Notes (GFSN). GFSN are putable
government bonds, which are very well suited for our study since they have a simple and
stable structure which does not change during the whole observation period, are consistently
issued every few weeks or months, cannot be traded and—most interestingly—because their
coupon offerings differ steadily over time. This means that we are able to conduct consistent
analyses of investors’ behavior for a wide range of putable bonds with different degrees of
steepness, kurtosis and levels of coupon structure.
Our main findings are threefold: first, the coupon structure influences the attractiveness of
an investment (“investment decision”). Products with a steeply rising coupon structure and
a low duration, i.e. with a short weighted average time until cash flows are paid out, attract
more investors and higher overall volumes. Second, controlling for environmental changes
and exogenous influences, we observe that such products are also less frequently exercised
early (“exercise decision”), which is in line with the findings of Eickholt et al. (2014b). This
implies that the average Individual Investor values bonds which promise a high final coupon
in the future more highly than financially fully equivalent bonds, i.e. GFSN with the same
maturity and the same financial fair value, that offer steady yearly coupons but a lower final
coupon payment. Our results are robust for different time sub-samples, valuation scenarios
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and investor subgroups. For instance, we notice that the preference for steeper coupon
structures is independent of an investor’s financial sophistication or experience. Investors
who very frequently invest and exercise show exercise biases similar to those of investors who
invest only once.
Third, the coupon structure is also an important basis on which investors decide which
bond in a portfolio of several GFSN to exercise early (“portfolio decision”). Consistent with
our previous results, we find that the exercise probability is higher for portfolio items with a
low valuation, a comparatively flat coupon structure and a high duration. A comparison of
different investor groups shows again that these empirical patterns are robust and appear for
almost all subsamples. Overall, we attribute the diverging decisions related to the coupon
structure here and in our first analysis to a cognitive and behavioral bias of Individual In-
vestors. Apparently, products with a higher final coupon are (irrationally) perceived as more
attractive and more valuable.
Finally, we discuss which kind of coupon structure is most promising for an issuer. For
this, we run several scenario analyses and examine exemplary coupon designs and interest rate
environments for the difference between the financial fair value at issuance and the “empirical
value”. We estimate these based on the empirically observed exercise behavior of Individual
Investors in our sample. Moreover, we use Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate the average
empirical and theoretically optimal exercise frequency. The results suggest that issuers who
exploit empirical exercise patterns related to the coupon structure can benefit in two ways.
First, issuers might reduce their liquidity reserves for bonds with a steeply ascending coupon
structure as the early exercise volume tends to decrease, due (among other reasons) to a
preference of Individual Investors to continue holding this kind of bond. Additionally, such
a lower exercise probability results in an advantage to the issuer at times when an exercise
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is theoretically reasonable. Second, our simulations indicate that the difference between the
empirical value and the fair value widens in the case of flat or concave coupon structures,
which is mainly due to the higher theoretical value placed by Individual Investors on the early
exercise right for these products—a right however that they only exploit to a small extent.
Obviously, such a poor utilization of a highly valuable option provides a financial advantage
to issuers. Following, our main conclusion in this paper is that there is some potential for
the issuers of structured fixed-income products that target Individual Investors to increase
their financial benefit through proficient “behavioral financial engineering”, i.e. by offering
product structures designed to fit their needs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our data set.
Section 3 investigates what impact upcoming coupon structure and product duration have
on Individual Investors’ investment (Section 3.2), on exercise (Section 3.3) and on portfolio
decisions (Section 3.4). In Section 4 we investigate what kind of coupon structures can be
advantageous for issuers. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
This paper aims to study the influence of different coupon structures of putable bonds on
the financial behavior of Individual Investors. For this analysis we are able to utilize a unique
and very detailed data set from the German Finance Agency (“Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Finanzagentur GmbH”)2 that covers all investment, holding and exercise decisions of 223,117
Individual Investors in German Federal Saving Notes (“Bundesschatzbriefe”, GFSN in the
following), that were booked through the German Finance Agency between July 1996 and
2The German Finance Agency is a state-owned central service agency for Germany’s governmental bor-
rowing.
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February 2009.3
GFSN are basically standard putable bonds issued by the German government, which
are very well suited for our study for following reasons. First, GFSN have a standardized
and simple product structure but differ over time regarding their coupon offerings, i.e. the
steepness, kurtosis and extent of coupons vary with every new issuance. Second, new GFSN
are issued every few weeks or months—whereby the former issuance is closed—after significant
changes in the market interest rates, which gives us a large sample panel of investors and
products. Third, commissions or transaction fees are negligible for GFSN. Fourth, GFSN
are sold exclusively to Individual Investors4 and cannot be traded on a secondary market.
This restriction allows us to observe the influence of different coupon designs on investors’
exercise behavior more comprehensively than in the case of products that are publicly traded
and where a sale to a third party is always an alternative to early exercising. Finally, GFSN
issuances have a minimum nominal value of only e50 and regularly attract a high number
of Individual Investors in Germany. Even for the single least popular GFSN in our data set,
we find transactions of more than 4,000 individual accounts in the German Finance Agency’s
debt register, which ensures some robustness of our results to, e.g., outliers.
2.1 Product statistics
Two types of GFSN (Type A and Type B) are offered at each issuance date. A Type
A GFSN is a step-up bond with a maturity of 6 years that pays a yearly rising coupon.
Type B products also offer yearly rising coupons over a maturity of 7 years but are issued
3This data set is a randomly drawn subset that covers the transactions of circa 25% of the accounts at
the German Finance Agency. Further on, we reduce the level of detail from daily to monthly observations.
4Additionally, resident institutions serving public benefit, charitable or religious purposes may also invest
in GFSN. We ignore these investors in the following, as they account only for a very small share of overall
investments.
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in a zero-bond structure and pay the nominal value plus coupons and accrued interest at
maturity. In addition, both Type A and Type B GFSN contain an early exercise right that
gives an investor the right to redeem early his investment plus accrued interests at any point
in time after the initial one-year blocking period. There are no charges for exercising early.
Investors can acquire the current issuance of a GFSN at nominal value plus accrued
interest directly from the German Finance Agency via telephone or postal order or indirectly
at banks. Banks, however, typically charge custody fees for GFSN that are held with them,
whereas the German Finance Agency offers cost-free accounts for all Individual Investors,
so that a direct acquisition is in general financially more advantageous for investors. Still,
investors can shift their investments between banks and the German Finance Agency at any
time without fees.
Our data set comprises transactions for all 204 issued GFSN in the sample period from
1996 to 2009. Table 1 shows summary statistics on the issuances and provides an overview
of the offered coupon structures over time. For comparison, we also calculate the difference
between the yearly coupons and the respective spot rate at issuance.
[Table 1 about here.]
As noted above, the statistics show that the offered coupons of issued GFSN vary significantly
over time with a standard deviation of about 0.8% for each year of maturity. Thus for instance,
the coupons for the first year range from 1.500% (5th percentile) to 4.000% (95th percentile),
with a mean payment of 2.745% and with a standard deviation of 0.812%. Similarly, we
observe a wide range of offered coupons at maturity, from 3.750% (5th percentile) to 7.000%
(95th percentile) for Type A GFSN (4.000% to 7.000% for Type B). Typically, the first three
coupon payments of a GFSN lie below the spot rates and rise thereafter above the market
rates, which indicates an non-linearly increasing coupon structure.
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Going further, Table 1 provides also some consolidated information on the shape of the
coupon structure at issuance. As a first proxy we compute the steepness of the coupon
structure, defined as the difference between the coupon in the sixth (Type A) or seventh year
(Type B) and the first year coupon. We find again a remarkable variance among the issued
GFSN with an average difference of 0.02076 (0.02199), which corresponds to a relative increase
of 92.061% (98.581%). There are also some products with almost flat coupon structures,
where the difference between the first and last coupon amounts to only 0.00750 (0.00750)
and 18.750% (18.750%) respectively in relative terms. In contrast, this difference reaches
0.04000 (0.04250) for GFSN with the steepest rising coupon offerings.
As a second proxy for the shape of the coupon structure we calculate for Type A GFSN
the Fisher-Weil duration (see Fisher and Weil, 1971) based on the coupon offerings and spot
rates at issuance, whereby we focus on the duration of the bond component and omit the
option right. For Type B GFSN, the duration always equals maturity due to the zero-bond
structure, hence we do not further analyze the values for this product type at this stage. In
general, we interpret the duration as the weighted average time until all payouts (coupons
and nominal value) have been made to the investor. The statistics reveal that the average
value over all bonds is circa 5.539 years. The 5th percentile is 5.403 years for a bond with a
comparatively flat coupon structure, whereas the longest (95th percentile) weighted average
time until payout lies closer to the respective bond’s maturity at 5.712 years.
2.2 Investor statistics
Our data set contains circa 31 million decisions by 223,017 Individual Investors to acquire,
hold or exercise early one of the above-mentioned 204 GFSN on an individual account and
monthly basis. However, we exclude in our following analyses all decisions in the last year of
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a product’s maturity, as we suspect that at this time investors’ decision criteria on holding or
exercising a GFSN differ from the criteria for products with a longer remaining lifetime.5 For
example, the question of coupon structure is presumably negligible if the product matures in
one month, whereas coupon structure is probably more important if the investment is still
bound for several years. This leaves us with circa 26 million decisions, which is—compared
to most studies on Individual Investors’ behavior in equity derivatives such as Bauer et al.
(2009), Schmitz and Weber (2012) or Liao et al. (2013)—still a comparatively large sample.
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the selected investor base and on their activities in
GFSN.
[Table 2 about here.]
Overall, we note that the investor base in GFSN is quite heterogeneous. Male (33.47%
for Type A, 38.41% for Type B GFSN) and female (38.36%, 38.00%) investors of any age
invest in GFSN (we have no information for the remaining share of investors). The average
investor is 44.09 years (31.15 years) old. Further, the data shows that about 4.15% (3.50%)
of investors hold a doctoral degree or professorship. Regarding the distribution channel, we
note that Individual Investors slightly prefer to acquire GFSN at a bank and to transfer
their accounts later to the German Finance Agency (59.18%, 54.01%). A smaller proportion
(40.82%, 45.99%) chooses the direct distribution channel.
Looking at the financial statistics, we find that a large share of the investor base invests
only rarely, i.e. has a low investment frequency. Obviously, this is due to the restriction of
our sample to Individual Investors, who are typically less active in financial markets than
professional investors or funds. An investor in our sample acquires on average only 3.147
(2.790) GFSN throughout the whole observation period of almost 13 years. Similarly, the
5In addition, we exclude accounts with an average transaction volume below e300 since for such small
volumes the early exercise right seems to be of comparatively low importance.
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mean investment volume is small, with circa e8,818 (e5,085). Nevertheless, Individual
Investors make regular use of the exercise option. Almost every second investor redeems an
investment early at least once before maturity, which totals overall circa 82,787 (47,900) early
exercise decisions in our data set. A separate analysis—not reported here—shows that these
early exercises occur for all GFSN in our sample, the share of investments exercise early per
GFSN ranging from 9% to 52% (13% to 48%).6
We note only a few differences in the average investment behavior of the presented in-
vestor subgroups (see Table 2), which we mainly attribute to personal characteristics or
environmental circumstances. For instance, the results reveal that older investors and in-
vestors holding a doctoral degree put higher volumes in GFSN, which is presumably due
to greater personal wealth. In addition, investors who prefer to invest in GFSN via direct
distribution show greater investment activity than Individual Investors, who mainly invest
through banks, which might be due, for example, to a generally more conservative strategy
of indirect investors. A third example is the lower (absolute and relative) exercise activity
of female investors. This pattern seems to be an analogy to Individual Investors’ behavior
on the equity market, where the increased trading activity of men is typically ascribed to
a higher confidence of male investors in their financial competency (see, e.g., Barber and
Odean, 2001).
6For comparability, we consider in this analysis only GFSN that mature before the end of our sample
period.
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3 Influence of coupon structure on investors’ decisions
3.1 Variables
Based on the described data set, this section investigates how the coupon structure of
a GFSN influences an investor’s investment, exercise and portfolio decisions. For this, we
introduce two variables that—similar to our previous analysis in Table 1—describe the shape
of the coupon structure at issuance and then at each later point in time.7 First, we measure
the relative steepness of the upcoming coupon structure (UPSTEEP), defined as the average
linear increase in coupon payments until maturity:
UPSTEEPt =
CT − Ct
T − t , (3.1)
where C is the coupon payment for the current year, t is the time index and T stands for the
last year of maturity. As the second variable we use the Fisher-Weil duration (see Fisher and
Weil, 1971) of the bond component (DURATION). As noted before, we ignore the value of
the option in this calculation. In general, this duration value consolidates both information
on the steepness and kurtosis of the underlying coupon structure. Still, it might also be
interpreted as the sensitivity of the respective bond against interest curve shifts, or as the
weighted average time of a GFSN until all coupons and the nominal value are paid back. In
this paper we will typically refer to the latter interpretation.
We then take into account that besides the coupon structure, the current valuation of
a GFSN might play an important role in investors’ early exercise decision. To consider the
economic benefit of exercising a GFSN, we calculate the following PVEV-ratio for each point
7This variable definition is in line with the study of Eickholt et al. (2014b).
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in time:
PV EVt =
PVt
EVt
, (3.2)
where PV stands for the present value and EV for the exercise value which is paid immedi-
ately by the issuer if an investor makes use of his early exercise right. According to theory,
an early exercise is only economically rational for an investor if this PVEV-ratio equals 1. In
all other cases, it is optimal to keep holding the GFSN since the expected discounted value
of all upcoming payments (continuation value) exceeds the amount of the exercise payment.
The calculation of the exercise value for our sample products is straightforward, as it
simply equals the notional value plus accrued or compounded interests for the respective
GFSN. However, determining the present value proves to be more complicated due to the
early exercise right that is granted to an investor. For this valuation we first apply an
essentially affine interest rate model EA1(3) on a weekly basis (see Dai and Singleton, 2000)
to model the dynamics of the interest rates (the parameterization and further explanations
are outlined in Eickholt et al., 2014a). Following this, we estimate the value of the early
exercise right via Monte-Carlo simulations with 10,000 paths using Euler discretization on a
monthly basis, i.e. with a step width of  = 1/12. To determine the continuation values in
the simulation we utilize the least-square regression approach as proposed by Longstaff and
Schwartz (2001), with the first four monomials as basis function.
3.2 Investment decision
Our first analysis investigates the influence of the product structure on the attractiveness
of a newly issued GFSN (“investment decision”). We measure the attractiveness by the
number of investors and the volume of overall investments.8 As GFSN are issued in a standard
8We also test the logarithm of the volume as independent variable, which leads to similar results.
127
Behavioral Financial Engineering in the Fixed-Income Market
structure every few weeks or months with varying coupon offerings, we do not have to account
in this analysis for, e.g., new product features, underlying characteristics or diverging credit
ratings. Yet, a major assumption in our analysis is that the share of investments booked
in the German Finance Agency’s debt register account (in contrast to investments held at
banks) remains constant for all GFSN in our sample. This means we assume a comparatively
stable distribution between direct and indirect investments in GFSN over time.
Moreover, we control in our analysis for several potential environmental influence factors.
First, we incorporate the time (quarter of the year) of an issuance, the value of the bond
component (BOND) and the value of the option component (OPTION) of the respective
GFSN. Splitting the overall value of a GFSN here into two parts allows us to investigate the
influence of both factors independently. This can be helpful, for example, in determining
the influence of the bond value on decisions of investors with a lower financial literacy, who
might not be able to evaluate the value of the early exercise right appropriately. Next, we
consider the long-term trend and the overall demand for governmental fixed-income products
at the time of issuance. As proxy for the latter we define the variables LAST6INV, that
consolidates the number of all investors in the last six issuances of the respective GFSN type,
and LAST6VOL, which comprises the cumulated investment volume of all these investors.
In some further analyses—not reported here—we substitute these trend variables by yearly
dummies to control for further timing and trend influences but find few differences in the
results, for which reason we decided to proceed with the described variables LAST6INV and
LAST6VOL.
Table 3 shows the results of a regression of an issuance’s attractiveness on the coupon
structure and the control variables. As noted, we refer to the number of investors (left part)
and the overall volume (right part) as indicators of attractiveness. Robust standard errors
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(see Huber, 1967; White, 1980, 1982) are used in this and all upcoming regression analyses.
[Table 3 about here.]
The regressions explain in all four models around 50% of the response variable variation.
Focusing on the estimated coefficients, we note at first that a high valuation of a newly
issued GFSN elicits a stronger interest among investors. Both the bond component and the
option value have positive loadings (however, these are not statistically significant for the bond
variable) indicating that they are positively correlated to the attractiveness of an issuance,
which seems very reasonable. In fact, the high elasticities of these variables suggest that the
economic value is an important determinant for investors in deciding on new investments.
We then observe some time effects in the regression. There seems to be a higher investment
demand in the first quarter of the year which diminishes over the year as expressed by the
negative coefficients for the variables Q2 to Q4.
Most interesting for our study, the regressions reveal that the coupon structure has a
statistically significant influence on the attractiveness of an issuance. The variable UPSTEEP,
which represents the steepness of the coupon structure, receives significant positive loadings
throughout all models. This suggests that investors prefer rising coupon structures and a high
final coupon payment in their investment selection. On the other hand, the coefficients for
our second proxy, the duration (DURATION), are consistently negative. Hence, Individual
Investors apparently look for a short weighted average time until the investment and coupons
are paid back. Separate regressions show that the described relations are robust for investor
subsamples and different time (investment) periods. They are also robust even when we focus
only on either UPSTEEP or DURATION to describe a product’s coupon structure.
Summing up, our main finding in the regression analysis is that the coupon structure seems
to influence Individual Investors’ decisions to invest in a GFSN. In a more general context,
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the results point to a potential for issuers of fixed-income products to place more successful
issuances, i.e. to extend the investor base and to achieve higher investment volumes, through
offering specific investment profiles. For our sample, steep coupon structures combined with
a low capital duration draw most interest among Individual Investors. The next sections
focus on investigating whether such a coupon structure is also advantageous in the case of
investors’ early exercise and portfolio decisions.
3.3 Exercise decision
In this section we use—similar to Eickholt et al. (2014b)—pooled logit regressions to find
whether the probability of an early exercise (“exercise decision”) differs depending on the
(upcoming) coupon structure of a GFSN. As discussed before, we emphasize that according
to theory an investor’s exercise decision should be linked only to the current valuation of the
GFSN.
Besides the defined PVEV-ratio, which indicates if an exercise is economically reasonable,
and the proxies for the coupon structure, we control in this analysis for three environmental
factors. First, we control for an extraordinary early exercise effect in the first month after the
initial one-year blocking period (BLOCK) of a GFSN. In this month, exercises might occur
more frequently due to the long-deferred need to exercise that had developed during the
first twelve months of maturity when investors could not liquidate their GFSN investments.
Second, we account for two major changes in the German tax system during our observation
period. Both in 1999 and 2006, the tax allowances for Individual Investors were significantly
reduced in Germany, which might have induced increased exercise activities in the months
shortly before the tax changes became effective by investors who wished to optimize their tax
debts. We introduce two dummy variables (TAX99 and TAX06) to cover this potential effect
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in November and December 1998 and 2005. Third, the dummy variable NEWMARKET is
designed to capture potential exercise peaks related to the introduction and growth phase of
the “New Market” index NEMAX50 between 1998 and 2000 in Germany. This stock index
listed new economy companies and gained a high popularity among Individual Investors in
the last years of the 1990s. Hence, some Individual Investors might have exercised early
their GFSN at this time so as to shift investments from the fixed-income market to the
growing equity market. Finally, we incorporate for Type A GFSN the lifetime of a product
(LIFETIME), i.e. the time since issuance.9
Compared to the number of decisions to continue holding a product, early exercise deci-
sions are comparatively rare in our data set (see also the investor statistics in Table 2). Thus,
to ensure that we have no (underestimation) bias in the estimated probabilities, we run rare
event regressions according to King and Zeng (2001) on the data set. However, a compar-
ison with the results of a pooled logit regressions does not show substantial differences, so
that we decided to continue with standard regressions for efficiency and comparability rea-
sons. Accordingly, Table 4 shows the results of a pooled logit regression of investors’ holding
and exercise decisions on the defined variables for Type A and Type B GFSN. In addition,
we estimate—if applicable—the respective elasticities at means indicating the proportional
change in the exercise probability for a proportional change in the respective dependent
variable.
[Table 4 about here.]
Beginning with the overall model output, we note that the regression is based on 15.924
million decisions for Type A and 9.991 million decisions for Type B GFSN. The pseudo-R2
9We note, that the lifetime of a product is correlated to the duration variable and that this collinearity
might potentially result in inflated standard errors. However, because running the logit regression with
orthogonalized regressors and running the regression without accounting for the lifetime variable leads to
similar findings, we decided to continue with the described variables.
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lies at 5.34% and 3.90%. We highlight three regression results. First, all four environmental
variables have—as expected—a statistically significant positive coefficient, which suggests
that the first month after the initial blocking period, tax effects and growth phases in the
equity market are all associated with higher exercise rates. Following the argumentation
in Eickholt et al. (2014b), this is not surprising as the demand for financial flexibility and
liquidity seems to play an important role in the decision-making of Individual Investors with
regard to fixed-income investments. Second, the coefficient for the valuation variable (PVEV)
is strongly negative implying that the exercise probability decreases with a higher valuation
of the respective product. As noted before, this is economically reasonable, since only at
the lowest possible PVEV-ratio of 1 is an exercise profitable from a theoretical point of
view. Moreover, the high elasticity for this variable indicates that Individual Investors are
indeed very sensitive to valuation changes in their investments, which is in line with our
observations on investment decisions in the previous subsection. Our third finding is that the
coupon structure of a GFSN has (again) a significant influence on the probability of exercise.
Both regressions for Type A and Type B GFSN in Table 4 exhibit negative coefficients for
the upcoming steepness of the coupon structure (UPSTEEP) and positive loadings for the
duration variable (DURATION). This suggests that Individual Investors hesitate to exercise
early investments which promise strongly rising coupons in the future, whereas they more
quickly redeem products with only slightly sloping coupon structures. Further, investors
apparently value more highly products with a comparatively short weighted average time
until coupons and investments are paid back, than financially fully equivalent products with
a longer duration. Separate analyses show that these relations are robust even when we focus
only on either UPSTEEP or DURATION to describe a product’s coupon structure.
Overall, the empirical patterns in Individual Investors’ exercise decisions are consistent
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with our above-described analysis on investment decisions, where we show that issuances
with increasing coupon payments until maturity entice more investors and attract higher
investment volumes. In summary, we interpret the economically irrational—and contrary to
standard theory—penchant for high future coupons in both decisions as a “behavioral bias”
of Individual Investors, which may be regarded based on psychological reasons.
Next, we aim to determine whether this bias in exercise behavior also applies to sub-
samples. We again regress investors’ decisions on the defined product and environmental
variables, but restrict the analysis in each case to selected time frames and specific investor
groups that differ with regard to personal or investment characteristics. In addition, we inves-
tigate two special valuation cases and two different investment history scenarios. Regarding
the valuation cases, we consider in a first regression only exercise decisions made at times
when the PVEV-ratio is close to 1 (PVEV≤1.025). In contrast, we focus in another regres-
sion on exercise decisions that occur at—from a theoretical point of view—clearly suboptimal
points in time (PVEV>1.025). Regarding the investment history cases, we incorporate in
one regression all decisions to hold or exercise a GFSN that are made until maximal three
feasible exercise opportunities have occurred. Another regression considers only decisions
on GFSN that are made after the respective investor has already left out several attractive
exercise opportunities. Table 5 presents the results for the described subsamples.
[Table 5 about here.]
In short, we observe that our results are quite robust for the subsample analyses. Beginning
again with the environmental variables, the coefficients for BLOCK and NEWMARKET
point in the same direction as in our last regression for all subsample regressions and for both
Type A and Type B GFSN. The coefficients for the tax variable are again mostly positive.
Furthermore, the results show a very consistent influence of the coupon structure. In general,
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the probability of an exercise decreases for GFSN that offer a significant growth of coupon
payments towards maturity (negative coefficients for UPSTEEP) and increases in almost all
samples with a higher duration (positive coefficient for DURATION), which seems to support
our hypothesis of a behavioral bias in Individual Investors’ exercise behavior. Few exceptions
appear. For investors with a high number of early exercises, for products with a high ratio
of present to exercise value (PVEV) and for products for which an exercise would have been
advantageous several times beforehand the estimated influenced of the UPSTEEP variable
differs from the other regressions. Still, this must not contradict our former findings regarding
a behavioral bias among investors as it seems reasonable to assume that investors who, e.g,
regularly omit profitable exercise chances and who use their option right at clearly suboptimal
points in time, assign a lower relevance to the coupon design than other investors. A possible
motive behind these exercise decisions—even though the respective GFSN currently has a
high PVEV-ratio and thus an exercise is not economically advantageous—is the need for
liquidity (see also the discussion in Eickholt et al., 2014b), in which case the upcoming
coupon structure does naturally matter less.
Besides indicating robustness, the results in Table 5 also suggest that the penchant for
specific coupon structures persists over different investor subgroups and applies for investors
with varying personal characteristics. Even investors, who might be ascribed a higher finan-
cial literacy—such as investors holding a doctoral degree or investors who very frequently
exercise GFSN early—seem to prefer investments with higher final coupon payments and
short durations.
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3.4 Portfolio decision
In this section we focus on investors who hold a portfolio of several GFSN. Following our
former results, we aim to examine if the coupon structure is also a relevant decision criteria
for Individual Investors in selecting a specific portfolio item for early exercise.
As the first step in this analysis, we create a new data set that comprises only “portfolio
decisions” of the investor base. We define an Individual Investor’s decision as a portfolio
decision if he holds at least two exercisable GFSN at the time of decision. This means that
the investor has a choice among two or more items when he contemplates the early exercise
of a product. As there are only a few differences between both GFSN types we consider the
whole portfolio of an investor at this stage, i.e. we no longer differentiate between decisions
on Type A and Type B GFSN. Moreover, we simplify our analysis at two points for a clearer
presentation of the results. First, we focus on exercise decisions, i.e. we exclude decisions to
continue holding the complete portfolio without any changes. Second, we consider a maximum
of six items per portfolio and month. If an Individual Investor’s portfolio comprises more
than six GFSN investments at the time of exercise we ignore the items with the highest
PVEV-ratios, as these products seem to be—as discussed in the last section—less likely to
be selected for exercise.
Next, for each month and each portfolio we determine a ranking (from the lowest to the
highest value) of all portfolio items according to each of the following product characteristics:
valuation (PVEV), duration (DURATION), yearly growth of upcoming coupon payments
(UPSTEEP) and investment volume (VOLUME). We also test if exogenous effects, such as
tax changes, or the lifetime of a product, have an impact on portfolio decisions. However,
separate analyses—not reported here—show that incorporating exogenous effect variables
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and running the regressions with the lifetime variable does not change the overall results,
thus we decided to continue with the described approach.
As a final step, we use random effects logit regressions to estimate the influence of the
ranking position of each considered product characteristic on an investor’s portfolio decision,
i.e. on the selection of a portfolio item to be exercised early. Technically, we assume for
the panel regression that each portfolio represents its own group of observations. Table 6
presents the results of a regression on the overall data set (second column). To examine the
robustness of our results we also conduct panel regressions for several investor subsamples
(third-to-last columns).
[Table 6 about here.]
Focusing first on the overall statistics, we observe that Individual Investors made overall
179,820 portfolio decisions for 48,590 different portfolios during our sample period, which
implies that the average portfolio comprehends circa 3.7 investments in Type A or Type B
GFSN.10 The number of examined portfolio observations is significantly lower here compared
to our previous analysis of exercise decisions (see Table 4) due to the exclusion of pure
holding decisions and due to a high share of investors holding only one product in their
portfolio for most of the time (see investor statistics in Table 2). Nevertheless, we note
that the regression on this smaller subsample of portfolio decisions generally resembles the
findings in our previous discussion. Three observations are most striking: first, the PVEV-
ratio remains an important basis for portfolio decisions. The negative coefficients for this
variable for the lower ranking positions imply that investors prefer to hold items in their
portfolio with a comparatively high PVEV-ratio. On the other hand, the probability of an
early exercise increases for products that have a comparatively low valuation, which seems
10In fact, the average portfolio is slightly larger since we restrict—as outlined—our analysis to the first six
items in an investor’s portfolio.
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very reasonable.
Second, we observe a tendency among investors to select portfolio items with higher
investment volumes (positive coefficients for volume). Additionally, the results suggest that
Type B GFSN are more often exercised early. Third, the statistically significant coefficients
for UPSTEEP and DURATION indicate that an investor’s decision as to which item in a
portfolio to exercise early also depends on the coupon structure of the respective portfolio
items. This is in line with our previous discussion. While we find a negative influence of the
UPSTEEP variable, the loadings for DURATION are mostly positive and tend to increase
with later ranking positions in the portfolio. This means that the probability of an early
exercise decreases for portfolio items with a relatively steep coupon structure and thus with
a comparatively high final coupon payment. On the other hand, the exercise probability
increases in the case of a long weighted average time until the investment plus coupons is
paid back, i.e. for portfolio items with a lower ranking position regarding the duration.
In the following, the right part of Table 6 (third-to-last column) reflects—as noted—the
robustness of our results. For this, we rerun the described random effects logit regression
but restrict the analysis to portfolio decisions of specific investor groups. In short, our
main finding is that the regressions on these subsamples produce coefficients very similar
to the results for the overall sample. Interestingly, we also note that only a few differences
occur in the decision-making of investors with different personal characteristics. For instance,
investors with considerable experience (more than 10 investments in GFSN) and high average
investment volumes (more than e10,000) seem to use decision criteria in the selection of
portfolio items for exercise that are very similar to those of investors who invest only rarely
and make small investments. For both investor groups, the subsample regressions reveal that
not only the current valuation level (PVEV-ratio) but also the coupon structure has some
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influence. As in our analysis above, we conclude that portfolio holders seem to rate items
with slowly rising coupon payments and—less strongly pronounced—a high duration less
favorably than portfolio items with different coupon structures.
4 Financial relevance of coupon structure
Following our empirical investigation, we use in this section scenario analyses11 to investi-
gate the financial relevance of the coupon structure of a putable bond. Furthermore, we seek
to determine how issuers of putable bonds can potentially exploit the apparent penchant of
Individual Investors for specific coupon structures.
Our approach can be divided into three steps. First, we design several exemplary bonds
with varying coupon structures that are financially fully equivalent in four different interest
rate environments (Section 4.1). Second, we use Monte-Carlo simulations to quantify for each
of these bonds an issuer’s potential advantage from the often suboptimal exercise behavior
of Individual Investors (Section 4.2). For this purpose, we examine the “spread” between the
financial fair value at issuance and the “empirical value” of a product, which we estimate
based on the empirically observed exercise strategies of Individual Investors in our sample.
Moreover, we compute for each product the theoretically optimal and the empirical exercise
frequency over all simulation paths to gain a better understanding of the potential demand for
liquidity during the years to maturity. Third, we discuss the results and derive implications
for issuers (Section 4.3).
11We refer here to scenario analyses instead of using the empirical data to ensure comparability of the
results and to exclude exogenous influences on the data, such as diverging bond and option values at issuance,
changes in the tax laws or time effects.
138
Behavioral Financial Engineering in the Fixed-Income Market
4.1 Scenario description
We construct five hypothetical Type A and Type B GFSN with different coupon struc-
tures, whereby each bond resembles one of the issued GFSN in the empirical sample. The
exemplary bonds cover a representative variety of degrees of steepness and kurtosis. First,
we consider a GFSN that pays constant coupons over the respective six or seven years to
maturity (Ct = CC, where C is the yearly coupon payment, t the year and CC the constant
coupon rate). Second, we examine a product with a concave coupon structure, which implies
a decreasing growth of coupon payments over time. For simplicity, we assume for this GFSN
that the coupon payments grow each year by a fixed value divided by the current year of ma-
turity (Ct = Ct−1+ CFt , where CF is a fixed value). Our third bond offers linearly increasing
coupon payments over time (Ct = t×CL, where CL is the linear multiplicator). Fourth and
fifth, we consider bonds with convex coupon structures and thus with exponentially growing
payments over time (Ct = Ct−1 × CX, where CX is the convexity degree). Because such
convex coupon structures seem to be most interesting for our analysis, we design two similar
products here that only differ as to the degree of convexity (1.50 and 1.65) and thus as to
their kurtosis.
We analyze the exercise strategies and valuations for these bonds in four different interest
rate environments. Figure 1 shows the exemplary spot rate curves we assume for the sim-
ulation, which we construct based on the well-known function of Nelson and Siegel (1987),
i.e.:
R(t) = β0 + β1
1− e(−t/τ)
t/τ
+ β2
(
1− e(−t/τ)
t/τ
− e(−t/τ)
)
, (4.1)
where r is the spot rate at time t. We use diverging parameters for β0, β1, β2 and τ .
[Figure 1 about here.]
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Our first scenario is a normal or positive spot rate curve that slopes upwards (“normal”).
In the second scenario we assume a similar term structure, where, however, the spot rates
increase more steeply over time (“steep”). The third scenario represents an interest rate
environment with a humped term structure (“humped”), which implies that spot rates grow
at the beginning but decrease in the midterm, so that later spot rates again approach the
initial level. In our last scenario we assume constant spot rates over time (“flat”).
4.2 Valuation
Our next step is to quantify for each of the described five hypothetical GFSN and for
each interest rate environment the potential financial advantage for an issuer. For this, we
compare the financial fair value of all products at issuance with an “empirical value” that
considers Individual Investors’ empirically observed exercise behavior.
To determine the fair value of a GFSN, we follow an approach similar to that outlined in
Section 3. First, we model the dynamics of the interest rates using a 1-factor short rate model
according to Hull and White (1990), i.e. dr(t) = κ(θ(t) − r(t))dt + σdW (t).12 For all bond
valuations we use the same parameters (mean reversion speed κ = 30%, short rate volatility
σ = 1.0%, 2.5% and 4.0%, whereby the time-dependent drift θ is adjusted to the initial
forward rates of the respective scenario following the approach of Brigo and Mercurio (2006).
Next, we determine the value of all considered GFSN at each time step via a Monte-Carlo
simulation with 10,000 paths and a step size of t = 1/12 using Euler discretization and
applying the least square regression method as proposed by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001).
For result comparability, we assume that all GFSN in all interest rate environments are
issued at a financial fair value of 1.020 and with a nominal value of the bond component of
12W (t) stands for a standard Brownian motion.
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1.000.13 This means that from a theoretical point of view all considered products should be
equally attractive for investors. To construct a coupon structure for each exemplary bonds
that leads to the same fair value, we refer to a non-linear optimization algorithm based on
the interior-point method. With this algorithm we estimate the best fitting values for the
parameters CC, CF , CL, CX1.5 and CX1.65, using the mean squared error as goodness-of-fit
criteria. We rerun the optimization until the distance from the previous best estimate to the
current best estimate is less than 1×10−16. As a short summary of the optimization approach,
Table 7 presents the estimated first and last coupon for each product in each interest rate
scenario.
[Table 7 about here.]
In general, the statistics show that—as expected—the estimated final coupon payment in-
creases from the first bond with a flat coupon structure to the last example, with a strongly
convex coupon structure. In contrast, it generally decreases with a rising volatility level,
which is due to a higher value of the early exercise right in more volatile environments. We
will discuss this effect in detail at a later stage.
In contrast to the financial fair values, we expect that the empirical values of our exem-
plary designed GFSN differ among the scenarios due to the preferences of Individual Investors
for specific coupon structures and payment profiles. To estimate the empirical values we basi-
cally apply a reduced-form model and refer to the estimated determinants of early exercising
from Table 4. We ignore the influence of changes in the tax legislation and changes in the mar-
ket structure, as these cannot be anticipated by investors. This means that the probability
13We also run the simulations with fair values of 1.000 for all constructed GFSN and obtain similar results.
The assumed fair value of 1.020 represents an approximate average of the valuations of Type A and B GFSN
at issuance during our sample period.
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of an exercise is given by:
Pr(ext) = exp[βˆ1PV EVt + βˆ2UPSTEEPt + βˆ3DURATIONt
+βˆ4BLOCKt + βˆ5LIFETIMEt + Constant]/
[1 + exp(βˆ1PV EVt + βˆ2UPSTEEPt + βˆ3DURATIONt
+βˆ4BLOCKt + βˆ5LIFETIMEt + Constant)]
, (4.2)
where ex stands for an early exercise event, t for the current time step and βˆ for the previ-
ously estimated regression coefficients. The variables UPSTEEP, DURATION, BLOCK and
LIFETIME (for Type A GFSN) are defined as in our former analysis. For the PVEV variable
we utilize the results from the theoretical valuation.
Besides considering the influence of the coupon structure, the modeled empirical values
also represent Individual Investors’ generally suboptimal exercise behavior. As outlined in
the study by Eickholt et al. (2014b), Individual Investors often tend to omit attractive ex-
ercise opportunities and use their early exercise right at times that are not economically
advantageous. The reduced-form model implicitly accounts for both effects.
4.3 Scenario results
Table 8 compares the computed “spread” between the financial fair value and the empirical
value at issuance for all products and for all interest rate environments.
[Table 8 about here.]
In addition, Table 9 presents for each scenario the simulated exercise frequency over all Monte-
Carlo paths for the theoretical optimal strategy (Panel A) and for the empirical valuation
approach based on the reduced-form model (Panel B).
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[Table 9 about here.]
Beginning with the valuation results in Table 8, we observe clear differences over the presented
scenarios. The lowest spreads occur in the simulations for GFSN with strongly convex coupon
structures in the case of a steep spot rate curve (0.116% points to 4.766% points for Type
A and 0.243% points to 5.477% points for Type B GFSN), whereas the highest spreads are
linked to bonds with flat coupon payments (7.728% points to 13.156% points and 8.892%
points to 15.604% points). More generally, we find that the spread is positively correlated
to a higher volatility and that it varies depending on the assumed interest rate environment.
We concentrate in the following on discussing the influence of the volatility and the coupon
structure.
Regarding the impact of the volatility, we recap that the option component in a GFSN
represents an unilateral right of the investor to reclaim his investment. This means the number
of potentially attractive exercise opportunities and hence the value of the early exercise right
increase in a high volatility environment. Accordingly, the results in Panel A of Table 9
show in general a rising percentage of exercised paths over the volatility scenarios. For
instance, for our exemplary GFSN with a strongly convex coupon structure, the optimal
exercise frequency grows from 16.480% for the low volatility scenario to 82.690% for the high
volatility scenario (normal term structure, from 16.650% to 84.350% for Type B GFSN).
Yet this increasing number of economically reasonable exercise points also means that the
optimal exercise strategy acquires a greater financial relevance. Missing attractive exercise
opportunities and exercising too early or too late is more disadvantageous in a more volatile
environment. In fact, this is the reason why the spread between the fair and the empirical
value—which incorporates the frequently suboptimal decision-making of the investor base—
widens over the volatility scenarios.
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Moreover, we find that the estimated spread typically diminishes along the five designed
products. In short, the decreasing values are due to the declining relevance of the early
exercise right and thus to the declining importance of the negative influence of Individual In-
vestors’ often suboptimal exercise behavior. To explain this effect in detail, we compare, as an
example, the simulated exercise frequencies and valuations for our first and last constructed
GFSN. First and most importantly, we note that for a GFSN with a flat coupon structure
significantly more attractive exercise opportunities arise until maturity than for the last case,
a GFSN with a strongly convex coupon structure, where the highest coupon payments are
deferred towards maturity. The statistics in Panel A of Table 9 show that the percentage of
optimally exercised simulation paths decreases for the low volatility scenario and a normal
spot rate curve from 99.070% for the first GFSN to the above-mentioned 16.480% for the
last analyzed product (from 99.590% to 16.650% for Type B GFSN). Similarly, the optimal
exercise timing differs. A separate analysis—not reported here—indicates that the average
optimal holding times over all simulated paths for these two bonds are respectively 28 months
and 63 months (28 months and 73 months). Both the lower exercise frequency and the longer
holding period, i.e. the later exercise time, are due to on average higher continuation values
and thus to an on average higher PVEV-ratio of products that offer high final coupon pay-
ments. Recalling our former argument that an early exercise is economically only reasonable
if the PVEV-ratio reaches 1, it becomes obvious that the theoretical and empirical option
value decreases along the ordered product scenarios. Thus we can infer the main reason for
the narrowing spread is the smaller number of economically advantageous exercise opportu-
nities that Individual Investors can potentially omit due to suboptimal exercise decisions. In
other words, the risk of missing attractive exercise points is reduced for products with steeply
rising coupon structures.
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However, in addition to the development of the PVEV-ratio, a second factor also drives—
as discussed earlier—differences between the product scenarios, namely the penchant of Indi-
vidual Investors for specific coupon structures. The reduced-form model for the estimation of
the empirical values considers that investors more often hesitate to exercise their investments
early in the case of coupon payments that grow more strongly towards maturity (negative
coefficient on UPSTEEP in the model), and that they generally prefer to hold products with
a short duration (positive coefficient on DURATION). Taken together, this “behavioral bias”
leads to a reduced exercise probability in products with steeply rising coupon payments as
the influence of UPSTEEP outbalances the influence of the DURATION variable. Compared
to the last argument this bias acts in the opposite direction. It has a positive and increasing
impact on the spread along the five exemplary GFSN.
Nevertheless, looking at the spread statistics, we find that this positive second effect is
widely overcompensated by the negative influence of the above-described diminishing rele-
vance of the option component. However, it is more obvious in the statistics on the modeled
empirical exercise strategies shown in Panel B of Table 9. Here, the tendency among investors
to continue holding allegedly more attractive bonds further reduces the average exercise fre-
quency for GFSN with high final coupon payments, and contributes—on the other hand—to
an increasing number of early exercises for GFSN that offer flat coupon payments.
In summary, the scenario analyses imply that issuers of putable bonds for Individual In-
vestors can gain a significant financial advantage through “behavioral financial engineering”.
In particular, issuers might benefit from two empirical patterns. First, our results suggest
that offering products with a (strongly) convex coupon structure allows issuers to reduce their
liquidity reserves as Individual Investors prefer to continue holding such bonds and instead
tend to exercise early products with visually less attractive coupon offerings. Second, flat
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or concave coupon structures seem to be most suitable for issuers that aim to maximize the
spread between the empirical and the theoretical value of their issuances. The reason is that
for such products, the exercise right has a comparatively high theoretical value, which is
advantageous for issuers since Individual Investors regularly forfeit attractive exercise oppor-
tunities and typically exploit even very valuable exercise rights to only a small extent. This
is also expressed by the difference between the statistics in Panel A and B in Table 9.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the influence of different product designs on Individual In-
vestors’ decision-making in putable bonds. Our main finding is that the coupon structure
plays an important role in how investors make investment, exercise and portfolio decisions.
Bonds with a steep coupon structure and a short weighted average time until all payouts
have been made tend to attract more investors and have a lower exercise probability than
products with the same financial fair value that offer a flatter coupon structure. This em-
pirical observation, which appears to be robust for almost all subsamples in our data set,
cannot be explained by economic arguments. Hence, we interpret our results as indicating a
behavioral bias among Individual Investors. Apparently, Individual Investors value putable
bonds differently, depending on the psychological or visual attractiveness of the remaining
coupon payments.
A main conclusion of our study is that there is some potential for issuers of fixed-income
products with early exercise rights for Individual Investors to increase the attractiveness
of their products and to steer investors’ exercise behavior through proficient “behavioral
financial engineering”. Our analyses indicate that issuers who are looking for high investment
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volumes and a low capital outflow throughout maturity should prefer putable bonds with
significantly increasing coupon payments until maturity. Issuers benefit in this case in two
ways. First, they must have less liquidity available, as the early exercise volume tends to
diminish as Individual Investors prefer to continue holding this kind of bonds. Second, the
share of exploited attractive exercise opportunities tends to be lower than in the case of other
coupon structures.
On the other hand, for issuers who seek to maximize the spread between the theoretical
and empirical value of a newly issued putable bond, flat or concave coupon structures might
be more suitable. The reason is that—as discussed in detail in the study of Eickholt et al.
(2014b)—Individual Investors typically exploit even very valuable option rights to only a small
extent. Consequently, the spread between theoretical and empirical value is—measured in
percent points—larger for products for which the probability of an early exercise, and thus
the theoretical option value, is comparatively high, such as putable bonds with flat coupon
offerings.
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Figures
Figure 1: Interest rate scenarios for scenario analyses
This figure shows the exemplary spot rate curves at issuance for the scenario analyses. The spot rates are calculated using the formula
of Nelson and Siegel (1987), i.e. R(t) = β0 + β1 1−e
(−t/τ)
t/τ
+ β2
(
1−e(−t/τ)
t/τ
− e(−t/τ)
)
, with the following parameters. Normal:
β0 = 0.06, β1 = −0.035, β2 = 0.020, τ = 7.000. Steep: β0 = 0.035, β1 = −0.030, β2 = 0.140, τ = 3.000. Humped: β0 = 0.000,
β1 = 0.030, β2 = 0.120, τ = 1.500. Flat: β0 = 0.040, β1 = 0.000, β2 = 0.000, τ = 6.000.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics on GFSN
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Mean Med. p5 p95 Std.dev. SR Mean Med. p5 p95 Std.dev. SR
Coupon p.a. in %
Year 1 2.745 2.750 1.500 4.000 0.812 -0.641 2.745 2.750 1.500 4.000 0.812 -0.641
Year 2 3.199 3.250 1.750 4.250 0.813 -0.342 3.199 3.250 1.750 4.250 0.813 -0.342
Year 3 3.627 3.625 2.500 5.000 0.807 -0.072 3.627 3.625 2.500 5.000 0.807 -0.072
Year 4 4.034 4.000 3.000 5.750 0.821 0.181 4.034 4.000 3.000 5.750 0.821 0.181
Year 5 4.409 4.250 3.250 6.250 0.858 0.415 4.250 4.250 3.250 6.250 0.858 0.415
Year 6 4.821 4.500 3.750 7.000 0.929 0.700 4.821 4.500 3.750 7.000 0.929 0.700
Year 7 4.944 4.750 4.000 7.000 0.924 0.709
Steepness of coupon structure
Diff. in %
points
2.076 2.000 0.750 4.000 1.066 2.199 2.250 0.750 4.250 1.128
Rel. in % 92.061 80.000 18.750 171.429 69.220 98.581 81.818 18.750 216.667 77.121
Fisher-Weil duration
Years 5.539 5.529 5.403 5.712 0.098
The table exhibits statistics on the coupon offerings for Type A and Type B GFSN for all 204 issuances (102 Type A, 102 Type B) in our sample
period from July 1996 to February 2009 and on the corresponding spot rates in Germany. For year 1 to 6 identical coupons are offered for
Type A and Type B GFSN at each issuance date, whereas the coupons in year 7 are only applicable for Type B. SR stands for the difference
between the coupon rate and the respective spot rate for the respective year, whereby the spot rates represent the term structure of interest
rates on listed Federal securities (method by Svensson) at the respective issuance date according to Deutsche Bundesbank. Absolute steepness
of the coupon structure describes the difference between the last and the first coupon, the relative steepness is the ratio of the last to the first
coupon payment.
Table 2: Summary statistics on investor base
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Ø Invest- Ø Volume Ø Early Ø Invest- Ø Volume Ø Early
Percent Abs. ments in e exercises Percent Abs. ments in e exercises
Gender
Male 33.47 52,717 3.282 5,670 0.582 38.41 35,595 2.948 2,858 0.563
Female 38.36 60,425 2.938 11,212 0.450 38.00 35,214 2.561 8,610 0.424
n/a 28.17 40,370 3.273 10,885 0.561 23.60 21,871 2.901 5,053 0.590
Age
0 to 40 years 42.64 67,168 2.785 6,910 0.534 59.50 55,146 2.543 4,308 0.470
41 to 100 years 54.09 85,194 3.560 9,996 0.550 37.62 34,867 3.314 7,838 0.630
n/a 3.27 5,150 1.042 10,319 0.002 2.88 2,667 1.037 5,053 0.003
Doctoral degree
Doctorate or professorship 4.15 6,536 3.911 12,382 0.604 3.50 3,243 3.896 11,160 0.594
No doctoral degree 95.85 150,976 3.114 8,664 0.522 96.50 89,473 2.750 4,865 0.514
Preferred distribution(1)
Indirect (via
banks) 59.18 93,217 1.607 9,016 0.323 54.01 50,057 1.489 4,531 0.356
Direct (at German
Finance Agency) 40.82 64,295 5.380 8,533 0.819 45.99 42,263 4.318 5,734 0.706
Overall 100.00 157,512 3.147 8,818 0.526 100.00 92,680 2.790 5,085 0.517
The table exhibits information on personal and investment characteristics of all 223,017 Individual Investors in our data sample, whereof 27,175
investors hold both Type A and Type B GFSN. The first and second column show the relative distribution and absolute numbers of investors with
the respective personal characteristics, the third column lists the average number of investments, the fourth column shows the mean investment
volume, while the last column shows the average number of early exercises for each cluster. (1) We define the preferred distribution channel as
direct if an investor executes at least one direct transaction. Indirect means that an investor purchases a GFSN at a bank and later transfers
his investment to the German Finance Agency.
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Table 3: Influence of coupon structure on investment attractiveness
Number of investments Investment volume
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity
Valuation
BOND 25.316 5.168 23.620* 9.204* 276.223 7.734 124.353* 11.735*
OPTION 100.107* 0.448* 62.421* 0.740* 857.074* 0.526* 283.416* 0.814*
Coupon structure
UPSTEEP 1,163.491* 1.932* 660.747* 1.841* 11,050.160* 2.516* 3,016.935* 2.036*
DURATION -6.358* -7.320* -53.675* -8.476*
Trend
LAST6INV 0.027 0.164 0.046 0.277
LAST6VOL 0.014 0.082 0.023 0.165
Timing
Q2 -1.850* -1.168* -16.231* -5.895*
Q3 -1.605 -0.986* -13.566 -4.306*
Q4 -1.048 -0.283 -10.011 -1.933
Constant 4.081 -27.258* -38.339 -140.023*
N 102 102 102 102
R2 in % 50.30 55.76 48.86 50.85
The table exhibits the results of standard regressions on Individual Investors’ investment decisions in Type A and Type B GFSN. In the left
part of the table the dependent variable is the overall number of investments, whereas in the right part the cumulated volume per issuance
is used. Only investments and decisions after the initial one-year blocking period are considered. The variables LAST6INV and LAST6VOL
represent the cumulated number of investors respectively the cumulated GFSN volume over the last 6 issuances and thus represent a mid-
term trend. The elasticities (ey/ex) are calculated at means and are not determined for dummy variables. Robust standard errors are used.
* signals statistical significance at the 5% level.
Table 4: Influence of coupon structure on early exercise probability
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity
Economic benefit
PVEV -19.291* -19.982* -14.277* -15.003*
Coupon structure
UPSTEEP -23.006* -0.118* -31.232* -0.132*
DURATION 4.557* 13.592* 0.305* 1.139*
Environmental circumstances
BLOCK 0.220* 0.150*
NEWMARKET 0.732* 0.648*
TAX99 0.225*
TAX06 0.585*
Lifetime in years
LIFETIME 3.682* 6.783*
Constant -6.281* 8.058*
N 15.924m 15.924m 9.991m 9.991m
Pseudo-R2 in % 5.34 3.90
The table exhibits the results of a pooled logit regression on Individual Investors’ early exercise
decisions for Type A and Type B GFSN. Only decisions to hold or exercise after the initial one-year
blocking period and before the last year of maturity are considered. The lifetime variable is not
considered for Type B GFSN as it is perfectly correlated to the duration. The elasticities (ey/ex)
are calculated at means and are not determined for dummy variables. Robust standard errors
are used. Pseudo-R2 is the percentage improvement in the log-likelihood achieved by our model
compared to a constant-only model. * signals statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 5: Influence of coupon structure on early exercise probability for subsamples
UP- DURA- NEW- LIFE- Pseudo-R2
Type A GFSN PVEV STEEP TION BLOCK MARKET TAX99 TAX06 TIME Const. N in %
Issuance date
2002 or earlier -12.981* -15.166* 5.693* 0.274* 0.895* 4.758* -18.343* 12.460m 4.31
After 2002 -46.038* -120.364* 2.830* 0.167* 2.148* 29.383* 3.464m 5.96
Gender
Male -18.948* -16.233* 4.548* 0.246* 0.731* 3.684* -6.573* 5.498m 5.23
Female -18.101* -33.709* 4.688* 0.236* 0.734* 3.846* -8.225* 5.854m 4.73
Age
≤ 40 years -15.722* -15.342* 4.293* 0.236* 0.735* 3.498* -8.689* 6.072m 4.24
> 40 years -22.548* -32.116* 4.772* 0.204* 0.698* 0.137 -3.938* 9.851m 6.35
Doctoral degree
Doctorate or professor-
ship
-19.72* -20.939* 5.075* 0.310* 0.900* 4.147* -8.388* 0.794m 5.78
No doctoral degree -19.273* -23.082* 4.537* 0.216* 0.724* 3.664* -6.194* 15.130m 5.32
Preferred distribution channel
Direct -28.761* -68.844* 3.818* 0.228* 0.486* 2.972* 7.126* 6.546m 6.71
Indirect -14.258* -4.784 4.037* 0.157* 0.904* 3.285* -9.34* 9.377m 4.20
Number of investments
≤ 3 -15.94* -2.649 3.986* 0.208* 0.767* 3.228* -7.278* 10.437m 4.06
> 3 -27.734* -60.584* 4.553* 0.197* 0.630* 3.592* 2.638* 5.487m 7.44
Ø Investment volume
≤ e10,000 -19.199* -25.043* 4.579* 0.207* 0.720* 3.703* -6.430* 11.891m 5.37
> e10,000 -19.401* -14.103* 4.256* 0.271* 0.776* 3.410* -4.928* 4.033m 5.12
Number of early exercises
≤ 2 -16.809* -5.861* 3.339* 0.219* 0.894* 2.653* -3.689* 15.137m 4.09
> 2 -19.309* -21.672* 5.536* 0.133* 0.249* 4.679* -9.277* 0.786m 5.69
Valuation scenarios
PVEV ≤ 1.025 -67.256* -54.345* 3.538* 0.225* 0.422* 2.735* 47.009* 5.023m 6.24
PVEV > 1.025 -6.582* 37.571* 0.276 0.196* 0.452* -0.039 -0.217 10.901m 1.44
Investment history
≤ 3 missed chances -15.744* -26.358* 3.557* 0.359* 0.763* 2.781* -5.359* 12.760m 4.43
> 3 missed chances -31.94* -28.759* 4.995* 0.472* 4.048* 4.652* 3.164m 5.66
Type B GFSN
Issuance date
2002 or earlier -9.832* -52.418* 0.006 0.191* 0.873* 0.268* 1.112* 3.614* 7.692m 3.50
After 2002 -27.745* -78.055* 0.350* 0.113* 0.227* 21.874* 2.299m 4.29
Gender
Male -14.583* -40.286* 0.318* 0.158* 0.642* 0.220* 0.576* 8.403* 4.022m 4.13
Female -14.219* -28.031* 0.280* 0.177* 0.638* 0.229* 0.475* 7.935* 3.664m 3.57
Age
≤ 40 years -12.933* -29.823* 0.286* 0.160* 0.673* 0.192* 0.617* 6.681* 5.730m 3.57
>40 years -15.936* -35.348* 0.320* 0.136* 0.657* 0.284* 0.550* 9.786* 4.261m 4.33
Doctoral degree
Doctorate or professor-
ship
-16.042* -86.969* 0.371* 0.265* 0.817* -0.097 0.455* 9.733* 0.409m 5.09
No doctoral degree -14.233* -28.537* 0.303* 0.142* 0.642* 0.234* 0.593* 8.016* 9.582m 3.86
Preferred distribution channel
Direct -21.171* -50.274* 0.354* 0.150* 0.394* 0.041 0.429* 15.053* 4.568m 4.90
Indirect -8.863* -52.309* 0.208* 0.160* 0.976* 0.337* 0.875* 2.705* 5.422m 3.53
Number of investments
≤ 3 -11.347* -24.923* 0.238* 0.167* 0.720* 0.339* 0.701* 5.207* 6.825m 3.02
> 3 -20.921* -38.88* 0.410* 0.111* 0.566* -0.048 0.412* 14.491* 3.166m 5.86
Ø Investment volume
≤ 10.000 -14.403* -30.529* 0.308* 0.138* 0.633* 0.175* 0.607* 8.171* 9.031m 3.92
> 10.000 -13.505* -40.409* 0.281* 0.250* 0.805* 0.601* 0.349* 7.431* 0.960m 3.94
Number of early exercises
≤ 2 -11.023* -36.744* 0.217* 0.190* 0.921* 0.309* 0.635* 4.655* 9.482m 3.10
> 2 -16.833* 22.010* 0.241* 0.054 0.204* -0.034 0.449* 12.51* 0.509m 4.17
Valuation scenarios
PVEV ≤ 1.025 -53.159* -33.131* 0.335* 0.162* 0.474* -0.014 0.492* 47.273* 2.357m 5.26
PVEV > 1.025 -4.335* 19.051* 0.166* 0.202* 0.520* 0.589* 0.684* -2.212* 7.634m 1.33
Investment history
≤ 3 missed chances -11.601* -32.164* 0.265* 0.311* 0.661* 0.313* 0.714* 5.369* 8.796m 3.06
> 3 missed chances -21.08* 16.466 0.486* 0.449* -0.008 14.169* 1.194m 5.57
The table exhibits the results of several pooled logit regressions (each row shows a specific regression result) on Individual Investors’ early
exercise decisions in Type A and Type B GFSN. The regressions differ according to the issuance time of the underlying GFSN, investors’
personal and investment characteristics, valuation ranges and the investment history. The lifetime variable is not considered for Type B
GFSN as it is perfectly correlated to the duration. Only investments and decisions after the initial one-year blocking period and before
the last year of maturity are considered. Robust standard errors are used. Pseudo-R2 is the percentage improvement in the log-likelihood
achieved by our model compared to a constant-only model. * signals statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 6: Influence of coupon structure on early exercise probability of portfolio items
All Gender Age Doctoral Preferred Number Ø Investment
Portfolio items
ranked from low
to high
in years degree distribution of investments volume in e
Male Female ≤40 >40 Yes No Direct Indirect ≤10 >10 ≤10,000 >10,000
Economic benefit
(PVEV)
Rank 2 -0.905* -0.897* -0.873* -0.952* -0.874* -0.863* -0.907* -0.907* -0.899* -0.923* -0.782* -0.857* -0.918*
Rank 3 -1.432* -1.387* -1.456* -1.521* -1.368* -1.542* -1.425* -1.431* -1.412* -1.467* -1.206* -1.313* -1.461*
Rank 4 -1.739* -1.716* -1.792* -1.814* -1.683* -1.786* -1.736* -1.722* -1.744* -1.767* -1.538* -1.64* -1.764*
Rank 5 -1.962* -1.938* -1.964* -2.059* -1.883* -1.944* -1.962* -1.961* -1.924* -1.973* -1.785* -1.881* -1.979*
Rank 6 -2.053* -2.072* -2.111* -2.192* -1.947* -2.138* -2.048* -2.033* -2.062* -2.085* -1.838* -2.051* -2.043*
Steepness of coupon structure
(UPSTEEP)
Rank 2 -0.268* -0.293* -0.275* -0.28* -0.261* -0.205* -0.272* -0.299* -0.224* -0.250* -0.332* -0.285* -0.263*
Rank 3 -0.497* -0.506* -0.516* -0.500* -0.494* -0.284* -0.510* -0.496* -0.484* -0.490* -0.429* -0.498* -0.492*
Rank 4 -0.602* -0.599* -0.633* -0.590* -0.603* -0.521* -0.607* -0.601* -0.576* -0.567* -0.562* -0.636* -0.584*
Rank 5 -0.669* -0.669* -0.711* -0.651* -0.67* -0.574* -0.674* -0.665* -0.645* -0.610* -0.628* -0.720* -0.644*
Rank 6 -0.733* -0.785* -0.753* -0.709* -0.736* -0.743* -0.732* -0.747* -0.666* -0.578* -0.800* -0.840* -0.689*
Duration ratio
(DURATION)
Rank 2 0.427* 0.437* 0.408* 0.491* 0.391* 0.560* 0.421* 0.418* 0.440* 0.415* 0.495* 0.391* 0.435*
Rank 3 0.494* 0.533* 0.466* 0.617* 0.428* 0.576* 0.491* 0.506* 0.499* 0.470* 0.712* 0.505* 0.495*
Rank 4 0.608* 0.641* 0.536* 0.720* 0.557* 0.570* 0.612* 0.680* 0.511* 0.585* 0.878* 0.669* 0.594*
Rank 5 0.719* 0.747* 0.669* 0.887* 0.646* 0.806* 0.716* 0.767* 0.692* 0.698* 1.054* 0.760* 0.716*
Rank 6 0.864* 0.864* 0.834* 1.063* 0.783* 0.989* 0.86* 0.906* 0.865* 0.817* 1.270* 0.903* 0.863*
Investment volume
Rank 2 0.206* 0.180* 0.185* 0.282* 0.154* 0.163* 0.209* 0.194* 0.225* 0.224* 0.103* 0.261* 0.195*
Rank 3 0.055* 0.043 0.048 0.102* 0.025 -0.106 0.064* 0.075* 0.046 0.073* 0.056 0.185* 0.025
Rank 4 0.047* 0.039 0.089* 0.143* -0.011 -0.010 0.051* 0.100* -0.018 0.060* 0.098* 0.151* 0.027
Rank 5 0.071* 0.030 0.076 0.172* 0.018 0.021 0.075* 0.146* -0.048 0.094* 0.128* 0.157* 0.057*
Rank 6 0.117* 0.058 0.155* 0.257* 0.044 0.069 0.120* 0.182* 0.026 0.099* 0.256* 0.175* 0.115*
Product type
Type B GFSN 0.054* 0.082* 0.025 0.015 0.014 -0.050 0.059* 0.054* 0.054* 0.023 0.095* 0.018 0.092*
Constant 0.067* 0.057 0.127* 0.216* -0.017 -0.066 0.074* -0.058* 0.199* 0.173* -0.660* -0.179* 0.116*
N 179,820 71,304 54,230 71,261 108,559 9,718 170,102 113,698 66,0122 130,907 48,913 41,749 138,071
Portfolios 48,590 18,993 15,117 20,074 28,516 2,482 46,108 28,531 20,059 38,759 9,831 10,204 38,387
Portfolio observations
Min. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mean 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.7 3.9 4.0 3.3 3.4 5.0 4.1 3.6
Max. 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Pseudo-R2 in % 10.58 10.43 11.01 11.23 10.19 10.53 11.62 10.49 10.52 10.42 10.59 10.26 10.64
The table shows the results of several random effects logit regressions (each column shows a specific regression result) on Individual Investors’
exercise decision depending on the ranking positions of the product in a portfolio. To determine the respective rank per criteria, all products
in an investor’s portfolio are ordered at each point in time from the smallest to the highest value. The first column shows the results of an
overall analysis. The following columns show the results of panel regressions on subsamples that differ regarding personal and investment
characteristics. The number of investments describes the cumulated amount of investments of an investor in GFSN over the whole sample
period. Only exercise decisions after the initial one-year blocking period and exercise decisions that occur at times when the respective
investor holds at least two GFSN are considered. For portfolios that comprise more than six GFSN, we consider only the first six products
with the lowest valuation ratio (PVEV). Pseudo-R2 is the percentage improvement in the log-likelihood achieved by our model compared to
a constant-only model. * signals statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 7: Scenario analyses – exemplary coupon structures
Panel A Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
First coupon in % Interest rate scenario Interest rate scenario
Normal Steep Humped Flat Normal Steep Humped Flat
Volatility 1.0%
Flat 2.752 5.042 2.741 2.314 2.734 5.037 2.353 2.280
Concave 1.849 3.674 1.521 1.466 1.797 3.417 1.222 1.396
Linear 1.071 2.055 0.818 0.835 0.967 1.721 0.604 0.738
Convex 1.103 2.114 0.830 0.857 0.858 1.515 0.528 0.654
Strongly convex 0.788 1.514 0.587 0.611 0.561 0.990 0.343 0.427
Volatility 2.5%
Flat 1.961 4.512 2.138 1.457 1.897 4.442 1.754 1.366
Concave 1.334 3.214 1.272 0.963 1.257 2.974 0.981 0.873
Linear 0.832 1.924 0.714 0.591 0.740 1.612 0.509 0.507
Convex 0.888 1.998 0.732 0.633 0.703 1.443 0.456 0.486
Strongly convex 0.657 1.446 0.525 0.468 0.476 0.950 0.307 0.330
Volatility 4.0%
Flat 1.206 3.696 1.423 0.616 1.106 3.537 1.043 0.492
Concave 0.825 2.623 0.880 0.411 0.739 2.387 0.610 0.317
Linear 0.533 1.649 0.516 0.263 0.457 1.378 0.333 0.195
Convex 0.583 1.738 0.539 0.287 0.459 1.274 0.310 0.196
Strongly convex 0.446 1.284 0.396 0.221 0.326 0.854 0.209 0.142
Panel B
Final coupon Interest rate scenario Interest rate scenario
at maturity in % Normal Steep Humped Flat Normal Steep Humped Flat
Volatility 1.0%
Flat 2.752 5.042 2.741 2.314 2.734 5.037 2.353 2.280
Concave 4.529 9.001 3.727 3.592 4.660 8.860 3.168 3.619
Linear 6.425 12.329 4.909 5.007 6.769 12.049 4.226 5.162
Convex 8.372 16.054 6.302 6.511 9.773 17.256 6.011 7.446
Strongly convex 9.633 18.514 7.182 7.473 11.316 19.979 6.923 8.618
Volatility 2.5%
Flat 1.961 4.512 2.138 1.457 1.897 4.442 1.754 1.366
Concave 3.269 7.875 3.117 2.359 3.258 7.710 2.544 2.263
Linear 4.990 11.542 4.283 3.548 5.183 11.280 3.564 3.550
Convex 6.745 15.171 5.561 4.804 8.004 16.438 5.190 5.530
Strongly convex 8.033 17.689 6.414 5.727 9.601 19.168 6.202 6.665
Volatility 4.0%
Flat 1.206 3.696 1.423 0.616 1.106 3.537 1.043 0.492
Concave 2.022 6.427 2.155 1.006 1.916 6.190 1.582 0.821
Linear 3.199 9.896 3.098 1.581 3.197 9.648 2.333 1.362
Convex 4.425 13.196 4.095 2.179 5.230 14.508 3.527 2.231
Strongly convex 5.456 15.708 4.843 2.705 6.584 17.240 4.225 2.855
The table shows the estimated first (Panel A) and final coupon (Panel B) at maturity for 5 hypothetical GFSN. All GFSN have a financial fair
value of 1.020. The respective coupon structure parameters for each bond (CC, CF , CL, CX1.5 and CX1.65) are estimated via a non-linear
optimization algorithm based on the interior-point method and using the mean squared error as goodness-of-fit criteria. The dynamics of
the interest rates are modeled using a 1-factor short rate model according to Hull and White (1990), i.e. dr(t) = κ(θ(t)− r(t))dt+σdW (t),
with κ = 30%, σ as shown and θ being adjusted to the initial forward rates of the respective scenario following the approach of Brigo and
Mercurio (2006). The fair value of a product is calculated via a Monte-Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths and a step size of t = 1/12
using Euler discretization and the least square regression method as proposed by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001).
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Table 8: Scenario analyses – differences between theoretical and empirical value
Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Value difference Interest rate scenario Interest rate scenario
in % points Normal Steep Humped Flat Normal Steep Humped Flat
Volatility 1.0%
Flat 4.286 7.728 0.751 2.812 6.096 8.892 0.946 4.006
Concave 1.766 0.946 0.491 1.391 2.536 1.318 0.787 1.953
Linear 0.705 0.216 0.408 0.721 1.014 0.591 0.710 1.017
Convex 0.537 0.191 0.426 0.611 0.739 0.353 0.588 0.772
Strongly convex 0.447 0.116 0.358 0.549 0.635 0.243 0.555 0.649
Volatility 2.5%
Flat 7.424 10.018 3.289 6.098 10.239 11.702 4.024 8.512
Concave 5.862 4.769 2.473 5.214 7.902 5.875 3.344 7.123
Linear 4.350 2.261 2.031 4.266 5.756 2.991 2.705 5.758
Convex 3.811 1.960 1.858 3.842 4.525 2.310 2.408 4.833
Strongly convex 3.255 1.567 1.693 3.465 3.900 1.864 2.008 4.428
Volatility 4.0%
Flat 10.238 13.156 6.016 8.664 14.479 15.604 7.781 12.859
Concave 9.593 9.306 5.467 8.439 13.155 11.274 7.206 12.285
Linear 8.811 6.242 4.891 8.292 11.712 7.721 6.457 11.807
Convex 8.341 5.640 4.794 7.963 10.752 6.345 6.126 11.276
Strongly convex 7.865 4.766 4.408 7.813 9.945 5.477 5.832 10.941
The table shows the estimated difference at issuance between financial fair value and the empirical value for exemplary Type A and B
GFSN with different coupon structures in varying interest rate environments (see Figure 1 for the corresponding spot rate curves). The
coupon structures of all bonds are designed for a fair value of 1.020. The interest rate environment is estimated using the 1-factor-model of
Hull and White (1990), i.e. dr(t) = κ(θ(t)− r(t))dt+ σdW (t), with κ = 30%, σ as shown and θ being adjusted to the initial forward rates
of the respective scenario following the approach of Brigo and Mercurio (2006). For the valuation a Monte-Carlo simulation with 10,000
paths with a step size of t = 1/12 and least squares regression methods are applied. The estimation of the empirical value is based on a
reduced-form model that considers the observed exercise behavior of Individual Investors (see regression results in Table 4).
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Table 9: Scenario analyses – simulated exercise frequency in theoretical and empirical valu-
ation
Panel A Type A GFSN Type B GFSN
Optimal exercise Interest rate scenario Interest rate scenario
frequency in % Normal Steep Humped Flat Normal Steep Humped Flat
Volatility 1.0%
Flat 99.070 99.840 29.220 93.520 99.590 99.870 29.210 95.910
Concave 80.970 50.740 9.960 70.220 86.280 47.960 11.830 76.470
Linear 39.730 9.310 3.880 37.440 43.960 10.630 4.920 42.130
Convex 23.880 8.230 3.550 23.550 23.110 7.540 3.810 23.240
Strongly convex 16.480 4.390 2.750 17.190 16.650 4.340 3.150 17.900
Volatility 2.5%
Flat 95.290 97.070 68.680 91.770 97.110 97.440 71.180 94.170
Concave 89.070 79.740 57.600 86.130 92.570 80.700 62.040 89.780
Linear 78.360 52.480 46.390 78.400 82.220 55.050 52.260 82.590
Convex 70.370 44.300 41.060 72.820 70.560 42.580 44.330 74.440
Strongly convex 63.360 36.050 37.030 67.740 63.140 35.860 41.920 68.990
Volatility 4.0%
Flat 94.520 95.770 79.400 91.770 96.370 96.710 81.840 94.210
Concave 92.190 87.700 74.910 90.360 94.660 89.530 78.840 93.140
Linear 88.520 74.260 70.560 88.600 91.680 77.070 75.120 91.730
Convex 85.690 67.530 67.210 87.150 87.640 66.890 71.190 89.910
Strongly convex 82.690 59.610 64.540 85.610 84.350 59.890 68.870 88.580
Panel B
Modeled empirical Interest rate scenario Interest rate scenario
exercise frequency in % Normal Steep Humped Flat Normal Steep Humped Flat
Volatility 1.0%
Flat 25.150 16.800 17.820 27.120 31.430 32.220 20.950 30.800
Concave 16.930 7.230 11.890 20.760 25.610 20.000 16.400 25.550
Linear 11.180 2.730 8.030 14.530 18.100 9.580 12.530 20.340
Convex 9.480 2.020 8.330 13.310 11.670 4.540 9.630 14.040
Strongly convex 8.150 1.360 6.760 11.640 9.910 2.960 8.310 10.870
Volatility 2.5%
Flat 28.550 17.210 21.470 30.460 30.410 31.290 22.860 29.080
Concave 20.690 8.730 16.310 24.430 25.640 21.750 19.140 26.530
Linear 15.980 4.530 13.320 21.180 21.820 13.170 16.980 22.510
Convex 13.520 3.150 11.820 19.100 15.800 6.650 12.990 18.000
Strongly convex 11.840 2.130 11.430 16.710 12.490 4.640 11.190 15.560
Volatility 4.0%
Flat 32.300 18.760 25.700 36.540 28.470 30.380 23.570 27.530
Concave 27.480 11.320 21.350 33.050 27.110 23.310 21.190 27.530
Linear 22.100 6.200 17.690 29.960 23.940 15.470 19.070 25.320
Convex 20.750 4.430 16.880 29.820 20.190 8.830 16.850 24.150
Strongly convex 19.160 3.520 16.620 28.030 17.090 6.760 15.370 22.080
The table shows the simulated exercise frequency (percentage of exercised Monte-Carlo simulation paths) for exemplary Type A and Type
B GFSN with different coupon structures and in varying interest rate environments (see Figure 1 for the corresponding spot rate curves).
Panel A shows the results for the fair valuation approach, whereas Panel B shows the results for the estimated empirical value based on
a reduced-form model that refers to the estimated determinants of early exercising from Table 4. The coupon structures of all bonds
are designed for a fair value of 1.020. The interest rate environment is estimated using the 1-factor-model of Hull and White (1990), i.e.
dr(t) = κ(θ(t) − r(t))dt + σdW (t), with κ = 30%, σ as shown and θ being adjusted to the initial forward rates of the respective scenario
following the approach of Brigo and Mercurio (2006). For the valuation, we apply a Monte-Carlo simulation with 10,000 paths with a step
size of t = 1/12 and least squares regression methods.
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List of Symbols
α First parameter for beta distribution
β Second parameter for beta distribution
βi Parameters for the Nelson-Siegel function (Paper 3)
βˆ Empirically estimated parameters for reduced-form model
t Step width for Monte Carlo simulation
SR Difference of spot rate to coupon rate
  Decision strategy
 n Decision point
ω Proportion of passive investors

 Sample space
(
,F , Q) Probability space
F σ-algebra
κ Mean reversion speed
σ Short rate volatility
τ Strategy (pair of decision and exercise strategy)
τ Decay factor in Nelson-Siegel function (Paper 3)
θ Time dependent drift of short rate
B Standard beta distribution
C Coupon
CC Constant coupon payment for scenario bond
CF Fixed value for concave scenario bond
CL Linear multiplicator for scenario bond
CV Continuation value
CX Convexity degree for scenario bond
DC Decision costs
DT99 Dummy for change in German tax legislation 1999
DT99 Dummy for change in German tax legislation 2006
DY E Year-end dummy
EER Early exercise rate per month
EV Exercise value
p Cluster weight
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List of Symbols
p5 5th percentile
p95 95th percentile
PV Present value
Med. Median
N Number of observations
NV Nominal value
Q Equivalent spot martingale measure
r Short rate
R Spot rate
R2 Coefficient of determination
s Share of sluggish investors
Std.dev. Standard deviation
t Time index
T Maturity
TC Transaction costs
V Product value
W Standard Brownian motion
X Payoff
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Glossary
BLOCK Dummy, first month after blocking period
CDAX10+ Dummy, changes in CDAX > +10% points within a month
CDAX10- Dummy, changes in CDAX < -10% points within a month
CDAX25+ Dummy, changes in CDAX > +25% points within 6 months
CDAX25- Dummy, changes in CDAX < -25% points within 6 months
CFI Comparative fit index
COUPON Dummy, coupon payment upcoming within the next 60 days
EA Essentially affine interest term structure model
EXERCISED Dummy, signaling if investor has already early exercised before
GFSN German Federal Saving Notes
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung
HJM Heath, Jarrow, and Morton model
INVESTS Number of former personal investments
INVESTSUM Sum of overall investments in eso far
LAST6INV Number of all investors in the last six GFSN issuances of the
respective Type A or Type B
LAST6VOL Cumulated investment volume in the last six GFSN issuances of
the respective Type A or Type B
LIFETIME Lifetime since issuance in years
MAR Missing at random
MISSED6 Number of economically reasonable months (PVEV=1) within
the last 6 months
MISSEDALL Number of economically reasonable exercise months (PVEV=1)
since issuance
MSE Mean squared error
NEWMARKET Dummy, introduction of new stock market “New Market” in Ger-
many (January 1998 to December 2000)
PERFORMED Dummy flagging if investor has already early exercised when eco-
nomically reasonable (PVEV=1)
PVEV Ratio of present value to exercise value
Q1-Q4 Quarter
RELDUR Fisher-Weil duration of bond component in years
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Glossary
RMSEA Root mean square error of approximation
SRMR Standardized root mean square residual
TAX06 Dummy, change in tax legislation 2007 (November-December
2006)
U.K. United Kingdom
U.S. United States
UPSTEEP Average yearly growth of upcoming coupon structure (last coupon
minus current coupon divided by years to maturity)
VOLDAX 45-day option-implied volatility of DAX measured by VDAX
VOLINT Volatility of German 5-year spot rate estimated from weekly re-
turns over a 6-month window
YEAREND Dummy, end of the year (each December)
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